FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL
1949

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 27 APRIL 1949 No. 3

REGIONAL PACTS: STRONG POINTS OR STORM CELLARS?

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

THIRTY years have passed since "the great debate" over the League of Nations after one world war, and less than four since we hailed the United Nations as promising at least some compensation for the sacrifices of a second. Yet today we find ourselves facing again the question that seemed settled — whether the interests of the United States are as wide as the world or can be narrowed to particular areas? The debate has already begun, with men of good will ranged on both sides, precipitated by the announcement of a treaty for the mutual defense of the United States and certain countries of Western Europe.

This treaty, if adopted, may prove to be one of those great occasional acts which determine the whole course of a nation's foreign relations. There is every propriety, then, and indeed an overwhelming necessity, that it be examined with care, discussed at length, and acted upon with a full consciousness on the part of those concerned — namely, all the American people — of the special significance of each possible course of action regarding it.

The sponsors of the treaty evidently have both military and political aims in view, both heavy with psychological overtones. The question in the minds of some observers as to the precedence which should be given each will doubtless be a factor in the debate. Can any recommendation be made that might reconcile them? Another question is what effect the adoption of a regional security pact among the strongest western Powers will have on nations which are not included, and, more important still, on the universal security system of the United Nations. Finally, there is the question how these considerations affect the long-view interests of the United States, especially its paramount interest in establishing security and peace. I shall take the questions up in reverse order, beginning with the last and largest.

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II. NEUTRALITY VERSUS COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Any tendency to replace the general United Nations commitment to oppose aggression by a series of limited pacts for defense within arbitrary geographical boundaries can hardly fail to rehabilitate the ancient concept of neutrality which the Charter was supposed to have finally discredited. For while the signatories of the Charter understood that the Security Council procedure for deciding that an armed attack had occurred was subject to veto by any one of the five permanent members, the substantive obligation to help the victim was clearly set forth and was not the less binding morally for being stated in general terms.

In 1932, Mr. Stimson, then Secretary of State, argued that in accepting the Briand-Kellogg Pact renouncing aggressive war the 63 signatories had extended the concept of "a community spirit which can be evoked to prevent war" already accepted by the signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations. "Henceforth," he wrote, "when two nations engage in armed conflict either one or both of them must be wrongdoers — violators of the general treaty. We no longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the punctilios of the duelist's code. Instead we denounce them as lawbreakers. By that very act we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of reëxamining many of its codes and treatises." [1]

Fifteen years later, Mr. Stimson, having meanwhile directed our War Department in another world war, developed his thesis that the Briand-Kellogg Pact had not been "an isolated incident." He noted that repeated resolutions in the League of Nations and elsewhere had denounced aggression as "criminal," and that the question whether this term was accurate had come up specifically in connection with the proposal to try the men responsible for the recent war. Had there in fact been a war of aggression and, in that case, were those who ordered the aggression punishable? The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal held that the responsible leaders of Germany were subject to trial; and they were in fact tried and convicted. Appraising the Nuremberg judgment, Mr. Stimson wrote:

[1] Address before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, August 8, 1932 (*Foreign Affairs*, October 1932, sup.).

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What happened before World War II was that we lacked the courage to enforce the authoritative decision of the international world. We agreed with the Kellogg Pact that aggressive war must end. We renounced it, and we condemned those who might use it. But it was a moral condemnation only. We thus did not reach the second half of the question: What will you do to an aggressor when you catch him? If we *had* reached it, we should easily have found the right answer. But that answer escaped us, for it implied a duty to catch the criminal, and such a chase meant war. It was the Nazi confidence that we would never chase and catch them, and not a misunderstanding of our opinion of them, that led them to commit their crimes. Our offense was thus that of the man who passed by on the other side. That we have finally recognized our negligence and named the criminals for what they are is a piece of righteousness too long delayed by fear.[2]

The belief against which ex-Secretary Stimson argues is that neutrality is compatible with international justice and the realities of international security. He might have added that it is incompatible with the national interest of a World Power.

I remember asking Lord Bryce 25 years ago why England had come around in 1908 to a concept of the freedom of the seas which accorded broad rights to neutral shipping in time of war — a concept which, when war actually arrived only six years later, undermined the logic of British replies to protests against the naval blockade of Germany. Bryce, a man of lofty ideals as well as high intelligence, answered very simply: "We expected to be neutral."

Today in the atomic age there is less excuse to make that sort of mistake, but the credulity of isolationists in all lands dies hard. In England today we see a group of left-wing Laborites placing the same emphasis on expediency that Lord Bryce did, and neglecting in addition an issue in international morality which hardly existed in a day when idealists often thought the proper aim was to keep out of war rather than prevent it. The argument of this group of Labor extremists is that Britain should be neutral as between the United States and Soviet Russia. It is well expounded in *The New Statesman and Nation,* nearly every issue of which prints their fervent attempts to rationalize the view that Britain is equally in danger from American capitalism and Soviet Communism, that she should not enter into the question of which would be the more to blame if war should come, and that she would have no stake in the outcome.

All of us can recall somewhat similar phenomena on our side

[2] "The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law." *Foreign Affairs,* January 1947.

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of the Atlantic. In 1912–14 President Wilson launched the program of domestic reform known as the New Freedom; and understandably enough, on purely domestic counts, he hoped against hope that it would not be interrupted by any need to participate in the war which broke out in Europe in the second year of his Administration. Our social progress was in fact set back very seriously by our concentration of energies on winning that war and by the reaction which followed; and the ground lost was only made good — and then at far greater cost because belated — in the first years of the New Deal. But the challenge to the United States in 1914–16 on the world stage transcended the challenge in the field of social reform, important as that was. As the war progressed, Wilson saw that Germany's attack on Britain and France, her invasion of neutral Belgium and her campaign of frightfulness on land and sea constituted an attack on western civilization; and when Germany contemptuously wrote off our protests against the sinking of American ships on the high seas as simply more scraps of paper, he realized that if the assumption that necessity knows no law were not defeated there would not merely be no social reform in the United States but eventually, perhaps, no United States.

If Wilson was astigmatic in failing to see earlier that we would not be immune to the results of Germany's conquest of Europe, and hence must abandon the concept of neutrality in thought and deed, his political opponents in 1919 and 1920 made a more profound and less excusable mistake of the same sort. By then we had played a decisive part in winning a world war which we had tried by every means to avoid. Yet they imagined that we could retreat behind our two oceans, escape responsibility for the ensuing settlement and refuse any part in organizing a world security system.

The same illusion persisted 15 years later. In 1935-39 the American Congress made painstaking efforts to legislate the American Government into a position where it would *have* to remain neutral, whereas of course it should have been devising legislation which would warn the threatening aggressor that if war came the United States would *not* remain neutral.

Contemporary counterparts of the English leftists who take refuge in the hope of remaining aloof while the future of the world is being settled between Moscow and Washington are the American commentators who recently were advising that the

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United States take a neutral position between Britain and Russia in the Mediterranean and Middle East, specifically in connection with the British effort to help the Greek people and Government resist a Soviet-sponsored Communist revolution. The Truman Administration did not adopt the advice. It decided that (as permitted by international law) it would help the legally-elected Greek Government maintain itself; and it joined in the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations to try actively to prevent the fighting on the northern frontiers of Greece from developing into full-scale war by investigating it on the spot and baring the truth about it to the world.

Both the Englishmen who see no British stake in a contest between American democracy and Russian Communism, and the Americans who find some new reason each week to limit the interests of the United States to a particular area to suit a particular solution of some threatening situation, are deluding themselves. Even in the realm of theory, aggressive war is an international crime only if at best the whole of the civilized world community, and at least the majority of it, are willing to define it as such; and progress is made toward giving the definition concrete significance as they become ready to back up their profession of faith with, if need be, the force of their arms. Concretely, war in the Middle East between the Soviet Union and Britain as a result of a Soviet attack will involve us inevitably on the British side, not in defense of "British imperialism" but for the same reason that war in Alaska between the Soviet Union and the United States as a result of a Soviet attack will inevitably involve Britain on our side.

One thing certain is that if the greatest and most fortunately situated member of the civilized community holds back, the assertion that aggressive war is a crime falls to the ground, in theory and practice, reduced automatically to the level of the protestations of virtue without valor and good intentions without force which issued from Geneva in the thirties while the armies of aggression were openly gathering for the projected step-by-step conquest of the world.

The conclusion — so simple as to be banal, but not on that account less than everlastingly true — is that any nation, and above all a World Power, must in its own interest look at its long-range problems not with a hope of securing an isolated advantage here, a tactical success there, but with a view to estab-

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lishing more firmly in the world the principles of justice. For the course which strengthens the security of a world society based on freedom and peace will correspond in the long run to the highest interest of any free nation which is bent on retaining its freedom and hopes not to have to fight for it. But on what basis can the security of a free and peaceful world society be built if the strong are to be neutral in the face of wrong?

III. REGIONALISM VERSUS COLLECTIVE SECURITY

President Truman has told us that the proposed North Atlantic Pact (the text of which will doubtless have been published by the time this appears in print) is "a collective defense arrangement within the terms of the United Nations Charter;" and the State Department has said [3] that it finds its basis in Article 51 of the Charter, which permits U.N. members to join in measures of self-defense against armed attack in cases where the Security Council fails to act, and in Article 52, the first paragraph of which permits them to form regional arrangements "for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action," and the second and third paragraphs of which specifically describe those matters as "local disputes."

The reference to Article 52 limits rather than strengthens the authority supplied by Article 51. At San Francisco, Article 51 was deliberately placed in Chapter VII, entitled "Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," instead of in the following Chapter, entitled "Regional Arrangements." Since all the authorization needed to make a general treaty underwriting the defense and security provisions of the Charter is contained in Article 51, the additional invocation of Article 52 indicates our intention to increase our commitment to collective action on a regional basis but not at present to move to strengthen the United Nations procedure generally.

Now it should be recalled that nowhere in the United Nations Charter is any *geographical* limitation on the rights and duties of members imposed or implied. The only limitation is the one as to *method* which is contained in the right of veto granted the five permanent members of the Security Council.

The American people gave every sign of approving the universal nature of the United Nations commitment; and when

[3] *State Department Bulletin,* "Building the Peace," January 14, 1949.

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the Senate ratified the Charter by 89 votes to 2 the United States was taken to have legally come of age as a World Power. What were the duties of U.N. membership which seemed to justify that belief? One in particular, set forth in the very first article enumerating the organization's purposes — "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." And the second article bound members not only to "fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter," and not only to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means," and not only to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," but also to "give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter."

United Nations enthusiasts created some dangerous illusions by "overselling" the organization to the American public; it was not, as they hoped, a completely efficient instrument for enforcing the peace, and could never become that while the right of absolute veto existed. But by describing the United Nations as they would like it to be they did in a way accustom the American people to the grander conception and established a presumption that the United States was more unambiguously committed to preserving world peace than was actually the case. Later, as Soviet Russia resorted again and again to the veto, and particularly when she used it to exclude qualified new members from the organization, Americans acquired a dislike and contempt for the device in itself and began asking whether something could not be done to modify it or at least by-pass it. Why should the Soviets be permitted to thwart the world's dream of peace? Thus, somewhat ironically, Americans came progessively to accept the idea that the United Nations should be enabled to reach decisions more easily, even on questions involving the use of force, while its ability to reach decisions on anything was growing less and less. Unhappily, moreover, an increasing number of Americans arrived at the dangerous conclusion that before U.N. can become efficacious in any respect the Soviet Union must be forced out.

The fundamental damage done the United Nations by the veto has been that it stopped the Security Council dead in its

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tracks when it tried to create the very basis from which it *might* be able to act in time of crisis. The "everlasting no" of the Soviets prevented the creation of the enforcement machinery called for in the Charter and the designation of the military and other forces which would make possible that machinery's operation. It did this by paralyzing the Military Staff Committee, which was supposed to arrange what armed contingents or other facilities should be provided by members for the international police force. At the same time it increased world tension by blocking the Atomic Energy Commission, created in 1946 to work out a fair system of controlling the production of fissionable materials and atomic weapons. This paralysis of the Security Council in its two most important constructive functions has more than anything else caused the present sense of insecurity to spread through the world and raised the cry that a way must be found to break the stalemate and unlock the enforcement powers of the Charter.

This being so, should not the effort which we are now about to make to remedy the comparative defenselessness of Western Europe be thought of in connection with the need to remedy the weakness of the United Nations? It is in accordance with the Anglo-Saxon instinct, I know, to think first of the concrete step to meet a concrete problem and only afterwards to define the underlying logic which prompted it. But do we really need further evidence, after the calamitous chapters in our memory book bearing the names Manchuria, Ethiopia, Poland and Pearl Harbor — not to go back to Sarajevo — that a World Power has special reasons for understanding that an armed attack on any peaceful nation is an armed attack on every peaceful nation?

A World Power which was contemplating aggression might think it useful to limit geographically the right of all U.N. members to receive aid against aggression and the duty of all members to render it. But surely that is not in the interest of a World Power which is building and hoping for peace. Nor, indeed, would it be in the interest of such a Power in case it were called on to fight to uphold the principles of the United Nations. What American strategist before World War II would have thought of, say, Dakar or New Caledonia as vital military points in the American war effort? Who can name today, in the atomic age, the areas in which U.N. members would need facilities in order to defeat an aggressor? If the struggle for peace fails and

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war comes, those who are fighting the aggressor will want as many nations as possible to be at the very least not neutral.[4]

Now there is nothing wrong with the concept of regional arrangements to deal with local disputes, as authorized by Articles 52, 53 and 54 of the Charter, and indeed their advantages as adjuncts to a global security system are obvious. But these articles have to be very broadly interpreted indeed to make them cover disputes between nations in different regional groups, or between the groupings themselves. And when we do so, do we not risk raising all disputes straightway to intercontinental proportions? Further, it is almost impossible to define authentic "regions" as foundations of a comprehensive system. What focus of power is there in Africa or Southeast Asia or the Middle East? When we devise a region to fit one set of requirements it does not hold for another, and may be still less valid in the unforeseen circumstances of tomorrow. What — not approximately, but exactly, in the sense that this nation is in and that nation is not — do we mean by "West Europe?" What in this same exact sense is the "North Atlantic Community?" Or the "Mediterranean Community?" Or "Southeast Asia?" Begin segregating nations into groups — put Canada or Portugal or Italy or Greece or Austria or Iran "here" and not "there" — and the contradictions and dangers of the attempt become obvious. Is Portugal a Mediterranean nation, as has been suggested, though it faces the Atlantic and its island possessions are the key to the middle ocean? If France is interpreted for purposes of the Atlantic Pact as including the metropolitan area which lies across the Mediterranean in Africa and is named Algeria, what is left in logic or practice of the terms "Western Europe" and "North Atlantic"? Is Austria more (or less) West European than Italy, or Norway than Spain? Shall Greece and Turkey, whom we are helping, be partners in a Mediterranean bloc while we are not, or if we are to join it shall we also take a special interest in the other nations which might belong? The quandary in which one attempt at arbitrary allotment placed the Scandinavian countries is a warning against looking on the living international fabric as a paper map which can be cut up to suit the pagination of a book of geography written in accordance with some particular theory.

[4] Granted, of course, that internationally guaranteed neutrality is a permissible rôle for a certain sort of political entity, even though it did not save Danzig or Belgium last time. But neutrality is not compatible with membership in an organization which imposes certain obligations in the event of aggression.

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And what happens when regions overlap, when some nations are members of two or more groupings? We belong to the Pan American system — which, incidentally, does not include as important an American state as Canada. We are now to belong also to the North Atlantic Community — which (though including Canada) excludes Cuba on this side of the Atlantic and perhaps various maritime countries on the other. Eventually, if the system spreads, we might belong not only to the Mediterranean group but also to an East Asia group. Meanwhile, of course, the fact is that we shall already have become tied to the most remote of those areas, and not simply by our pledges under the U.N. Charter. Through the common membership of Britain and ourselves in the Atlantic Pact we shall have acquired a special link (whether defined or not) with Australia, New Zealand, Malaya and Ceylon and perhaps India and Pakistan; and similarly, via France and the Netherlands, with Indo-China and Indonesia. What responsibilities do members of a regional alliance have toward co-members whose colonial possessions become involved in a local war? Would even an explicit statement limiting such responsibilities prove to have meaning if the hostilities involving the interests of Great Powers? And what are the responsibilities of members toward co-members who belong to another regional alliance? For example, would Brazil, our Pan American partner, support us in case we had to go to the defense of France, our North Atlantic partner? Would she help us in case of war beginning in Berlin? Vice versa, what would be France's view of her commitment to us if we felt called on to go to the help of, say, Brazil? Still closer home, what would Canada do in that circumstance? The overlappings in a security system based on regions are evidently as troublesome as the gaps.

Even if we solve these difficulties, or ignore them, there remains what in the present atmosphere of crisis would seem a special reason to move very cautiously in establishing regional arrangements for purposes admittedly far transcending the settlement of "local disputes" specified in Article 52. At present the security provisions of the Charter exist merely on paper and in the consciences of the signatories. The weak can only hope that if they are attacked and resist, the stronger will feel impelled on the spur of the moment to implement their promises of help to the best of their abilities; but no preparations to do so have

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been made. This is already a disheartening situation for the smaller nations. If now some of them are left out of any regional arrangement, they not only fail to secure the reinsurance which it provides but they also will feel that their hope of assistance under the Charter, unsatisfactory as it was, has been further diminished. Some might think that they had no recourse but "neutrality." Essentially this is so unrealistic and hazardous a rôle that many would soon look for reinsurance elsewhere. Where? Almost inevitably from the very potential aggressor against whom they would have hoped for assistance under the Charter in case of need.

Thus there seems to be a real danger, which we should take steps to avoid, that nations which are included in a regional scheme will tend to feel that it sets the practical limits of their obligations; and that those not included will drift gradually into another camp. The ranks of the peace-loving nations would thus be divided, and the organization in which they had agreed to pool their joint efforts to maintain world security would lose even the pretense of power.

IV. THE JOINT POLITICO-MILITARY OBJECTIVE

Is there a way to gain the advantages aimed at in the Atlantic Pact and avoid the disadvantages of attempting to solve the problem of world security by dividing it regionally? May it even be possible to multiply the advantages? A twofold approach to the security problem, one political and general and continuing, one military and limited and temporary, might supply affirmative answers to both questions.

The political approach would be based on the principle that peace is indivisible and that security and peace are inseparable. One simple way of proceeding would be to prepare a special Protocol which would renew the pledge already given by U.N. members to use the procedure laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the procedure in Chapter VII for dealing with acts of aggression; but which would supplement the Charter by providing that if the peaceful procedure fails and aggression occurs the signatories will not take a veto in the Security Council as final but will themselves attempt to live up to the purposes of the Charter and restrain the aggressor by force. A voluntary agreement of this sort, which would be open to all members of the United Nations, is fully

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permissible within the letter and spirit of the Charter; for it would commit the signatory nations to nothing substantive to which the Charter does not already commit them, and it would commit them procedurally merely to doing as a group in certain cases what they had said they intended doing unanimously in all cases.

The Protocol could be made to conform to the constitutional and other legal requirements of the various signatories, for the method by which they were to decide to bring it into operation could offer adequate provision for deliberation and consultation. For example, it might provide that if an attack on a U.N. member took place and a stalemate occurred in the Security Council, any one of the Great Power signatories to the Protocol would be authorized to canvass the other signatories in order to see whether they were prepared to take action, and if two-thirds replied in the affirmative then all would be called on to make available the specified military contingents or other facilities for the necessary police action. This has the advantage of requiring no elaborate machinery and probably would produce quite realistic results. Alternatively, the Protocol might make the General Assembly or the Little Assembly responsible for deciding by a two-thirds vote whether or not the agreed action was to be begun. Or perhaps a specified vote in favor of action in the Security Council might bring the Protocol into effect. Throughout any one of these processes, of course, the influence of the United States would, as a practical matter, be fully felt.[5] If it wished to hold back from action because it did not consider that the aggression was unmistakable or because it did not feel that the peaceful procedure had been exhausted, there would be little possibility that any majority could be mustered for action.

In our own case, Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution reserves to Congress the exclusive power to declare war, and no Congress can legally bind its successors. We cannot too soon establish, however, the principle that every Congress shall act against recognized aggression. Precedents show that Congressional policy often develops as a result of a lead by the President. The Monroe Doctrine began as an exclusively Executive pronouncement; yet today the Congress would unhesitatingly declare war to uphold it (though constitutionally free not to do

[5] For other aspects of the program, including possible effects on Soviet policy, see the present writer's articles in *The New York Times Magazine*, Sunday, August 1, 1948; *Foreign Affairs*, October 1948; *Look*, January 3, 1949.

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so), and it is the knowledge of this, of course, which gives the Doctrine its true sanction. Until the same can be said of our obligation to resist aggression the Senate's ratification of the United Nations Charter fails in certain measure to carry the necessary meaning.

Actually, the Senate has already moved toward recognizing this need by the admission that some latitude must be allowed the Executive if the United States is ever to participate in an effective program to discourage international aggression. It made this move when it accepted membership in the United Nations.

The Charter authorizes the Security Council to take military action against an aggressor, and confers on the Military Staff Committee the duty of arranging the contingents which member nations (the United States, of course, included) shall provide in advance for this purpose. The bill enabling the United States to participate in the United Nations (presented to the Senate by Senator Connally on November 8, 1945, and passed December 4 by 65 to 7 votes) authorized the President to negotiate special agreements with the Security Council "providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and assistance, including rights of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with Article 43 of said Charter." It further stated that these agreements "shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution," *i.e.* by a mere majority vote and not by the two-thirds required for the ratification of treaties. Furthermore, although a decision of the Security Council that the military forces assigned to it shall be used in a given case is subject to the veto, and though this veto can of course be exercised by the American representative, he is under the orders not of the Senate but of the President.

Thus the Senate has already set fairly broad limits for what the Executive may do in order to deal with aggression under the Charter. If none of the procedures outlined above for bringing the suggested Protocol into operation seems to fall within those limits, certainly one which does can easily be found.

A reaffirmation of the most fundamental duty of U.N. membership coupled with the adoption of a procedure by which it might more easily be performed would constitute the political

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part of the contemplated twofold approach to the security problem. The larger the number of U.N. members participating in it, the better; and the duration of their voluntary agreement should be limited only by the possibility that at some future time the United Nations might find itself able, as a result of unforeseen changes in the nature and policy of certain states, to strengthen its own enforcement procedure to the point where any supplementary agreement among a group of members became superfluous.

The military part of the contemplated program would be along the lines indicated in the Charter. Its basis, as under the Charter, would be an agreement among those Powers best able to carry the terms of the political agreement into effect. They would agree on the means needed for effective enforcement action and on the contribution which each was to hold itself in readiness to make. The more effective their preparations, the less the likelihood that they would be called on to use them on their own behalf; equally important, the greater would be their ability to give prompt and affective aid to co-signatories of the Protocol which might not have been able to participate actively in the group preparations for self-defense.

All this, it will at once be noticed, closely resembles what will be done under the proposed North Atlantic Pact when a number of powerful U.N. members join for self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. The European participants in the Pact will be nations which are in a position to coöperate closely with the United States in the event of attack (thus fulfilling the requirement of the Vandenberg Resolution that our help to other nations shall increase the security of the United States); and it will be to them that the United States will first allot whatever military lend-lease it can afford. The President will presumably submit the lend-lease agreements with the Atlantic Pact countries to Congress in order to obtain its approval and the necessary appropriations. Thus the immediately necessary military part of the two-fold program will be fulfilled. But, as I have said above, we should not think that our political interests had simultaneously received adequate attention.

Evidently there is much more than a technical difference, moreover, between an Atlantic Pact which is an isolated measure of group self-defense and an Atlantic Pact which is coupled with an agreement among its signatories reaffirming the responsibility

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of every United Nations member for the safety and defense of all members and creating a more flexible procedure for deciding on collective action in particular instances. A vast difference in American mood and intentions is indicated, which will not be lost either on nations not included in the Atlantic Pact or on nations tempted now or later to commit aggression.

If the Atlantic Pact is to stand for the present as an isolated measure there is particular need that it state categorically, either in the preamble or the text, that it does not modify in any respect the obligations of its signatories under the United Nations Charter and that it is not a limitation of policy to a few U.N. members but a specific reënforcement of a general policy which applies to all members.

A step that might be taken at once to forestall fears (or in some quarters hopes) that the United States is reverting to any form of isolationism, even on a hemispheric or oceanic scale, would be for the President to make a solemn statement affirming our broad purpose, within the limit of our capabilities, to help any member of the United Nations which is the object of armed attack. He might do this when the Atlantic Pact is signed or ratified; or he might choose some occasion when the whole world will be listening, for example when he lays the cornerstone of the United Nations permanent headquarters in New York. He thus would expand the special and limited meaning of the "Truman Doctrine," raise it from a negative to a positive policy, and thereby link it to the general purposes of the United Nations. He would have left the way open, too, for possible later action, as through the suggested Protocol, to strengthen the enforcement procedure of the United Nations. In any event, the new Truman Doctrine could be implemented later, if Congress saw fit, by a joint declaration. Or time and necessity might give it the same Congressional sanction without Congressional action that they have given the Monroe Doctrine. Meanwhile, Senators would have no cause for worry lest it placed responsibilities on us which we could not fulfill or might not consider it proper to fulfill in areas where the political situation was so fluid or turbulence was so endemic that intervention seemed fruitless, or when we did not feel that the alleged act of aggression was unmistakable. For the declaration would be unilateral, and we would fulfill its intentions as our capabilities permitted and our conscience dictated.

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Other methods can be suggested, doubtless, to achieve what we have in view in Europe and simultaneously to emphasize that it is only a part of the general program of establishing world security and peace to which we remain committed. The question is whether Americans care enough about the goal to risk adopting any one of the methods. They must be reminded that the United Nations is not an abstraction but an operating organization which is only as strong as its strongest members, and that in present circumstances this means, realistically, that it will be as strong as the American people say that they will be. If they revert to the idea that foreign wars are "somebody else's fault" and "somebody else's business," the security provisions of the Charter will be writ in water and will become as inconsequential in practice as the words of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

Is this the desire of the American people, for all their disappointments with a veto-ridden United Nations? I do not believe it, but rather that under bold leadership they will consent to use their sovereignty, in Wendell Willkie's phrase, instead of hoarding it. The task is to convince them that there is less safety to be found in the pre-United Nations concept that sovereignty is a hard protective shell which must be kept intact at all costs than in the belief animating the Charter that it is a source of dynamic power which nations can draw on to serve their national interests by conscious acts of foresight.

Mankind will of course never reach a perfect equilibrium. We are forever climbing up the ever-climbing wave. Relations between men and the relationship of men to their environment change, and there is no final solution to the problems which those changes produce. The struggle for happiness, prosperity, justice, security and peace goes on, under new conditions and in new forms. Sometimes in this struggle right confronts right. No organization of nations can make sure that in such a dilemma each will get his due, or even insure absolutely that when right confronts wrong right will win. But it can set as a standard of civilized behavior that when an international conflict threatens, whatever the apparent rights and wrongs, neither side shall resort to force to gain its way but shall be constrained to follow a prescribed procedure of peaceful settlement which will among other things give the public opinion of the world a chance to inform itself, express itself and, if need be, prepare for action. The United Nations established this as its guiding principle and

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made nonobservance of it the test by which it would mark a nation as an aggressor. Under the Charter, even a member which is right becomes wrong if it resorts to force other than in self-defense; and to that wrong no other member can be neutral.

This was the line of conduct on which the world took its stand in 1945. If regional pacts are to be strong points along that front line, they contribute to the abilities of U.N. members to carry out their duties under the Charter. If they are to be storm cellars in the rear where the strongest take refuge, leaving many of the weak in advanced and untenable positions, then they are a signal of a general retreat. Which they are to be will be seen soon in the general setting given the Atlantic Pact.

V. AN AMERICAN DOCTRINE

In summary, this might be an agenda for our policy makers:

1. Help establish economic, social and political stability in foreign countries, to the extent of our capacities; so that their people may choose their form of government freely and will feel able to exercise that freedom to reject dictatorship; and so that their governments may be able and anxious to resist the spread of totalitarian ideologies and defeat the operations of fifth columns.

This, of course, is the objective of the Marshall Plan. President Truman's "bold new program" for the improvement of undeveloped areas aims to supplement it.

2. Give political support to constitutional and independent governments which are ready and willing to fulfill their duties as United Nations members, and increase their confidence that joint measures of assistance can be taken on behalf of those of them that need it; so that, if war should come, they will choose to fight in fulfillment of their duties and for the defense of their countries, as brave people have fought before, even against odds which may at first be overwhelming, in hope of ultimate victory and survival in a society of free nations.

The foregoing would be the aim of a general Protocol, open to all United Nations members, reaffirming the Charter obligation of members to assist each other against aggression and making it easier for those that decide they will do so to do it effectively.

3. Give military help in the form of military lend-lease or otherwise to specific countries which will thereby be better

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enabled to defend themselves against aggression, direct or through fifth columns; selecting for this help (with proper regard, of course, for our own needs and capacities) those countries which could coöperate most closely with us in the event that they became involved in a war against aggression, thus increasing our own safety by decreasing the likelihood of war and, should war come, by increasing the likelihood of victory.

The foregoing would be the objective of the North Atlantic Pact for mutual defense and of our program of continued help to countries like Greece and Turkey.

4. Sum up and bring to new life our purpose in undertaking these immense and costly efforts on behalf of stability, security, justice and peace in a comprehensive statement of policy by the President of the United States — a statement which would take cognizance of the dangers in which we live and of the responsibilities which our resources, talents and traditions put on our shoulders; which would be calculated to persuade our people to choose the lesser risk of playing their rôle in the world fully, bravely and with foresight rather than the greater risk of evading it by delay, indecision or retreat; and which would rally as many members of the civilized world community as possible to join us in safeguarding our common inheritance and convince them that together we need not fail.

This unified policy would muster our full weight behind the purposes and principles which became ours when we joined the United Nations, unlock the Charter's power to enforce security and maintain peace, and carry a new American Doctrine to greatness.

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CANADA AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

By Lester B. Pearson

IN an address on the foundations of Canadian foreign policy at the University of Toronto in January 1947, the Right Honorable Louis St. Laurent, now the Prime Minister of Canada, made the following statement concerning the attitude of Canadians to their foreign policy: "If there is one conclusion that our common experience has led us to accept, it is that security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international organization." At that time Mr. St. Laurent was Secretary of State for External Affairs. Anyone who holds this office, and indeed any serious-minded student of foreign affairs in Canada, must concur in his judgment, for it is based upon considerations in the political and economic life of Canada which make it almost axiomatic.

On many occasions members of the Canadian Government have expressed the hope that the United Nations would work out quickly and in detail procedures by which peace could be maintained through collective action. There was disappointment in Canada when differences amongst the Great Powers delayed this development, but the Canadian Government continued to be anxious that the United Nations should proceed with its main task. At the opening of the General Assembly in September 1946, for example, the leader of the Canadian Delegation said:

> Canada therefore urges that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee go ahead with all possible speed in the constructive work of negotiating the special agreements and of organizing the military and economic measures of enforcement. It appears to us that it would be in the interest of all members of the United Nations to see the Security Council equipped and ready in fact to enforce proper decisions for the maintenance of world peace and also to see serious consideration given to the reduction of national armaments so that the productive capacity of the world thus conserved may be used for improving the living conditions of all peoples.

In early 1947 there was still reason to hope that the idea of universal collective security, so important in the minds of Canadians, might be realized before long, and on a basis more secure than had been the case when the experiment had previously been made in the League of Nations. Today the principle

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to which Mr. St. Laurent gave expression remains constant in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy; but evidence during the past two years has led to the sober realization that collective security of this kind will be more difficult to achieve than had been expected.

Even as the Charter was being signed, the evidences of disunity within the membership of the United Nations were present. This disunity has now led us to the point where we must frankly and honestly admit that our hope of gaining security through the United Nations, although we do not abandon that hope, is not one which will soon be realized. We have been led to this conclusion partly through developments within the United Nations itself and partly because of the menacing state of affairs which has developed in the world, and which the United Nations is clearly not capable of meeting in its present condition. Merely to name some of the principal issues before the United Nations which remain deadlocked shows at a glance the extent of the danger: how to control atomic energy; how to establish military forces under international control; how to secure Greece against attacks from her northern neighbors; how to establish a rational plan for disarmament. All these involved questions not only threaten peace but lead to gnawing fear and insecurity, particularly among the less powerful members of the United Nations.

Nor is the situation more encouraging in the Security Council. On issues which divide the Great Powers, it is frequently impossible to take decisions because of the operation of the veto. On the other hand, the permanent members of the Security Council may, if no one of them dissents from a proposed course of action, move the Security Council to swift and radical action in matters which affect the interests of smaller Powers. A contrast between the handling of the Balkan question and the Indonesian question gives a good example of the difficulties which face a Power of middle rank in endeavoring to work out a consistent policy in relation to the Security Council. Greece's northern neighbors, because they enjoy the protection of a powerful sponsor, cannot be touched by the action of the Security Council. The Dutch, on the other hand, whose friends amongst the permanent members of the Security Council are more conscientious about the way in which they use their voting privilege, find themselves in a much more exposed position during the discussions of the Indonesian question. Similarly, the difference in

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attitude amongst the Great Powers towards truce resolutions, depending on the part of the world to which these resolutions apply, has been a cause of serious misgiving to less influential members of the Council. In the meantime, these members, these smaller states, find themselves in the presence of an aggressive political theory, Communism, supported by all the resources of a powerful totalitarian and militaristic state.

The expansion of Communism cannot be regarded merely as the natural emergence of a particular political ideology in certain European countries. It has come to mean the concentration by the U.S.S.R. of power so great, and exerted in so unscrupulous a manner, that, in states which border upon the Soviet Union, Communism can be imposed upon the people in defiance of their real desires. Further, this power is now centered in a nation which, in almost every organ of the United Nations, has made it clear that it will have its own way or no way at all. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. thinks of its security only in terms of the armed forces it can itself muster, the territory it can control or influence, and the confusion of purpose it can engender among those who oppose its policies. Any security that might be offered by the United Nations to the U.S.S.R. on top of this will be welcome, but will not occasion any abandonment of the original Soviet attitude or any move towards accommodation with other viewpoints.

The Canadian Government has not been alone in its concern and misgiving over these disquieting developments. The first concrete result of the western world's growing sense that its way of life was threatened was the conclusion of the Brussels Pact in March of last year. In Canada it was observed with particular interest that the pledge given by the Brussels Powers went beyond the conventional exchange of military guarantees. Starting with the promise of mutual support in event of an armed attack, the signatories to the Brussels Pact agreed also to take steps in order to create and perfect a coördinated defense organization and coöperate in social and economic fields for their common good, and in order that they might not through weakness or disunity seem to offer an easy prey for an aggressor. Commenting on this characteristic of the Brussels Treaty, Mr. Mackenzie King, who was then Prime Minister of Canada, said that it was "far more than an alliance of the old kind." He went on to make the following comments on the agreement for

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Western Union: "It is a partial realization of the idea of collective security by an arrangement made under the Charter of the United Nations. It is a step towards peace which may well be followed by other similar steps, until there is built up an association of all free states which are willing to accept responsibilities of mutual assistance to prevent aggression and preserve peace."

A discussion in the Congress of the United States, which took place during the same period, led to the adoption of the Vandenberg Resolution which was part of the same pattern of development. Public interest and approval shown for the Brussels Pact and the Vandenberg Resolution made it clear that in the western world a movement had grown, both in governments and among peoples, for greater unity in the face of danger. This development in Western Europe and the United States had its counterpart in Canada. Throughout 1947 and 1948 many discussions took place, in Parliament and in the press, concerning the attitude which Canada should adopt towards the dangers that beset the western world.

From all these discussions, both in Canada and elsewhere, there emerged the proposal for an association amongst the nations of the North Atlantic community. The growth of this idea has been a good example of the way in which in democratic communities political leadership finds its best expression. Public concern over the failure in the postwar world to achieve security was general. So also was the conviction that peace and freedom can be secured only if those who love both peace and freedom pool their resources and stand together. These general ideas were interpreted and given precise form by the governments which represented the peoples of the western democracies. They were also made concrete in the negotiations for the North Atlantic Pact, which were undertaken in Washington during the latter part of 1948.

The negotiations themselves have been an equally good demonstration of the way in which foreign affairs are conducted in democratic countries. The exploratory and noncommittal meetings in Washington, in which the terms of the treaty have been worked out, have been secret. The participants in the preliminary discussions and the governments which instructed them have been free from day-to-day public comment on the details of the negotiation. For this reason, the process of mutual accommodation by which the most generally satisfactory result possible

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could be reached has gone forward without the pressures which invariably arise when the early stages of international negotiations are conducted in public. Honest differences of opinion, when they occurred in the afternoon, did not become sensational world headlines in the six o'clock editions. There is nothing more difficult for a democratic government to abandon than a headline. The negotiators and their governments were spared this difficulty. At the same time, however, the general purpose and tenor of the discussions have been well known to the public, and each of the participating governments has been able to test public opinion in its own country as the agreement was being formulated. As a final check on its judgment concerning the wishes of its people, each government will take the treaty before its own legislature for searching debate and final decision. In many respects the preparation of the North Atlantic Alliance has embodied an admirable combination of confidential diplomacy of the conventional style with free and open discussion of the general principles under consideration. It will be an open covenant, privately negotiated, publicly debated and decided.

Even before the precise terms of the North Atlantic Treaty have been revealed, its general characteristics have been made apparent to the public. It has been possible, therefore, for Canadians to estimate the extent to which the proposed treaty will fit within the general framework of Canadian foreign policy. For this reason, the support which Canada has given to the proposal for a North Atlantic Alliance has been increased and strengthened by the general conviction that it is in no way inconsistent with any other commitment or with the general aims and purposes of Canadian foreign policy.

The North Atlantic collective system, in the first place, will form part of a structure for the preservation of peace, and will therefore be in keeping with the aims and purposes of the United Nations. In engaging in such a pact, the member states will base their action on the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" recognized in Article 51. In accordance with the other provision of that Article, they will not enter into engagements which would "in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." Measures taken by

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nations which sign the Pact will be reported to the Security Council and, when the Council is prepared to assume its full responsibilities as the universal guardian of security, then the arrangements embodied in the North Atlantic Pact will no longer be needed.

The proposed North Atlantic Alliance may prove to be an important step in the development of a chain of collective security pacts which will girdle the globe and underwrite the universal security aims of the United Nations. It will overlap but will not duplicate the Brussels Pact. One of its members, the United States, will also be a member of the Inter-American System. Two of its proposed members, Canada and the United Kingdom, belong to the British Commonwealth, which, although not bound by formal commitments, has nevertheless proved in the past half-century to be, in effect, one of the most successful systems for collective defense and coöperative action the world has yet seen, when there is a threat to world security as great as that embodied in the German aggressions of 1914 and 1939. The United Kingdom has special international responsibilities which, although they are not assumed by all members of the Commonwealth, are nevertheless of importance to them. The defense of its colonial territories and its agreements with other nations outside the Commonwealth on matters of defense involve the United Kingdom in a security system which is spread over a large part of the world and which will be a factor in the development of security on a universal basis. In the Pacific, two members of the Commonwealth, Australia and New Zealand, have entered into their own defense understanding. They have, therefore, a regional security system of their own as well as their association with the Commonwealth and their general commitment under the Charter of the United Nations.

Amongst these groupings, the North Atlantic community effectively meets the needs of Canadian foreign policy. In contrast with the Pan American Union, for example, it reflects political, economic and cultural interests which in the history of Canada have been of importance in the growth of its freedom and security. These interests also are more generally shared by other members of the Commonwealth of Nations, in which Canada is determined to maintain her membership. The North Atlantic grouping, moreover, is the association which most directly corresponds to the need which Canada has for increased

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security, because Canadians, perhaps more than any other people in the Americas, consider that the safety of their country is bound up with that of Western Europe.

All these plans should be viewed as part of a general pattern for world security, which can be progressively developed within the framework of the United Nations. The unity of this system might well be strengthened at once by as simple a device as a provision that each association should each year make a report on its activities to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The growth of regional security groups of this kind, coöperating closely together, calls to mind developments of an earlier age, when nations began to form out of provinces and states, as pressures from below and from outside seemed to make such a development necessary. It may be that an effective international organization to keep the peace on a universal or almost universal basis will in this way emerge out of regional associations in which, at the present stage, states can work together for security and progress more responsibly than they can in a larger looser body.

Whether the ultimate objective of an effective world organization is achieved in this or in some other way, there is no reason why the formation of a North Atlantic union now should hinder or defeat our efforts, in spite of all obstacles, to make our present United Nations work as effectively as possible. This regional Pact — all regional Pacts — should supplement, not replace, the Charter of the United Nations.

All the efforts at universal security which have been made up to now will be continued. The Assembly will explore issues and try to reconcile contending views. The various functional agencies, working in every sphere of international life, will continue to build from the groundwork of coöperation in day-to-day matters a structure of international administration. The Security Council will continue to be the main instrument for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The United Nations will lose no time in making use, for the good of mankind, of any improvement that may come in relations between the U.S.S.R. and the western world. Meanwhile, it offers the means by which any desire for an improvement in these relations can be put into effect immediately, and with a minimum of formality.

Finally, the proposal for a North Atlantic agreement should fulfill the desire of the Canadian people to make some positive contribution to the maintenance of peace. It is not enough

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merely to arm ourselves against danger, or to proclaim our abhorrence of totalitarian and reactionary Communism. We must also make sure that the North Atlantic Pact does not ever in any circumstances become merely a screen for narrow suspicions and fears or an instrument of unimaginative militarism. The hopes which Canadians have that this association of states will in the long run serve the best and fullest purpose of mankind were clearly stated by Mr. St. Laurent in an address in September last:

> Now a collective arrangement of this kind has positive as well as negative values. It can make for prosperity as well as security. It has in it the ultimate hope — and the possibility — of establishing freedom, order and welfare over a wide area. Under present conditions that seems to be our best formula for peace; the concentration of an overwhelming superiority of moral, economic and physical force on the side of those who do not wish to use force, but are resolved to do so together if the necessity is forced on them. If we can bring this about, it may then come to pass that the forces of aggression, respecting our power for war and convinced of our will for peace, will abandon their mad designs, dismiss their unjustified suspicions, and begin to coöperate with others without requiring that they become mere satellites. Any political association on other than a universal basis in this shrinking world cannot be an end in itself, but only a means to an end. The end is that set out in the Charter we have all signed, the erection of a structure of international coöperation and understanding, in which all men of every creed and race and color may exist together in peace and prosperity.

These are high aims. They are also a guarantee that we shall not fall into the old error of thinking that intricate alliances and military schedules are a lasting guarantee of peace or that they constitute the proper means to attempt a rapprochement between hostile Powers.

In all its important characteristics, therefore, the proposed North Atlantic Treaty is consistent with the principal aims of Canadian foreign policy as they have been formulated over the past generation. In one respect, however, the Alliance will be for Canada, as for the United States, a new and revolutionary departure. Up to the present the Canadian Government has, in time of peace, never recommended to Parliament that Canada undertake the precise and formal commitments of an Alliance such as the one proposed.

The Canadian people are perhaps better prepared for this new stage in the development of their foreign policy than the people of the United States, because of Canada's participation in the work of international organizations between 1919 and 1939. For Canadians, too, the vulnerability of the North Ameri-

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can continent to the shock of political earthquakes in other parts of the world has been more apparent, because of the fact that they were immediately involved in the wars of 1914 and 1939.

Since the outbreak of the last war, the rôle of the North American continent in world affairs has increased so greatly, and the dangers of disunity have become so generally recognized, that Canada is now prepared to accept the new aspect which the North Atlantic Treaty will give to the conduct of her external relations. The people of Canada will, when the time comes, take this decision deliberately and in full knowledge of what it means. Once they have taken it, they will be prepared to accept their share of the responsibility in the new alliance, though within the measure of their resources, and as part of plans agreed upon by all and according to which each member of the group assumes the tasks for which it is best qualified. In this way they can make an effective contribution to building and maintaining the peaceful world they so greatly desire.

The North Atlantic Alliance will not only be a pooling of resources, but it will also provide means for the collective working out of plans which are acceptable to all its members. For this purpose, it will be necessary to establish effective agencies on behalf of the states which have signed the agreement. Through these agencies, they all can take part in determining how the resources which have been built up in common can be used for their mutual benefit and protection. This is one of the conditions which will make it possible for a country of the size and strength of Canada to participate fully and freely in the agreement, for it gives to Canadians the assurance not only that they will share the obligations of the group, but also that they will share the responsibility for determining how these obligations shall be met. On no other basis could Canada — or indeed any other self-respecting nation — sign the Pact.

The North Atlantic Pact is designed solely to secure peace and promote progress. The first objective — peace — seems infinitely and immediately desirable as threats to that peace appear. Security, as it has been said, is the ideal of the insecure; and at present we are all insecure. We seek to put force behind peace and freedom now, so that later they can be maintained without force. Until that later time is reached, however, we must be on our guard against developments which may suggest that we can now lower our guard. The real test of our Atlantic Alliance will

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come if and when the threat to peace seems to recede and we are allowed to see that silver lining which the Iron Curtain is said to possess.

In the past, alliances and leagues have nearly always been formed to meet emergencies and have dissolved as the emergencies vanished. It must not be so this time. Our Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and deeper roots. It must build up habits and desires for coöperation which go beyond the immediate emergency. By ministering to the welfare of the peoples of its member states, it must create those conditions and desires for united effort which make formal pacts unnecessary. Threats to peace may bring our union into being. Its contribution to welfare and progress will determine how long it is to survive.

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THE ILLUSION OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

By Reinhold Niebuhr

THE trustful acceptance of false solutions for our perplexing problems adds a touch of pathos to the tragedy of our age.

The tragic character of our age is revealed in the world-wide insecurity which is the fate of modern man. Technical achievements, which a previous generation had believed capable of solving every ill to which the human flesh is heir, have created, or at least accentuated, our insecurity. For the growth of technics has given the perennial problems of our common life a more complex form and a scope that has grown to be world-wide.

Our problem is that technics have established a rudimentary world community but have not integrated it organically, morally or politically. They have created a community of mutual dependence, but not one of mutual trust and respect. Without this higher integration, advancing technics tend to sharpen economic rivalries within a general framework of economic interdependence; they change the ocean barriers of yesterday into the battlegrounds of today; and they increase the deadly efficacy of the instruments of war so that vicious circles of mutual fear may end in atomic conflicts and mutual destruction. To these perplexities an ideological conflict has been added, which divides the world into hostile camps.

It is both necessary and laudable that men of good will should, in this situation, seek to strengthen every moral and political force which might give a rudimentary world community a higher degree of integration. It was probably inevitable that the desperate plight of our age should persuade some well meaning men that the gap between a technically integrated and politically divided community could be closed by the simple expedient of establishing a world government through the fiat of the human will and creating world community by the fiat of world government. It is this hope which adds a touch of pathos to already tragic experiences. The hope not only beguiles some men from urgent moral and political responsibilities. It tempts others into irresponsible criticisms of the necessarily minimal constitutional structure which we have embodied in the United

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Nations and which is as bad as its critics aver only if a better one is within the realm of possibilities.

Virtually all arguments for world government rest upon the simple presupposition that the desirability of world order proves the attainability of world government. Our precarious situation is unfortunately no proof, either of the moral ability of mankind to create a world government by an act of the will, nor of the political ability of such a government to integrate a world community in advance of a more gradual growth of the "social tissue" which every community requires more than government.

Most advocates of world government also assume that nations need merely follow the alleged example of the individuals of another age who are supposed to have achieved community by codifying their agreements into law and by providing an agency of some kind for law enforcement. This assumption ignores the historic fact that the mutual respect for each other's rights in particular communities is older than any code of law; and that machinery for the enforcement of law can be efficacious only when a community as a whole obeys its laws implicitly, so that coercive enforcement may be limited to a recalcitrant minority.

The fallacy of world government can be stated in two simple propositions. The first is that governments are not created by fiat (though sometimes they can be imposed by tyranny). The second is that governments have only limited efficacy in integrating a community.

II

The advocates of world government talk of calling a world constitutional convention which would set up the machinery of a global constitutional order and would then call upon the nations to abrogate or abridge their sovereignty in order that this newly created universal sovereignty could have unchallenged sway. No such explicit abnegation has ever taken place in the history of the world. Explicit governmental authority has developed historically from the implicit authority of patriarchal or matriarchal tribal forms. Governments, so established, have extended their dominion over weaker neighbors. But the abridgment of sovereignty has always been indirect rather than direct; or it has been attained by the superimposition of power.

The notion that world government is a fairly simple possibility is the final and most absurd form of the "social contract" concep-

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tion of government which has confused modern political thought since Hobbes. It must certainly be obvious by this time that the conception of a state of nature in which all men were at war with all, and of a subsequent social contract through which men established a power over themselves to avoid mutual annihilation, is a pure fiction. A small human community is as primordial as the individual. No group of individuals has ever created either government or community out of whole cloth. One reason why the social contract conception of government has a particular plausibility with us is because the United States came closer to a birth by "contract" than any other nation. But the preamble of our constitution declares that its purpose is to establish a "more perfect union." That is a very telling phrase which presupposes a previous union. This previous union was in fact established on the battlefield in a common struggle against a common foe; it needed only to be made "more perfect." It may be observed in passing that, though the 13 colonies had never enjoyed sovereignty, they did not find it too easy to submit what had only been potential, and not actual, sovereignty to the authority of the federal union. We fought a civil war before it was proved that they had in fact done this without reservations.

When the question is raised whether the nations of the world would voluntarily first create, and then submit to, a super-national authority, the possible reluctance of nations, other than Russia, to take this step is fortunately or unfortunately obscured by the Russian intransigeance. The Russians have declared again and again that they would leave the United Nations if the veto power were abolished. This means that Russia, as a prospective minority in a world community, is not ready to submit her fate to the will of a majority, even in such a loose organization as the United Nations. It is therefore obvious that she would be even more unwilling to submit her sovereignty to a more highly integrated constitutional order.

The proponents of world government have two answers to the problem posed by Russian intransigeance. One is to assert that the Russians never have had the chance to accept or reject a genuinely constitutional world order; and that there are real possibilities of her acceptance of a constitution which is not weighted against her. This answer contains in a nutshell the rationalist illusion implicit in world government theories. It assumes that constitutions can insure the mutual trust upon which

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community rests. Actually, even the best constitution must, if it is democratic, set up some kind of majority rule. It is not workable if there is not enough common ground between majority and minority to assure that a majority will not take advantage of a minority, or that the minority will not suspect the majority of injustice, even though without cause. There are republics in South America with quite nice constitutions in which a defeated minority starts conspiracies against the government, usually through military channels, on the day after election.

The other answer to the problem of Russian intransigeance is a proposed creation of a "world" government without Russia. Thus in the name of "one world" the world would be divided in two. Proponents of world government are always ready with criticisms of the ambiguities in the Charter of the United Nations, without recognizing that those ambiguities correspond to the actual historical situation. The Security Council is, for instance, a bridge of a sort between the segments of a divided world. They would destroy that bridge for the sake of creating a more logical constitutional system. This done, they look forward to one of two possibilities.

One is that Russia, faced with a united opposition, and concluding that she would not have to sacrifice her Communist Government but only her ambition to spread Communism, would ultimately capitulate and join the world federation. This abstract approach to political problems is completely oblivious of the dynamism of Communism.

The other course chosen by some advocates of world government is to create such a government without Russia and to divide the world more consistently in the name of the principle of "one" world. If this should lead to a world conflict they believe that the agonies of war will be assuaged for us by our knowledge that we are at least fighting for a principle of ultimate validity.

There is, of course, a possibility that a closer political integration of the non-Communist nations may save the world from war by the creation of an adequate preponderance of power in the west. But such an objective is not to be reached by loftily disavowing "power politics" in favor of "law." The world federalists who accept the inevitability of war walk bravely up the hill of pure idealism and down again into the realm of pure power politics. In this journey they rid themselves of the logical and moral ambiguities of the much despised quasi-constitutional sys-

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tem of the United Nations. Their brethren who are in a less exalted frame of mind will continue to put up with the Charter for the sake of preserving a bridge, however slight, between Russia and the west, making the best arrangements they can to restrain Russia, while trying at the same time to strengthen the existing world security agencies.

The ambiguities in the Charter of the United Nations which so outrage the advocates of world government are in fact the consequence of seeking to guarantee two, rather than one, objectives. The one objective is to preserve the unity of one world, even though it be seriously divided, and to provide a meeting ground between east and west where some of the tensions and frictions may be resolved. The other is to preserve the integrity of our "way of life" against a tyrannical system which we abhor. The Russians, in so far as they are honest devotees of a Marxist dream of world order, are presumably in the same position. Each of us hopes ultimately to create a world order upon the basis of our conception of justice. Neither of us is ready, at the moment, to submit our fate to a world authority without reservation, so long as the possibility remains that such an authority could annul a system of law and justice to which we are deeply committed.

III

So far we have considered only the difficulties of creating a world government by constitutional fiat. But a much more serious defect in world government theories is to be found in their conception of the relation of government to community. Governments cannot create communities for the simple reason that the authority of government is not primarily the authority of law nor the authority of force, but the authority of the community itself. Laws are obeyed because the community accepts them as corresponding, on the whole, to its conception of justice. This is particularly true of democratically-organized communities. But it is well to observe that even in traditional, non-democratic communities of the past there was a discernible difference between tyranny and legitimate government. It consisted precisely in the fact that a legitimate government relied primarily upon the implicit consent of the community.

Even in a national constitutional system, such as our own, we have seen how limited is the power of law whenever a portion of the community adheres to moral standards which differ from

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those of the total community. We have had this experience both with the prohibition movement and with the question of civil rights for Negroes in southern states. And where is the police force, loyal to a world state, to come from? The police power of a government cannot be a pure political artifact. It is an arm of the community's body. If the body is in pieces, the arm cannot integrate it.

The priority of the community to its laws and its use of force does not mean that both law and force may not have limited efficacy in perfecting the organization and preserving the integrity of the community. Good constitutions provide for the rational arbitrament of many conflicting and competing forces which might otherwise tear the community apart. Preponderant force in one part of the community may also so shape the social forces of the total community that its use need not be perpetual. Thus the preponderant force of the northern states decided the issue whether our nation was a nation or merely a federation of states. But force is no longer necessary to guarantee the loyalty of the southern states to our union. The ancient empires of Egypt, Babylon and Persia were created through the preponderant force of a particular city-state; but they finally achieved a unity which did not require the constant application of force. It must be noted that this pattern of coalescence of communities gives us no analogy for the creation of a world community in democratic terms, that is, without the imposition of preponderant power. The best analogy for our present world situation is to be found in Greece rather than in Egypt or Babylon. The Greek city-states never achieved the imperial unity of the oriental empires. The threat of Persia did finally prompt the organization of the Delian League; but the rivalry of Sparta and Athens for the hegemony in the League resulted in its disintegration. The unity of Greece was finally achieved under Philip and Alexander of Macedon. But this imperial unity was also a tyrannical nemesis for Greek culture. The analogy in present global terms would be the final unification of the world through the preponderant power of either America or Russia, whichever proved herself victorious in a final global struggle. The analogy teaches us nothing about the possibilities of a constitutional world state. It may teach us that though the perils of international anarchy are very great, they may still be preferable to international tyranny.

The coalescence of communities from city-states to empires in

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the ancient world, and from feudal entities to nations in the modern period, was frequently accomplished only by the imposition of preponderant power. The fact is particularly significant, since all of these communities could rely upon all sorts of "organic" factors for their force of cohesion which the rudimentary world community lacks. By organic factors, I mean such forces as the power of ethnic kinship, the force of a common history — particularly the memory of joint struggles against a common foe — a common language, a common culture and a common religion. We do have examples of ethnically and religiously pluralistic nations and empires, but they possess a basic homogeneity of some kind, underlying the differences. In modern India, where religious differences are thoroughgoing and highly localized, it proved impossible to construct a constitutional system which could allay the mutual fears of Hindus and Moslems. The birth in blood of these two nations, once the unifying force of an imperial power was removed, ought to teach our world planners more about the limited efficacy of constitutions than they have evidently learned. There were certainly more common elements in the situation in India than the world community will possess for a long time to come. Despite these common elements, the unity of India proved to be unattainable.

Sometimes the world planners recognize the absence of organic forces of cohesion in the world community. Thus Erich Kahler[1] sees that a world constitution lacks the "substratum" of organic and historical forces, which characterize the constitutions of national governments. But he draws the conclusion that a world constitution "must create the substratum to which it is to be applied." The proposed method of creating the substratum, according to Mr. Kahler, is to use "regions" rather than "extant states" as electoral units in the world constitution, for "if we base the world government on the states, we will fail in the essential task of creating the substratum." The illusions of omnipotence which infect the thought of this kind of political idealism could not be more vividly portrayed. There is no explanation of how states, who have a sovereign voice, would be persuaded to grant this electoral power to "regions" which would have no such voice in a world constitutional convention. The idea probably is that there would be a nonrepresentative constitutional con-

[1] Erich Kahler, "The Question of a 'Minimum Constitution.'" *Common Cause,* June 1948.

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vention of "experts" and the hope is that sovereign states will meekly accept the dictum of the experts that regions offer a better "substratum" for the world community than extant states. Nor is any attempt made to deal with the difficulty that many of the regions which would hopefully be created are so little integrated that an electoral canvass would be completely meaningless in them.

The fact is that even the wisest statecraft cannot create social tissue. It can cut, sew and redesign social fabric to a limited degree. But the social fabric upon which it works must be "given."

IV

The international community is not totally lacking in social tissue; but it is very scant, compared with that of particular states. Let us briefly assess the various factors in it. Most important as a force of social cohesion in the world community is the increasing economic interdependence of peoples of the world. But it is important to contrast this economic interdependence immediately with the wide disparity in the economic strength of various nations. At the climactic dinner of the World Republic convention, held in Chicago in October 1948, Professor Urey, the atomic scientist, expressed the conviction that the "inclusion of the illiterate, poverty-stricken, overnumerous masses of the Far East" constituted the major problem of the world state. He believed that the white race would not tolerate being outvoted by Asiatics. He therefore proposed a system of weighted votes in favor of nations with high literacy and abundance of raw materials and industrial production. He felt certain that the more "enlightened" Orientals would not object to this procedure. But an objection, from Thomas Tchou, sitting two places to the left of Professor Urey, was immediately forthcoming. Weighted representation, he declared, was immoral.[2] Thus the real problems have an inconvenient habit of peeking through, even at a dinner of a World Republic convention.

A second factor in the social tissue of the world community is the fear of mutual annihilation, heightened in recent years by the new dimension which atomic discoveries have given to mankind's instruments of death. We must not underestimate this fear as a social force, even as we must recognize that some culturally

[2] *Common Cause,* December 1948, p. 199.

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pluralistic communities of past history have achieved some cohesion through the minimal conviction that order is to be preferred to anarchy. But the fear of destruction in itself is less potent than the fear of specific peril from a particular foe. There is no record in history of peoples establishing a common community because they feared each other, though there are many instances when the fear of a common foe acted as the cement of cohesion.

The final and most important factor in the social tissue of the world community is a moral one. Enlightened men in all nations have some sense of obligation to their fellow-men, beyond the limits of their nation-state. There is at least an inchoate sense of obligation to the inchoate community of mankind. The desperate necessity for a more integrated world community has undoubtedly increased this sense of obligation, inculcated in the conscience of mankind since the rise of universal, rather than parochial, philosophies and religions. This common moral sense is of tremendous importance for the moral and religious life of mankind; but it does not have as much immediate political relevance as is sometimes supposed. Political cohesion requires common convictions on particular issues of justice; and these are lacking. If there is a "natural law" which is "self-evident" to all men, it certainly does not contain very much specific content beyond such minimal rules as the prohibition of murder and theft and such general principles of justice as the dictum that each man is to have his due. There is little agreement on the criteria by which the due of each man is to be measured.

There is a special irony in the fact that the primary differences in the conceptions of justice in the world do not, however, spring from religious and cultural differences between east and west. They can, therefore, not be resolved by elaborate efforts at cultural syncretism between east and west. The primary differences arise from a civil war in the heart of western civilization, in which a fanatical equalitarian creed has been pitted against a libertarian one. This civil war has become nationally localized. Russia has become the national center of the equalitarian creed, while America is the outstanding proponent of the libertarian one. The common use of the word "democracy," together with the contradictory interpretations of the meaning of that word, is the semantic symbol of the conflict. The idea that this conflict could be resolved by greater semantic accuracy is, however, one of the illusions of a too rationalistic culture which fails to understand

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the power of the social forces expressed in contradictory symbols.

In short, the forces which are operating to integrate the world community are limited. To call attention to this fact does not mean that all striving for a higher and wider integration of the world community is vain. That task must and will engage the conscience of mankind for ages to come. But the edifice of government which we build will be sound and useful if its height is proportionate to the strength of the materials from which it is constructed. The immediate political situation requires that we seek not only peace, but also the preservation of a civilization which we hold to be preferable to the universal tyranny with which Soviet aggression threatens us. Success in this double task is the goal; let us not be diverted from it by the pretense that there is a simple alternative.

We would, I think, have a better chance of success in our struggle against a fanatical foe if we were less sure of our purity and virtue. The pride and self-righteousness of powerful nations are a greater hazard to their success in statecraft than the machinations of their foes. If we could combine a greater degree of humility with our stubborn resolution, we might not only be more successful in holding the dyke against tyranny, but we might also gradually establish a genuine sense of community with our foe, however small. No matter how stubbornly we resist Russian pressure, we should still have a marginal sense of community with the Soviet Union, derived from our sense of being involved in a common fate of tragic proportions and from a recognition of a common guilt of mutual fear. If community in basic terms is established by various organic forces of history, it must finally be preserved by mutual forbearance and forgiveness.

There is obviously no political program which can offer us, in our situation, perfect security against either war or tyranny. Nevertheless we are not prisoners of historical destiny. We shall have constant opportunity to perfect instruments of peace and justice if we succeed in creating some communal foundation upon which constitutional structures can rest. We shall exploit our opportunities the more successfully, however, if we have knowledge of the limits of the will in creating government, and of the limits of government in creating community. We may have pity upon, but can have no sympathy with, those who flee to the illusory security of the impossible from the insecurities and ambiguities of the possible.

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FRANCE GETS TO HER FEET

By André Géraud
("Pertinax")

DOUBT and skepticism are heard nowadays concerning the future of the French nation. It is said that France has lost her old recuperative power, and that the record of the French Cabinets since General de Gaulle's resignation from the Government, January 1946, is an unbroken chain of failures. It is true that France has at times seemed to be splitting up under the pressure of sectional interests, but I believe that these troubles are accounted for by the magnitude of the disaster which befell her in 1940-44. The fact is that the executive branch of the government is gaining the strength it needs to cope with the situation.

Not only were the French military and political leaders of the war and prewar periods utterly discredited at the time of the liberation by their errors of omission and commission, but nearly all the existing élites were swept off the board. By "élites" I mean the men who, because of their own achievements or the achievements of their forefathers, had been leaders in the administrative departments of government, in the professions, in the Academies, in society. Many were replaced by amateurs, with much resulting incompetence in government and a general absence of leadership throughout the nation. Moreover, the hasty adoption of an extreme theory of proportional representation in the electoral law of September 1945 aggravated the handicap of the government. Proportional representation made the "machines" of the political parties supreme. Small caucuses at their own pleasure chose deputies to the Constituent Assembly, high officials (not excluding ambassadors) and so on. An independent individual has had to possess exceptional energy to force his way into political life against the will of such oligarchs. Deputies were elected and officials selected by bunches — and bunches of yes-men they were. During the last half-century public life in France has more and more failed to attract the best elements, and first-rate men have been still further repelled by the domination of bosses whom they consider their intellectual and moral inferiors. Reforms in this direction are overdue, and are now in prospect. But in any event, the surprising fact is not that France has recovered less speedily than her friends hoped, but that she

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has made so much progress. The article is intended to describe some aspects of France's regeneration.

II

The first point to be stressed is that, mainly through the exertion of a resolute Minister of the Interior, Jules Moch, public order is being maintained against both Communists of the Left and the section of the Gaullists on the Right who would readily take the path of the late Croix de Feu. It can now be asserted with some degree of confidence that the possibility of a coup d'état against the Fourth Republic is practically nonexistent. This is no mean achievement, since the Cominform treats French territory as the crucial battlefield in the struggle for Western Europe.

The Fourth Republic was brought to the brink of the abyss by the strike in November-December 1947, which political observers quickly dubbed "insurrectionary." A man upon whom the heaviest responsibilities were thrown on short notice at that time said to me recently: "At times, we had to fight for the restoration of order against odds which seemed overwhelming. We had to prepare for the paralysis of the transport system, and knew that we might have to concentrate all the available police and military forces simply on keeping open the trunk-lines in the railway network. All nonessential arteries were to be abandoned until the hypothetical day when army reserves would begin to flow in."

Last October insurrectionary strike number two was launched, but this time the Cabinet was not caught napping. Jules Moch had taken charge of the Ministry of the Interior on November 22, 1947, in the midst of the initial struggle. He is one of those Socialists who refuses to trust a Communist an inch. Getting a respite at the end of 1947, he had set himself to rebuild from scratch the whole system of defense. First a purge was carried out among the commissioners of police in Paris and some other cities. A number of them were men of very inadequate background and training (commissioners of police today are law school graduates), who had been appointed to responsible positions from the rank-and-file because of their heroic records under the Vichy Government and the German occupation. They were called the *parachutés*. But some 60 of them were Communists, and at least one of these had climbed very near to the top.

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All were eliminated through the simple process of being put to the test of an examination. Then companies of Republican security troops suspected of being subject to Communist influence were disbanded and regrouped. Finally — and this was the most far-reaching innovation — an entirely new organization, half police, half military, was built up on the principle that the civil administration of the country must be able to crush any incipient rebellion without resorting to martial law. A total of 122,000 men were thus placed permanently under the Minister of the Interior. They consist of the Parisian police force (22,000 men); the 60,000 Republican Guards and gendarmerie — divided between Paris and the provinces — which the Minister of War, technically their superior, never employs for his own needs; 12,000 men belonging to the so-called companies of Republican Security; and 25,000 men set apart, in the various urban police forces, for carrying out instructions issued by the Central Government. That mass of 122,000 men may not seem large, but it has grown in effectiveness as a result of the arrangement which enables the official in command on the spot where disturbances have broken out to use all forces within reach, including air transport, in support of the police or para-police. In the past he had to beg for them endlessly.

Moreover, French territory has been divided into eight districts, plus the Paris area, and an inspector general — called for short an "Igame," *inspector général de l'administration en mission extraordinaire* — has been put at the head of each. He bears a commission investing him with full powers, signed by the Prime Minister, the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior, and ranks above the generals who are divisional commanders. Few people have ever heard of these inspectors, but it has been said with no little reason that such individuals as MM. Massenet (southeast), Perier (northeast), Bertault (center), Villey (north), and, of course, Jules Moch, Prefect of Police Leonard and Chief of National Security Boursicot are the true rescuers of the régime.

Modern equipment, of course, adds to the efficiency of the new organization; 32 radio stations are available to the police in a single big city. Motorized police units, radio trucks and a secret telephone network have been introduced. Last November, the coal mines in northern France were retaken from the strikers within five days. There were anxious moments, particularly on

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October 21, when the troops were forbidden to fire whatever the provocation: following an affray in the Alais coal mines (Gard Department) half the men in a company of Republican Security troops had to be sent to the hospital. As soon as the military and police were allowed to make use of their arms, however, the crowds dispersed. Later on, huge demonstrations engineered by Communists and Gaullists went off peacefully. Generally speaking, public meetings are not unwieldy as they used to be. In Dijon, the Communists called on the people to protest against the heavy penalties which the court had inflicted on certain strikers accused of sabotage. The response was feeble.

III

The Communists thrive on popular discontent, not on the appeal of the Marxist-Leninist decalogue; and God knows that the laboring classes in the cities and all people living on fixed incomes have had good cause for protest during the last five years. The most serious failure of government is the faulty distribution of foodstuffs and other necessities. The requisitioning of farm products from the millions of small landowners who, in France, contribute the bulk of agricultural production was a Herculean task at best, but inflation made it far worse. By now, however, we are getting nearer and nearer the goal which, even a few months ago, seemed unimaginably far away: all-round stabilization of prices, salaries and money. An optimistic view of the French balance of accounts with the outside world, and particularly with the dollar area, is, unfortunately, unwarranted. But by gradually balancing the budget and curbing inflation, France, notwithstanding the social and political turmoil, has taken long strides toward a normal monetary system during the last 18 months.

A few figures tell the tale. The budget of the French state has risen from 99 billion francs in 1935 to 1,529 billion in 1948, and 2,033 billion in the estimates for 1949. Translated into percentages of the national income (since in terms of saleable products the national income is approximately the same in 1949 as it was 11 years before) we see that the French budget corresponds, in 1938, to 26.4 percent of the national income and, in the estimates of the current year, to 28.2 percent. The great change is in the public debt. In 1938 it absorbed 12.8 percent of the national income; this year it will not require more than 1.2

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percent. The public debt thus has been practically annihilated. In contrast, the investment in new equipment for industry and agriculture rose from 4.6 percent in 1938, to 7.2 percent in 1948, and to 8.3 percent in 1949. The expenditure is met by taxation up to 21.9 percent of the national income, by the counterpart in francs of that portion of the Marshall annuity which comes to us as a gift and not as a loan (4.2 percent) and by borrowing (2 percent). Such, reduced to essentials, is the ledger of the French Government.

The experts agree that the inflation is beginning to subside. The French Government will keep the pledge of the bilateral agreement with the United States not to call upon the assistance of the Bank of France when its revenue falls short of its expenditure. On April 1, 1949, the debt of the Government toward the Bank will be lessened by 25 billion francs, and the ceiling of the advances the Bank is authorized to make to the Government will be lowered from 200 to 175 billion. The amount of bank-notes in circulation is less than it was before the war, if the depreciation of the currency is reckoned with. Until recently, whatever balance between revenue and expenditure was won by acrimonious debates in the National Assembly and painful pruning of administrative expenses was destroyed as soon as living costs rose and brought in their train a rise of wages. Today the terrible spiral of prices and wages appears to be at an end and living costs will probably turn down rather than up, in the wake of agricultural prices which, all over the world, bid fair to decline. The non-Communist labor unions — *Force Ouvrière* and Christian Workers — insist that the Government strive to bring prices down further, but except in quarters close to the Communist C.G.T. the clamor for increases of wages is no longer heard. Some authorities maintain that the average industrial worker is not worse off than before the war. Thus many risk the prophecy that stabilization of the currency is close at hand. When it comes, French public life will be transformed.

Now the Government can proceed with needed reforms. First comes the straightening of French accounts with the dollar and the sterling areas, within the time limit of the Marshall Plan. France must get rid of a deficit which in 1948 was more than one billion dollars and which in 1949 will swallow $890,000,000 supplied by E.C.A., plus the equivalent of $250,000,000 obtained by the device of "drawing rights" on European creditor coun-

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tries. Our trade balance is favorable with Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Sweden and other countries. On that favorable trade balance is superimposed an adverse balance of payments with the same countries as a consequence of movements of capital (some of them unusual) which France cannot control: for instance, transfers into Dutch currency made necessary by subscriptions to a new capital issue of the Royal Dutch, and transfers into Belgian currency of the salaries paid to Belgian workmen. Negotiations are now in progress for the coördination of national programs of the 16 European governments associated with the E.C.A. Henceforward, let us hope, the exports of one country will not conflict with the exports of the others; the programs now in existence are a galaxy of incompatible schemes. Of course, such collaboration will in many cases involve drastic changes in the economic structure of the countries concerned, and can perhaps be achieved only if the Organization for European Economic Coöperation is given real power.

But many other urgent problems are the sole responsibility of the French Government. I can do no more than enumerate them. None of them can be solved unless the system of taxation is overhauled and brought up to date — unless the rural population, to be concrete, is brought within the orbit of modern fiscal practice. In saying this I do not endorse all the strictures passed in Britain and America on the evasion of taxes by the French peasants. After all, the small landowners and the peasantry are foremost among those who are footing the bill. The government loans of the last half-century, now cut down to infinitesimal fractions of their original value in purchasing power, have been subscribed to by people of the countryside more largely than by any other group. The tremendous public debt, accumulated in 50 years replete with wars and preparations for war, is being repaid each year by 1 or 2 percent of the national income! This implies a heavy contribution to the rehabilitation of French finances. Nevertheless, the system of taxation is rough-and-tumble, and alien to the requirements of social justice. Fiscal reform must come.

France is ten years behind in industrial equipment, housing, and so on. Industrial production has been restored to the level of 1938, but this is below the output of 1929. If 1929 production had increased yearly by 2 percent, total output would today be 60 percent higher than it is. As long as government loans cannot

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be launched as they were 40 years ago, public funds must be used for the necessary investment. The only alternative is a reappearance of the habit of saving by the average Frenchman, destroyed by the inflationary practices of the last 13 years.

Appropriations made for armament have fallen too low: 5 percent of the national income for 1949 as against 6.3 percent in 1948 and 6.9 percent in 1947. France's metropolitan territory, the French Zone in Germany, and French North Africa are held today by 300,000 troops. American experts here have not been slow to point out that such a relaxation of our military effort is not in keeping with the signs of the times.

The operation of nationalized industries and of the so-called social assurances must be vigorously examined and revised by competent ministers, though no deep alteration of structure is involved. What is wrong with the nationalized industries is that they are administered in watertight compartments. Profit in some industries could compensate for losses in others.

IV

What of the political situation in France? Will the present Government have the same fate as the 11 Cabinets which have crowded the stage since September 10, 1944? Thirty-seven months have passed since General de Gaulle chose to lay down the leadership of the French nation and to retire to private life. It was a regrettable step. He had at his back the mass of his countrymen who were free from taint of collaboration: for another three or four years, he could have led a government of national restoration, with the greatest degree of national union that could be achieved. France might thus have been spared the wastage attendant upon superficial changes of ministry.

In 1945 Léon Blum, in conversation, expressed his affection and admiration for General de Gaulle in unforgettable words. "His intellect," said M. Blum, "is supremely powerful. Don't believe him when he says that something is beyond his compass." Vincent Auriol, when elected to the presidency of the Republic in January 1946, wrote the General that he wanted his advice and assistance at all times. De Gaulle discouraged Auriol (though he did not entirely destroy Auriol's warmth of feeling for him) by rejecting point blank four invitations to dinner. Even today, neither Auriol, nor Blum, nor Jules Moch, although repeatedly rebuffed by the General, would condone the charge

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that de Gaulle has become more or less a replica of General Boulanger. At the bottom of their hearts, they still return thanks for the speech delivered on the London radio on June 18, 1940: "A battle has been lost, the war has not been lost."

The Popular Republican Movement (Catholic Democrats) surpassed the Socialists in its devotion to General de Gaulle. "We are the party of fidelity," Maurice Schumann once exclaimed in the Constituent Assembly. The Popular Republicans are the survivors of the Popular Democrats who won only 11 seats in the 1936 general election, but who nevertheless impressed everyone by their high purposes and unflinching patriotism. Normally, the Christian Democrats could not be numerous in a French parliament: politics and religion are too closely associated in them to suit the taste of most Frenchmen. However, under the German occupation, they shone in contrast with Radical Socialists, and afterwards reaped a rich reward.

It would not have been difficult for General de Gaulle to keep the Socialists and the M.R.P. responsive to his leadership. But de Gaulle is a haughty man, perhaps more haughty than ambitious. Temperamentally, he is unable to merge himself in a group. The famous line of Alphonse de Lamartine, *Il faut se séparer, pour penser, de la foule et s'y confondre pour agir,* does not apply to him. To coöperate with political parties disgusted him. He was heard to remark: "I am not interested in that!" Privately, he explained himself more fully: "With political parties all around, it is impossible to tackle the great problems of government objectively."

In January 1946, when he left the presidency, the General boldly predicted that the two central parties would quickly dissolve. He was convinced that he would be called back to office before long, and more than once in the last three years it seemed that his prediction was about to come true. Had the insurrectionary strike flouted governmental authority a little longer or a little more violently in the dangerous interval between October 21 and October 26 last year, the National Assembly might have become panic-stricken and compelled the President of the Republic to entrust the premiership to de Gaulle. Vincent Auriol would have done his utmost to avoid taking that step but, in the end, would have had to give way to the pressure of the majority. Today all that seems very remote. What stands out is the fact that de Gaulle has never ceased to condemn the two central

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parties and to stake his plans on the failure of those who took office after him — an attitude which more often than not put him in embarrassing harmony with the Communist Party and, of course, with the relics of the Vichy cliques. Any constructive action that has been taken in France during the last three years has been accomplished in the teeth of de Gaulle's opposition. How much more helpful to the country would de Gaulle's administration have proved if, about May 1945, he had listened to the advice tendered by Adrien Tixier, the thoughtful Minister of the Interior! Tixier exhorted de Gaulle to enter the arena of party politics, to give up the empty pretense of National Union, to set up a French labor party and turn with the maximum vigor against the Communists. The Communists would, of course, have been ejected from the posts they held in the Cabinet and in the administrative services. To the day of his death, Tixier was sure that, had de Gaulle taken his advice, the Communists would not have been able to send so many men to the Constituent Assembly. The career of the General might have been triumphal.

V

Henri Queuille, who became Premier five months ago, hails from the Corrèze Department which has returned him to Parliament for more than 30 years without a break. He has served as Cabinet Minister more than 20 times, usually in charge of agriculture. He is the spokesman of France south of the Loire, at home in the right wing of the Radical Socialists. The reappearance of a Radical Socialist at the helm of the Government is a clear indication that the new personnel which issued from the liberation movement has not fulfilled the hopes set upon it. The days of the Popular Republicans are numbered, and the Radical Socialists are regaining public favor.

Queuille is a country doctor. Extremism is foreign to his temperament. From the time he took office he has said that he would free the country from the terrorism generated by the Communist Confederation of Labor (C.G.T.), and by deft manœuvring, coupled with the courageous support of Minister of the Interior Moch, he has accomplished his purpose. Today, the C.G.T. cannot boast of more than 2,000,000 adherents, as against 6,000,000 in 1947. One million have passed under the banner of *Force Ouvrière,* 1,000,000 have transferred their allegiance to the Christian Workers, and 2,000,000 are not enrolled

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anywhere. By the same method of gentleness mixed with firmness, Queuille expects to take France past other milestones on the road to recovery. He thinks that the National Assembly must be allowed to serve its full term of five years — up to the autumn of 1951.

Gaullists and Communists are eager to bring about a dissolution, believing that, in a general election this year, the Socialists and the Popular Republicans would fare badly They probably would. The Second-International Socialists have degenerated into a petit bourgeois party. After the years of captivity, Léon Blum, who is 77, has not the physical strength to wield the leadership, and his mantle can fall only on weak shoulders — though it should be said to the credit of the Socialists that in the struggle against the Communists they do not falter. As for the Popular Republicans, their best men have been tried in the great functions of the Republic and the record is not too impressive. The Radical Socialists (who have turned Conservative Liberals in the last decade) are better provided with skill for the management of public affairs, and two newcomers of outstanding ability have joined their ranks: Pierre Mendès-France and André Meyer. Both are former Ministers, the latter with a tendency toward de Gaulle. Many Popular Republicans and Radical Socialists, not to speak of members of Rightist groups, have a double allegiance, having reserved for themselves the option to emigrate to the Gaullist camp.

In an immediate electoral contest with Communists and Gaullists, the prospects of the Center, therefore, are not very promising. Henri Queuille and Vincent Auriol — the permanent leader of the "Third Force" — will counteract with all their might the effort to force a dissolution this year and even next year. They are not shaken in the least by the argument developed *ad nauseam* that the National Assembly no longer expresses the mood of the country. They know that the forecast is that if a general election were held suddenly, with the electoral system of 1945-46 still in operation, the Communists, the Rally of the French People (Gaullist) and the Center parties would divide the vote just about equally. But that means that the extremists of the Right and of the Left would be in the ascendant. A stable government would be practically impossible. Auriol and Queuille are unshakably convinced that there is no acceptable alternative to the present majority of Socialists, Popular Republicans

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and Radical Socialists, and that were it to disappear suddenly, two blocks of extremists would clash with results that perhaps could not be kept in bounds. With such a possibility before them, the President of the Republic and the Premier will exhort the Assembly to stick to its mandate until the improved economy of the country has begun to tell on the electorate.

On March 20 and 27, half of the *Conseils Généraux* (departmental bodies more or less comparable to county councils in England) will have to be reëlected. Will this release the tidal wave predicted by Gaullist zealots — that is to say, will victories for the Rally of the French People in the departmental elections demonstrate that the National Assembly has been disavowed by the country and must go? Most political observers (including those of the Gaullist persuasion) discount the "tidal wave" idea. This is the most unpropitious year for the Government to go to the polls, and as we have noted the Center parties will probably lose some ground. Costs of living have not yet fallen, and the Communists are exploiting the dissatisfaction of tenants with the new law on rents. (Actually, the number of Communist Party members has decreased from 1,000,000 to 600,000 in the past two years, and with the exception of *L'Humanité,* the Communist press, including the weekly *La Terre,* distributed far and wide in the rural districts, is losing circulation.) But no dramatic reversal appears to be in the cards. And if the Center parties together still attract more votes than the Gaullist "Rally," the policy of Auriol and Queuille will gain a two years' lease of life.

Last summer and autumn there was fear of a Gaullist coup d'état, and M. Auriol was thought to believe that the first breathing spell which the Government enjoyed should be used to modify the laws of September 1945 and September 1946 regulating the elections to the National Assembly. Experience makes it abundantly clear that in France proportional representation and voting by departments lend themselves to the success of mob movements. In 1885-88, the Third Republic very nearly succumbed to the movement known to history by the name of General Boulanger; the Third Republic was saved, in 1889, when the "uninominal" ballot was put in force — that is, the ballot based on the principle of one constituency for one member of Parliament, the constituency being a small fraction of the department. Local influences are apt to work for middle-of-the-road parties; it is said, for example, that on the uninominal

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ballot, the Communist Party might lose one-third or even one-half of its 183 representatives in the National Assembly. But the Popular Republicans believe that abandonment or curtailment of proportional representation would be ruinous for them also, and M. Auriol decided that he ought not to arouse a bitter controversy between Socialists and Popular Republicans.

However, the departmental elections are not held on the basis of proportional representation, and the "canton" — the electoral district — is a small constituency. Local interests usually predominate in this balloting. This is one reason that no surprising change is expected. Should the March elections turn strongly in favor of the men who advocate an immediate general election, however, M. Auriol might regret that he did not press for electoral reform while there was time.

VI

The reconstruction of France is proceeding apace, and Frenchmen are hard at work. They are deficient in civic discipline. From the top to the bottom of the social pyramid, they are doing their job in their own way, as individuals (an attitude for which a good deal is to be said in a world made terribly monotonous by mass production and totalitarianism). The national economy is being put in shape. What France lacks is confidence in the future, a sense of growth, a display of unspent energy. The material wounds left by the invasion and the occupation are healing. The moral wounds are still gaping. Had General de Gaulle remained the heroic figure he undoubtedly was when he landed in France less than five years ago, he would have hastened the process of moral recuperation. But even if he won at the polls tomorrow, one may doubt that he could be of real help to his countrymen. He can set cheering crowds on the move, but his prestige is on the wane among thoughtful Frenchmen. It is noticeable that the meetings of the *Compagnons de la Libération* (the bodyguard of the General recruited from the men who congregated around him in London) languish nowadays, with signs of discouragement plainly in evidence.

How shall we explain the evanescence of his magic? Three main reasons can be given. First, when he quarrelled with the Center parties he had to retrieve the loss by drawing on the right, that is, the men of Vichy. He is reported to have offered Léon Noël the portfolio of foreign affairs or, at least, the secretary

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generalship of the Quai d'Orsay. Léon Noël, in diplomatic affairs, was the personal adviser of Pierre-Étienne Flandin and Pierre Laval. In the spirit of Laval and Flandin, he served as Ambassador to Prague and Warsaw; he was second to General Huntziger in the French delegation which formally accepted the armistice of June 22, 1940. Second, General de Gaulle is showing once more his contempt of teamwork. He does not take the trouble to have men of ability near him. Obviously, he thinks that if he heads a cabinet, the caliber of his underlings is not specially important. Except for René Mayer, who is indisputably talented, his selection would not be likely to be impressive. Third, he provides his critics with too much ammunition. Though it is true that the Constitution of 1946 is imperfect and will have to be corrected in due time, General de Gaulle is the protagonist of a presidential omnipotence more or less in the style of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte. Moreover, his program of social and of foreign policy is not convincing. The social policy upon which he would embark bears a likeness to the corporative system of Mussolini. His foreign policy seems built upon the tirades of Charles Maurras; de Gaulle professes to believe that unitary Germany can disappear and the medley of small kingdoms which made the Holy German Empire can be permanently reinstated.

The key to the spiritual revival of the French nation lies in the field of external affairs, national defense and the empire overseas. The policy followed in Germany by the occupying Powers has been a constant cause of worry and irritation to the French people. Frenchmen have no taste for Communism, nor for the imitations of Communism. They are awake to the Soviet menace. At the same time, they feel uneasy whenever American officials profess that a democratic Germany can be relied upon, after a short probation period, to defend the west against the Eastern Empire. That a Germany of 72,000,000 inhabitants crammed together within narrow frontiers would refuse a bargain with Russia, who can give back at will some of the territories taken from the Reich, seems absurd. The London agreement of June 2, 1948, which stemmed from a memorandum drafted two months before by General Clay, cut short the ministerial life of Georges Bidault. A kind of fatalism is now stifling French diplomacy. Keenly aware of France's dependence on the United States, French diplomacy hardly dares take the initiative. In 1924,

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when the Ruhr policy of Poincaré came to grief, French diplomacy persuaded itself to find a solace in the easygoing formulas of Aristide Briand. The same chain of cause and effect unreels again today. The successor of Georges Bidault, Robert Schuman, turns for salvation to the European ideal. Bidault himself started the whole scheme when he had to admit that the realist policy he attempted to carry out was done for. But our American friends ought not to delude themselves into believing that the pattern of European union which Robert Schuman promotes has struck its roots very deeply in French intellect and in the French heart. It faintly expresses a wish to become more independent of Washington and London. It expresses what remains in France of the ideology of Second-International Socialism, as well as the traditions of a medieval Christian republic. In short, it looks rather like the last throw of a losing gambler. A united Europe from which not only Russia but also Britain kept away would not be a very safe harbor for the French nation! As a political entity, Europe never existed; the Holy Roman Empire was the nearest approach to it. An intelligent Frenchman believes in the Atlantic community. He does not believe in "Europe."

The realization that Western Europe is a "military vacuum," that this vacuum is the object of a continuous deliberation between professional strategists in Washington, that vital decisions are being reached about which France knows nothing, cannot but depress the public spirit. For a Frenchman it is a strange feeling to be without a system of defense which, rightly or wrongly, seems to protect the nation.

In the past, the sources of French national confidence have been found, first of all in the armed forces, and also in the overseas possessions. Any French government whose thoughts go beyond satisfying material requirements from day to day must see that those springs of valor are not lost to the national community. Our American friends are sure to wince at the very mention of the overseas possession. Our late friend Thomas C. Wasson, the former American Consul-General in Dakar who was killed in Jerusalem, could have told of France's achievements in interracial fraternity in black Africa. The first signs of new vigor in French life will show themselves in a rejuvenated army, and in the territories overseas. A new current of French life: this will mean that new élites are emerging!

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FRANCE LOOKS ABROAD

By Edouard Herriot

CERTAIN great problems confront France and the United States in common. I shall try here to explain how they are viewed in France and suggest how they should be handled, to the mutual advantage of our two countries and for the general good.

I. THE RECOVERY AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

Anyone who thinks that the French people are motivated by a desire for revenge on their neighbors beyond the Rhine is profoundly mistaken. All of us wish to see a democratic and peaceful Germany play her proper part in the community of European nations.

Last year in London the United States, the United Kingdom and France adopted certain principles which they would like to have incorporated in a German constitution. In consequence, a German Constituent Assembly has met at Bonn and is now engaged in drawing up a democratic constitution of a federal type which will guarantee the rights of the participating states against abuses by the central power. We believe it necessary, in the light of experience (and of our own mistakes in the past, for which we paid dearly), to prevent the rebirth of a strongly centralized Reich. This is not in our own interests only. A centralized state would be just as much a threat to German democrats as to France.

The economic problem of Germany is, of course, especially difficult. We must prevent her resources from being concentrated for future aggression; and yet we must make sure that after the losses of her victims in the war have been made good her industry can contribute to the well-being of all Western Europe. The administration of the Ruhr seems to us the heart of the problem. As Germany's boundaries are now drawn, 90 percent of her coal, 70 to 75 percent of her possible production of cast iron and steel, and 70 percent of her rolled steel products are located in the Ruhr. It is indeed a formidable industrial center, one of the most powerful in the world. After the Second World War, France demanded that the Ruhr be transformed into a separate international entity. Later she made concessions on this point.

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But when Ordinance No. 75 of the British and American Military Governors declared, following instructions from London and Washington, that a freely elected German Government would itself determine the final ownership of the coal, iron and steel enterprises of the Ruhr, France was stirred to her depths.

The recent statute of an International Authority for the Ruhr removed some of the French fears. It fixes both the amounts and the qualities of the coal, coke and steel destined to go from the Ruhr to other European countries; provides an opportunity for intervention to determine commercial practices and prices; and gives the Authority powers of inspection and investigation. Above all, it provides that in two or three years the control of management, production, investments and equipment is to be transferred either to the International Authority or to the Military Security Board or its successor. These powers should be adequate to prevent the reconstruction of the cartels and the restoration to positions of influence of the men who encouraged the warlike policies of National Socialism.

The central aspect of the French policy can be described simply as an effort to see that the powerful industrial arsenal of the Ruhr is henceforth utilized not against Europe but for Europe. Side by side with the International Authority, and coöperating with it, the Military Security Board will ensure that the Ruhr remains disarmed and demilitarized. The Board will advise the Military Governors, and will take care that industries which can serve warlike purposes do not exceed authorized levels. It is understood that all excess output must be allocated to reparations. When the sum requested is compared with the damage done by Germany it is seen to be modest. If the original reparations program is carried out, France will receive compensation for less than 0.5 of her war damages. (By comparison, she was awarded a 31 percent indemnity in 1918.)

Germany cannot utilize her industrial equipment fully. The experts of the Bizone concede that this is not necessary in order for her to reach a favorable balance of payments by 1952. Is it not reasonable to apply the surplus to the recovery of Europe? We should note that the signatories of the Ruhr agreement stated that the proposals made in 1946 would be corrected to whatever degree might later prove necessary. I repeat, we do not wish to make Germany miserable; but if she really wants peace, we ask for her help in establishing a well-balanced Europe.

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II. THE ECONOMIC UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

In his memorable speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947, Secretary Marshall demonstrated forcefully that the war's most serious economic consequence was not material destruction but the dislocation of international trade. He said:

> For the past ten years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Longstanding commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared, through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken.

And he likewise stressed the delay in economic recovery, as demonstrated by the failure to conclude peace treaties with Germany and Austria; the abolition of the traditional division of labor between peasants who produce foodstuffs and industrial workers who furnish tools; the dangerous transformation of cultivated fields into pasture lands (already begun after the first war); and the need of governments to have recourse to their supplies of foreign exchange or credits in order to pay for necessary imports. The Secretary of State concluded that Europe must either disintegrate or receive supplementary aid from America. "Our policy," he added, "is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." Secretary Marshall wished to reëstablish prosperity in order to let freedom live. History will honor him for it. Very naturally, he also declared that Europe must help herself if she wished outside support.

To unify the European national economies means achieving free circulation of men, capital and goods over the entire Continent; in other words, the reverse of the control over trade, inconvertibility of currency and immobility of populations which prevail in Europe today. A policy of economic integration would start with a customs union of the countries of Western Europe. Budgetary and fiscal practices would be harmonized. The creation of a European currency has also been proposed.

Unfortunately, it is much easier to describe such a program than to realize it in practice; systems that have been in effect for centuries cannot be easily changed. A step toward the goal

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was taken with the signing of the Convention of European Economic Coöperation at Paris on April 16, 1948. Under its terms, the signatory governments recognize that their economies are interdependent and that the prosperity of each of them depends upon the prosperity of all. They consider that only a close and permanent coöperation of the contracting parties can restore and maintain the prosperity of Europe and rebuild the ruins of the war. By Article I, the contracting parties agree to practise close coöperation in their mutual economic relations. They take as their immediate task the establishment and execution of a common recovery program. This program, which is intended to enable the contracting parties to maintain themselves at a satisfactory economic level without outside assistance of an exceptional character, takes into account particularly their need to develop exports to non-participating countries to the greatest possible degree. To these ends, they promise by individual efforts and in a spirit of mutual assistance to fulfill the obligations defined by the Organization for European Economic Coöperation. Thus ideas of autarchy are officially repudiated and the fact of interdependence is recognized.

The O.E.E.C. has drawn up a program of production and trade for 1948–1949, a forecast for 1952, and has begun work on a program for 1949–1950. It established an intra-European payments system which prevented an almost complete suspension of commercial exchanges. The Brussels study group for customs union is trying to define the conditions which will permit the creation of broader economic units. However, the countries which are benefiting from the Marshall Plan have yet to devise a long-term program of common action. If national policies are not changed, a deficit of perhaps $3 billion will remain in the European balance of payments in 1952. Without American aid there would already have been a sharp reduction of imports and, consequently, of the standard of living in most European countries. These are the truths which the statesmen of Europe must never cease explaining to their countrymen, who unfortunately are more accustomed to declamations borrowed from the inexhaustible resources of political theory and demagoguery.

One remedy for Europe's persistent deficit in trade with the dollar zone is to increase European industrial production and intra-European commerce. For this the removal of the fetters placed on trade by clearing arrangements and import duties is

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essential. It likewise is necessary to lower the costs of European production through specialization and to develop European overseas sales by a joint program of information about European products. The countries of Europe are beginning to understand the necessity of getting together. We must not crow too soon. Nevertheless, certain historic prejudices have been overcome already; and theoreticians who until now have been divided by abstract differences are coming closer under the pressure of reality.

Secretary Marshall and his compatriots obliged Europeans to examine their consciences; this is not the least of the services of the "Marshall Plan."

III. WHAT THE MARSHALL PLAN HAS DONE FOR FRANCE

What, more specifically, is France's place in the Marshall Plan? The aid given us under its terms followed a gift of interim aid, under the law of December 19, 1947, amounting to $283,000,000. At the moment when our own resources in gold and foreign exchange were exhausted and interim aid was at an end, and when there must have been an almost complete stoppage in French imports from the dollar area, the Marshall Plan came into operation. For the financial year 1948–49 it allows us a direct credit from the United States of $980,000,000 plus a sum granted by the other European countries associated in the ERP. The total amount of foreign aid granted France by the Marshall Plan is $1.350 billion, which will enable us to receive free the equivalent of this amount in goods which we could not otherwise have paid for. The extent of this aid can be gauged by the fact that our total imports amount to slightly more than $2 billion. Thus more than half of our imports come to us as a pure gift.

The total of French imports from the dollar zone is now slightly lower than in the previous years. Thus American aid has on the whole increased French resources; it has taken the place of former methods of financing — by gold reserves and foreign loans — which are no longer available. And our American friends will learn with pleasure that since the Marshall Plan began operations French agricultural and industrial production has undergone a general increase.

Last year's production of wheat was 75,000,000 quintals, as against 52 for the preceding year; potatoes, 140,000,000 quintals as against 102,000,000; industrial beets, 90,000,000 quintals as

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against 60,000,000; oilseeds, 1,500,000 quintals as against 800,000. Weather conditions were favorable — one reason why the Government is warning the French people now against excessive optimism — but the increase must nevertheless be put down in large part to American aid. The consumption of fertilizer was 125 percent of the prewar figure and the number of tractors rose from 65,000 in January to 80,000 in July. In order really to appreciate what this means one must see the joy of the French peasant, a tireless worker always short of help, when he succeeds in obtaining a tractor. I have witnessed it myself over and over again.

The consumer has not yet felt the resulting improvement in the food supply because of the numerous middlemen, heavy taxes and the high cost of transportation. The continuing high prices have intensified the quarrel between advocates of "liberalism" and "planning," echoes of which must have reached the United States. In my opinion it is a futile quarrel; common sense must provide the solution. If a product is scarce, it cannot be allowed to get into the hands only of privileged individuals. The ideal is certainly absence of all economic controls; but this presupposes abundance of the product in question, as well as real competition and non-interference by pressure groups — trade unions or others — which so often exert control when the state keeps hands off.

American aid has also been of great importance in increasing industrial production. Ten percent of our coal came from America, for example, and since the total amount of coal available for French use in 1948 was 13 percent greater than in 1947, it can be seen how crucial the American coal was. Without it we should have had much less coke at our disposal, and iron and steel production, machine tool output and the production of building materials would have been correspondingly less. Incidentally (if this can be called incidental!) the French people would have had no coal for heating their homes. The figures on liquid fuel are even more striking. American aid accounts for 45 percent of the output of the refining industry, which reached a level 75 percent higher than in 1947. Without it, France would have had to rely solely upon her share of crude oil from the Middle East, and a considerable proportion of French motor vehicles would have been immobilized.

Our supplies of non-ferrous metals declined by 20 percent as compared with 1947, and of those available the United States

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provided 35 percent. Without this addition our electrical construction would have been reduced at least 30 percent, and our program of hydro-electric development would have fallen by 30 percent. Approximately one-third of the supplies necessary for the textile industry is furnished by Marshall Plan assistance. The suspension of deliveries of raw cotton for our mills would have had very serious consequences, not only in France itself but for the populations of our overseas territories.

IV. THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

At Brussels on March 17, 1948, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom signed a treaty providing for coöperation in strengthening their economic, social and cultural ties. The five countries also pledged themselves to render mutual aid and assistance, in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, to ensure international peace and security and resist aggression. The Treaty created a Consultative Council of the Foreign Ministers of the five Powers which meets whenever necessary (or at least once every three months) in any of the five capitals. At the first meeting in Paris on April 17, 1948, the Council set up a Military Committee; and at the third meeting in Paris in October 1948 the Council accepted the principle of a defensive Atlantic pact. Conversations about this pact have been in progress in Washington among representatives of the five Powers and of the United States and Canada. The Consultative Council likewise set up a Study Committee for a European Union, discussed below. Between sessions, the Consultative Council is represented by a Permanent Commission with headquarters in London. It consists of the ambassadors of the five Powers and is supposed to concern itself principally with military organization.

The military organization includes a Defense Committee, composed of the Defense Ministers of the five Powers, a Committee of Chiefs of Staff (with which the head of the American delegation and the Canadian representative are invited to meet), and the Military Committee, meeting permanently in London and composed of a representative of each Power. The Committee of Chiefs of Staff is completed by Army, Air and Naval Advisory Committees, a Plans and Policy Committee, and Committees of Joint Intelligence and Joint Logistics. The actual command of military forces is in the hands of a Western European Com-

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manders-in-Chief Committee ("Uniforce"), of which Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery is Chairman. Other members are General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, Commander-in-Chief of the ground forces of Western Europe; Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, Commander-in-Chief of the air forces of Western Europe; and Vice-Admiral Robert Jaujard, Flag Officer of Western Europe. None of the members of this committee exercises effective command in peacetime. The Chairman's Forward Headquarters have been established at Fontainebleau.

Obviously, this organization is theoretical rather than practical. How could a committee which does not exercise real command dispose of all the forces of Western Europe immediately on the outbreak of war? The weakness of such a division of authority is an old story. In organizing Western Europe, the factors making for dispersion outweigh the factors making for unification. Since strength comes from unity, authoritarian régimes are always stronger than democracies at the start. The need for unity within a multiplicity of authority poses a hard problem. We meet it not only in organizing the military defense of Western Europe but in our work of organization in the economic, the financial and even the cultural field.

V. THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Under this heading I must begin by saying frankly that France has so far been deeply disappointed in the achievements of the United Nations. It seems to us to be thought of too often as an abstraction, indeed (as I remarked in the National Assembly) as an organization which moves in the fourth dimension.

Thanks in particular to the efforts of Mrs. Roosevelt, a Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been drawn up. It also proved possible — though not without difficulty — to define what has been called the crime of genocide, that is to say, persecutions directed against a group of human beings. But I feel constrained to say that what is of critical importance today is less the reaffirmation of the laws of morality than the expression of those laws in the acts of international life. It costs little to pay homage to virtue; it is hard to make one's conduct conform to it. The latter, however, is the prime necessity. So far every effort to turn the abstract into the concrete has been thwarted by ideological differences. One school seeks to subject peoples and individuals to the materialist discipline of Marx; the other holds

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that freedom of opinion, springing from freedom of conscience, is a precious attribute of civilization and must be preserved as a sacred right.

In this conflict of ideologies France will not yield. Frenchmen who have remained faithful to their historic tradition — the combined teachings of pagan humanism and Christian idealism — have only one choice in a conflict between spirit and matter. We are for the spirit. If the conflict persists, it will be impossible to organize international peace. Already it is almost a scandal that the necessary treaties with Germany and Austria have not been concluded. In practical matters it is not unfair to say that the United Nations is probably less effective than the old League of Nations, with which the Russians eventually collaborated. For my part, though the problem of how to free the world organization from the stalemate of differing ideologies is enormous, I do not despair that someday a way will be found. Meanwhile, U.N. will have served to make clear what a fundamental contradiction there is between the spirit of dictatorship (supposed to have been overcome in the last war) and the spirit of freedom.

VI. TOWARD EUROPEAN UNION

In order to end on a more optimistic note I would like to say a few words about our recent efforts to organize Europe. On October 26, 1948, the Consultative Council, mentioned above, set up a committee representing the signatories of the Brussels Treaty to examine and propose the measures to be taken with a view to realizing a greater degree of unity between the countries of Europe. This Committee was to study the suggestions both of governments and of private organizations, and was charged especially with examining the Franco-Belgian proposals for the convocation of a Consultative Assembly and the British proposal for the establishment of a European Council designated by the governments and responsible to them. It was asked to prepare a report for the next session of the Consultative Council. Of this Committee, including five represenatives of Britain, five of France, three of Belgium, three of the Netherlands and two of Luxembourg, I had the honor to be elected President.

Though all the discussions were marked by most friendly courtesy, contradictory British and French theses emerged. After many meetings, which need not be described in detail, a report

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was submitted to the Consultative Council suggesting that since all had confidence in its good will it should arbitrate our differences. Our confidence proved not to have been misplaced, thanks especially to the smiling tenacity of M. Schuman and the warm kindness of Mr. Bevin. The Consultative Council finally agreed upon the establishment of a Council of Europe, to be composed of a ministerial committee whose deliberations will be secret and a consultative body whose meetings will be public. Other European countries, in addition to the five, will be invited to participate in drafting the organic texts. The question of the composition of the consultative body had raised the greatest difficulties; this was settled by giving each government the right to decide how its representatives were to be designated. The total number of members of this consultative body will be about 100; decisions will be taken by a majority of the members present and voting; and it will have one annual session, to last not longer than one month.

Absolute minds, accustomed to resolving problems in the abstract, will be dissatisfied with this solution. Those like myself who saw for themselves the difficulties which attended the institution's birth will pay tribute to the liberal spirit of all the delegates of our Paris Committee and to the efforts at conciliation made by the various governments. Even in its modified form the Council of Europe will find itself faced with many difficulties which can be overcome only by steady wisdom and in a conciliatory spirit.

In short, peace has not yet been made. We are reminded constantly how truly my illustrious friend President Roosevelt spoke when he said that the basic requirement of peace is to guarantee the nations against *fear*. Today fear still divides the world. Despite her cruelly exposed geographical position, France tries not to give way to it and not to add to it. I hope I have made sufficiently clear here in these lines for *Foreign Affairs* that France bears only good will to other nations. I hope I have expressed, too, my appreciation of the immensity of the rôle assigned by history to America. In this twilight of my life, as I address to her once again the homage of an old and constant friend, I want to tell her how much confidence I have in her — in her strength, in her wisdom, in her ability to protect our pitiful humanity. The fate of the world rests, in large part, in her hands.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CANADIAN NATIONALISM

By Hugh MacLennan

IN THE autumn of 1948 William Lyon MacKenzie King completed his inch-by-inch retirement from public life as Prime Minister of Canada. He had finally served as head of state for a longer time than had any president, prime minister, consul or archon in the history of democracy, and on the way he had broken several longstanding records of other ministers of the British Crown.

These records apparently meant a lot to Mr. King. Each one that was broken was followed by rumors of his retirement, but the rumors were never specifically denied and Mr. King continued in office, his memory counting the tenure of his service to the hour. Then retirement was forced upon him suddenly one day for the reason of failing health. It was unfortunate that his own studied technique of doing everything as unobtrusively as possible had trained people to expect from him nothing dramatic, nothing that stimulates the imagination, nothing that suggests a crisis. Had he been an American, had he been an Englishman, had he been anything but the kind of Canadian he is, the record he set would have been celebrated with pomp at home and careful examination in other countries. As it was, the announcement of his retirement was noted by the world's press with only such interest as politeness required.

Mr. King's career, no less than the irony implicit in the quietness of his retirement from it, is deeply symbolic of the country he governed. Under his leadership, Canada has developed into the fourth military power among the United Nations, and subsequently into the second most important economic reservoir of western democracy. Few nations in modern times have grown in stature more rapidly. Canada has long ceased to be a Dominion in the original sense of the word; nor has she now, in swinging away from Great Britain, become what so many feared was inevitable, an appendage of the United States. She has become a highly integrated, growing nation, lacking one attribute only which seems necessary for world recognition. Like Mr. King himself, Canada has such a talent

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for avoiding the dramatic that she too often escapes even the notice of her friends.

What do most outsiders think of when the image of a Canadian comes to mind? Usually of a trooper of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in dress of scarlet, solitary on horseback surveying the Rocky Mountains. Sometimes of a trapper, of a hard-rock miner, of a kilted soldier playing the bagpipes at a Toronto fair, of a raw-boned sportsman who is the salt of the earth but notably unsubtle. On certain levels they remember the competent, mild-mannered, well-dressed individuals, neither British nor American but oddly reminiscent of both nationalities, who represent Canada at international conferences. In any event, Canadians are thought of as preëminently masculine, and this is fair enough; in both public and family life it is the men who are dominant in Canada. A masculine common sense, even a masculine lack of sensitivity, reveals itself in every facet of Canadian life from architecture to food. But the very truth of this fact has diverted nearly everyone who has tried to make visible the psychology of Canada as a nation.

As has often been pointed out, a nation is an abstraction. It is a convenient word or image which we use when we mean a group psychology, a group behavior-pattern or a group policy. And here is the paradox which has caused Canada to be so often misunderstood. Canada, *as a nation,* is not masculine at all. She is feminine. This feminine psychology has not arisen out of the lives of individual Canadians nor out of the kind of country they inhabit. It came into being because a country with Canada's peculiar history happens to share the major part of the North American continent with a colossus like the United States. Were it not for the United States, Canada would never have been a nation at all, much less the kind she is.

This country, which once was Britain's senior Dominion and now stands on her own, has acquired a purely feminine capacity for sustaining within her nature contradictions so difficult to reconcile that most societies possessing them would be torn by periodic revolutions. Canada has acquired the good woman's hatred of quarrels, the good woman's readiness to make endless compromises for the sake of peace within the home, the good woman's knowledge that although her husband can knock her down if he chooses, she will be able to make him ashamed of himself if such an idea begins to form in his mind. Canada also

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possesses the hard rock which is in the core of every good woman's soul: any threat to her basic values calls up a reluctant but implacable resistance.

This national feminine psychology becomes amusingly obvious in the attitude of the country towards the United States. Canadians have always clucked their tongues at American flamboyance and recklessness, but they know that life would be drab without it. They watch with indulgent amusement, even while affecting disapproval, the delight Americans take in their own accomplishments, their freedom from inhibitions, their love of boasting, their penchant for getting into the kind of trouble a lesser people would avoid and their correspondingly noisy vigor in getting out of it. During the past 50 or 60 years, Canadians have enjoyed the United States much as a good wife enjoys the spectacle of a robust husband being himself.

Another aspect of Canada's feminine psychology is seen in the manner in which her whole career as a nation has been a sort of domestic defiance of the United States. Her history shows that her dominant national impulse is to retain in her own eyes the kind of personality she *feels* she has, even though she has never been able to define this personality in words. Although she is pleased when Americans recognize her good qualities, she has never sued for American favor because she has been too proud to make the slightest effort to express herself in terms which might lead Americans to believe that she values their good opinion too highly.

The economist and the sociologist find different methods of explaining the psychology of Canada, but with a few notable exceptions, they generally require from the foreign reader more skill in coördinating abstractions than any human being is likely to possess.

Economists tell us that there is no real basis of economic union in Canada. The wheat-producing provinces have generally felt themselves treated like a colonial empire by the large eastern cities. The Maritime Provinces, with their tradition of seafaring and free trade, bitterly resent the tariffs imposed on them by the more populous manufacturing areas of Ontario and Quebec. In addition, many of Canada's most vital industries are controlled in the United States. Sociologists have constantly emphasized that Canadians have no common tradition of patriotism or even of social values. The English-speaking majority and the French-

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speaking minority are divided not only by religion and language, but are descended from ancestors who once were bitter national enemies, and whose struggles are remembered with deep emotion.

Those Canadians who are their own sharpest critics have attempted to explain the national character in terms of a sizeable inferiority complex. They talk about the reticence of their fellow-countrymen — both individually and as a national group — their reluctance to tell the rest of the world what a fine country Canada is. They deplore the behavior-pattern of a proud people who still react to the well-grounded belief that no matter how much they may contribute to a common cause, neither Britain nor the United States will accord them proper recognition. But these are only shadows on the picture. There are still more sides to this complex Canadian personality. The people of the country have also been strongly affected by physical environment, by a mixed religious inheritance, and by the invasion of American ideas from Hollywood and New York. These, too, have made her what she is.

The climate of Canada allows for less margin of error in economic life than does the climate of the United States. The average Canadian farmer is poorer than the average American farmer by at least five weeks of warm weather. Moreover, there is only a narrow belt of land — all of it lying close to the American border — which is uniformly fertile. The rest of the Dominion is mostly bush, tundra, hard-rock shield and ice cap. To be sure, Canada appears to be a nation of still untapped wealth so far as mineral resources are concerned, but since man has not yet learned to eat gold and pitchblende, wealth in such terms must be reckoned in basic values.

In addition to the repressions enforced by nature, there are few nations in which established religion has had a greater success in curbing exuberances. The authority of the Quebec priest over his parish is famous. In the English-speaking provinces Calvinism has been endemic from the beginning. Although both religions have done much to fortify Canadian society in the face of geographical debits, they have enormously inhibited the Canadian character in the process.

Finally, Canadian psychology within the last few generations has been subtly but thoroughly worked on by American motion pictures, American radio programs, American books, advertising in American magazines — a series of pressures which we Cana-

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dians have not so far returned in kind. For want of a true native culture which is dramatic enough to compete with New York and Hollywood, they have allowed themselves to absorb that of the United States. As a result, they have tended to understand Americans *intellectually* better than they understand themselves.

The more one enters into such detail, the more confused the picture becomes. Canada has two official languages, yet the resources of both have failed to provide a single word to designate a citizen of the country. When those of the French language use the word *Canadien,* they refer only to themselves; the rest of the population are *les Anglais.* Those who speak English operate on the same principle. *They* are the "Canadians;" the qualifying word "French-Canadian" is reserved for the inhabitants of Quebec. To date, Canada has no official flag. One of the hottest debates in recent parliamentary history occurred when the project of adopting a national flag was raised and discarded after weeks of exasperated argument. George VI is king of Canada; yet Canada is not a dependency of Great Britain. Canadians have no wish to join the United States, but they are almost more concerned by American national elections than by their own.

In spite of such contradictions, Canada is probably the most stable country in the world. Her standard of living is second only to that of the United States, and a close second at that. Canadians are more law-abiding than Americans, they are conservative no matter to which language group they belong; yet — as their social legislation proves — they are not reactionary. When Mr. King retired and handed the leadership to Mr. Louis St. Laurent, there was no perceptible change in internal or international policy. Mr. St. Laurent, a Roman Catholic of Quebec, continued calmly where Mr. King, an Ontario Presbyterian, had left off. One can only conclude, therefore, that Canada must contain some invisible common denominator which has kept her people stable and has drawn them together politically in spite of the dichotomies of which she is composed.

Canada became a nation through the unwilling coöperation of two distinctly different kinds of people, reinforced by a third group which had nothing in common with the social background of the other two. The first two were the French, who were the original European inhabitants of the country, and the United Empire Loyalists, of English stock from the Thirteen Colonies. The third group were Highland Scots. In subsequent years there

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were immigrations from Ulster, southern Ireland, England, Scotland, Wales and the continent of Europe, but it is extraordinary how little these later settlers altered the psychological mould which was set in Canada in the early days. They never counteracted the vital fact that the three original settling groups became Canadians because the nations or factions to which they had belonged had suffered total defeat in war. It was in their response to the challenge of these three separate defeats, a response which in each case was remarkably similar, that the common denominator in the Canadian character was forged.

In French-Canada today there is a much-used slogan, *notre maître, le passé*. The glorious past of French-Canada has overshadowed her immediate present ever since 1763. The greatest names in Canadian history — indeed, in the early history of the North American continent — are all French. What men can historians of the English colonies set up against Cartier, Champlain, Cavelier de la Salle, Père Marquette, Brébeuf, Joliet, d'Iberville, Radisson, Frontenac, Laval and Montcalm? Such names ring like bugle calls across the whole of America. Always working with fewer resources, both of men and materials, handicapped by corrupt governments in France, unsupported by sea power, the French under such leaders more than held their own against superior odds for a century and a half. And then suddenly their glory and their hope collapsed.

After the fall of Quebec in the Seven Years' War, the inhabitants of New France found themselves without a mother country. By the Treaty of Paris in 1763, France formally abandoned them to England, their hereditary foe. Sixty-five thousand Frenchmen of Catholic Norman stock, most of whom had been born in Lower Canada, found themselves alone in a hostile, Protestant, English-speaking continent, helpless before their conquerors' whims. Voltaire, in a cheap epigram, wrote of the country for which they had fought and suffered as "a few acres of ice and snow." Not only were the French-Canadians robbed of a mother country when France deserted them, they were robbed of one of the greatest dreams ever cherished by a human society, the dream of a French-speaking Roman Catholic empire extending from the Gaspé to the Gulf of Mexico.

After receiving such a blow from the British, why did the French-Canadians, barely 16 years after the fall of Quebec, choose to remain under the British flag when the seceding Ameri-

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can colonies sent Benjamin Franklin to beg them to join their revolution?

To answer this riddle is to explain how French-Canada met the challenge of her defeat. Two years before the outbreak of the American Revolution, the British Government had passed the famous Quebec Act, the most liberal political document enacted by a conqueror up to that time. It guaranteed the French-Canadians freedom of religion, the right to preserve their own language in the courts and to teach it in the schools, as well as the right to continue the use and practice of French civil law. In addition to the official attitude of the British Government, as expressed in the Act, the first British governors happened to have been humane, chivalrous and intelligent men.

In contrast to the behavior of the British, the attitude of such Americans as the French had known was deplorable. In the colonial wars it had been Americans who had insisted on the expulsion of the Acadians, and Americans who had treated Louisburg like a modern Carthage. Immediately after the fall of Quebec, New Englanders had swarmed north in the hope of despoiling the new province. They were bitter Protestants, intolerant of any aims or values but their own. Now, in 1776, the Catholic hierarchy let it be known that they regarded with abhorrence the principles behind the revolution.

In this great crisis in continental history, the attitude of French-Canadians hardened into a mould which has remained distinct to this day. After the Quebec Act was passed, the only aims they had left were to survive ethnically, to remain defenders of the Catholic faith and the French legend in North America, to preserve in so far as they could the tradition of their mighty ancestors. Then and now, they accepted the realities of their position. Their Norman common sense has continually enabled them to recognize what was to become a real principle in Canadian political life: when choices are few, take half a loaf and remember it is better than no bread.

It was a supreme irony of history which soon thereafter caused the French-Canadians to share Canada with tens of thousands of the very Yankee Protestants they had hitherto detested more than any other people on earth, the Loyalists in the colonies who had sided with the mother country during the Revolution. These people — men, women and children — were hounded north into the wilderness of Ontario and the Maritime Prov-

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inces, bounding Quebec on both sides, by the self-righteous rage of their own blood-relations.

Professor Toynbee has pointed out that no people in the history of Christendom had up to this time suffered such a fate for purely *political* opinions. The Loyalists were still Yankee in character and Protestant in religion. Their decision to remain loyal to England might have been wrong, but it had been as sincerely formed as was the decision of the others to revolt. Their treatment at the hands of their former countrymen, followed as it was by the virtual indifference of the British to their plight once the war was lost, produced in their collective psychology a kind of traumatic shock. They never gave way to the self-pity which was to retard the recovery of the American South a century later, nor did they glorify the legend of their own past. They had too much to do and too much to learn to brood upon it, since most of them came from a settled environment and now found themselves pioneers in a cold, unbroken country. As their social culture developed through the years it was seen to be more rigid than that of the United States, more cautious, less optimistic, more close-mouthed. In the early days, few of them expected Canada to amount to much and they retained their old dislike of Quebec. But they were determined to survive as British subjects in North America; like the French, they had made up their minds that half a loaf is better than no bread at all.

The third racial group, the Highlanders, became Canadians as a result of the infatuated loyalty of their chiefs to Charles Edward Stuart. After Culloden, while Charles did his best to drink himself into forgetfulness of his helpless dupes, the British set out ruthlessly to break down the clan system. This policy was later followed by enclosures, and when it became increasingly difficult for the clansmen to get a living in the Highlands, whole villages departed in communal ships to Canada. They settled in small, closely-knit communities in the Maritimes, in Ontario and even in Quebec, and, though they retained the Gaelic, they quickly set out to learn English. Few peoples, with the possible exception of the Japanese, have ever accommodated themselves more rapidly to the methods of European civilization. They remembered their past, but in a spirit which Santayana would commend, for they had no intention of repeating it. Loyal by tradition and nature they might be, but they would never again be loyal in the suicidal spirit of Cameron of Lochiel.

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Thus, if the members of each of these original groups which settled Canada had been able to voice their feelings in the hour of their tragedy, they would have spoken identical words: "Never again will we submit ourselves to the humiliation of being discarded by the friends for whom we were prepared to give everything we had."

For a time the distinct sections of what came to be known as British North America were governed as individual colonies of Great Britain. And then the growing pains of the American Republic caused a series of crises which directly affected these provinces to the north. Through their response to these new challenges they finally became a self-governing Dominion with a national psychology based directly on the past history of the three original groups.

The first crisis was the War of 1812. American armies were repulsed from their invasion of Canadian soil by the joint efforts of the Loyalists and the French-Canadians, assisted by small bodies of British regulars. For Canada, it was a decisive victory.

The second crisis was precipitated by President Polk over the question of the western boundary. Canadians were once more prepared to fight if invaded. War was averted, but Polk's imperialism made the Loyalists and the French realize that they had more to gain by standing together than by bickering.

The third and most serious crisis arose out of the resentment felt by Americans against the British at the time of the Civil War. Even before Lincoln's first inauguration, Canadians had viewed Seward with justifiable alarm. Their apprehensions reached a climax when the war ended and Lincoln's restraining influence was removed. Some American statesmen talked openly of annexing Canada in reprisal for British "violations" of neutrality during the Civil War. The American action of terminating the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 was viewed by British North America as a direct threat. The answer of the provinces was to form, in 1867, the Confederation which made Canada a nation in fact, with a federal parliament of her own. Thus, without meaning to do so, the United States brought about the establishment of a nation composed of peoples who had no desire to unite, but who — true to the lesson their respective pasts had taught them — chose union with each other in preference to absorption by another state which would care nothing for the respective heritages they cherished.

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It was in the years following Confederation that the present era of friendship and good will between Canada and the United States began. Confederation proved to American statesmen that Canada was not a military outpost of Great Britain, and with the departure of suspicion on one side and fear on the other, the sentiments of Canadians rapidly warmed to their southern neighbor. The Puritan descendants of the Loyalists, now that the slaves were liberated, were at last willing to admit that the Revolution had been not only successful, but had been fought with loftier motives than to keep Sam Adams and John Hancock out of jail. Although Great Britain was respected and even loved by English-Canada, and though loyalty to the Crown was inculcated in the schools, Canadians were always conscious of being North Americans.

Now the great saga of continental development was being celebrated by American writers and propagandists, soon to be followed by American motion pictures and radio, and this saga was part of the blood and bone of the Canadian people. American spokesmen constantly expressed ideas and emotions which Canadians shared. The analogy to the good wife appears once more. A man triumphs over great adversities, he civilizes a wilderness, he becomes rich and performs feats that stupefy the world. He boasts and glories in his achievement, and the world recognizes and honors him. His wife remains silent, but she knows in her heart that to more than a small extent his story is also her own.

So much for the good wife analogy. One returns inevitably to the career of William Lyon MacKenzie King, because he must be explained, at least in part, in any study of Canada today. This solitary bachelor with the tufted eyebrows, with a voice like that of a Presbyterian minister and a face which contrives to be both well-plumped and rugged at the same time, has done more than retain personal power for a record number of years. He is one of the few constructive political geniuses of the century. The fact that his face, as he has grown older, has assumed the expression of a watchdog pretending to be meek and melancholy is no accident.

During a good part of the Second World War, Mr. King was probably the most unpopular man in Canada. It was his aim to keep Canada united, to enable her to work for victory in the widest sense of the term, and to guide her towards a larger, inde-

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pendent development as a nation. For six years he walked the tightrope with confidence because he knew that the maintenance of social stability is, in Canada, a categorical imperative. He knew that no matter how deep lie the emotions of the people, no matter how profound their frustrations, French and English alike have an overriding common aim upon which the Canadian national character, whatever its individual manifestations may be, firmly rests. Both groups know subconsciously that the security their ancestors lost so dramatically, and which their descendants so painfully regained, must be preserved at any price. Again and again, Canadians have shown that whenever their emotions come into conflict with this principle, the principle will prevail.

In the autumn of 1944, during what came to be known as the Conscription Crisis, the emotions of English-Canada were represented by the late Colonel Ralston, Minister of Defense. All thought they knew the French point of view: Quebec threatened secession if conscription was imposed. Mr. King, remembering how badly national unity had been bruised by the conscription bill of 1917, contrived by various dexterities to postpone the issue as long as enlistments were meeting needs. But in 1944 it could be postponed no longer. Mounting casualties had struck the nation with grief and threatened the effectiveness of the army.

The real issue at stake — whether or not the nation should permit the generous volunteer to assume an extra burden of danger which compulsory service might mitigate — was kept by the Prime Minister as far in the background as possible. His technical skill in doing this reached the levels of necromancy, for at this period the Puritan conscience of English-Canada was working overtime. Colonel Ralston was embittered because he felt that a moral wrong was being committed before his eyes. The issue *should* stand forth. The nation should face its own conscience at home if it was afterwards to face its returned volunteers.

In the eyes of English-Canada, Ralston became a hero overnight. His rôle was infinitely more popular than the Prime Minister's could possibly be, and he was totally sincere. Mr. King's behavior at this time was respected by hardly anyone; yet, when passions subsided, it was recognized that he had displayed a moral courage of the most difficult kind, for it was the essence of his position that he had to make himself appear to the public to

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be less of a man than his antagonist, vacillating and weak while inwardly he not only knew himself to be right, but to be the strongest man in the country. Colonel Ralston so forcefully opposed Mr. King's policy of temporizing that his resignation was demanded by the Prime Minister. General MacNaughton, whose devotion to the army was unquestioned, for a few days seemed to be in agreement with Mr. King. The issue became too clouded for emotional intensity to find any direct outlet. Thus Mr. King, by playing on the national psychology with the skill of a magician, managed to save everything at once: the unbroken continuance of the war effort, the life of the government, national unity and his own place in history. The bill was passed in such a way that the English got their reinforcements, while the French, though losing on the actual issue, were able to feel that their stand on conscription had not only been morally right, but that English-Canada was grateful to them for having sacrificed their principles for the sake of national unity. Even Colonel Ralston, still a member of Parliament though out of the Cabinet, suppressed the enormous emotion he was feeling during the tense debate on the issue and conducted himself with calm dignity. He uttered no word against Quebec, he cast no slur on the integrity of the Prime Minister's tactics even when he most abhorred them. He was sufficiently Canadian to know that he himself, like his fellow-countrymen of both races, could never take the ultimate action which would wreck Confederation.

Mr. King's entire career has been marked by such feats, and there is no doubt that Canada owes much of her present stature to his strange species of resolution. Unfortunately, there is a debit side to his influence. In all of his public utterances he has described Canada in terms so uninteresting that only a man with superhuman determination could have kept the pattern so consistent. He never allowed anyone else to speak for him in the press, he discouraged photographers, he reduced to the barest minimum all attempts to dramatize Canada's rôle in the war. He must clearly have felt that the growing exuberance of a people awakening at last to their own strength and to a new vision of their country's beauties was dangerous.

Habits of thought are as difficult to break in nations as in individuals. Although Mr. King has encouraged some of the ablest young men in the country to enter public life, the effect of his ponderous insistence on removing all human contrasts and

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color from political activity will be reflected in Canada's relations with other countries for some time to come. But it will not last forever. Strong forces from outside are helping strong forces from within. Canadians of the younger generation are much less inhibited than their parents. With the advent of Mr. St. Laurent — an urbane, integrated man of great personal charm — Canadian public life already seems less chilly than it was. A considerable body of art and literature is beginning to be recognized as the visible, articulate expression of a new facet of the national character. Canadians are thus feeding their own hungry longing for self-expression and self-realization, and a wider understanding on the part of the rest of the world is bound to follow.

The same basic principle which has guided Canada through the maelstrom of local emotions into nationhood is today the basis of her foreign policy. Though it cannot be repeated too often that Canadians like and respect the United States, few of them would consider that a world dominated wholly by American methods and American materialism would be an unqualified blessing for mankind. Canada is more than thankful that the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt led Americans out of their former immaturity in international affairs, but her present orientation towards Washington does not imply a rejection of Great Britain. Canadians recognize, as the British do themselves, that the center of gravity has moved not only to Washington, but to the whole North American continent.

The day when the Canadian character could be adequately represented by mounted policemen, husky dogs, trappers, scenery and big game has disappeared. Canadians may seem to the world to be less colorful figures than their own tourist advertisements make them out to be, but American statesmen who frequent international conferences have been known to say that they feel more at ease with Canadians than with the representatives of any other nation. Of course they do. Instinctively, if not consciously, they know that Canadians understand their motives completely; their neighbors to the north are probably the only people in the world who regard the United States with a respect untainted by so much as a single grain of envy.

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EUROPE AFTER 1952

The Long-Term Recovery Problem

By John H. Williams

LAST July in these pages I discussed the task of European recovery.[1] We were then in the initial stage. The Economic Coöperation Act had been passed at the beginning of April. The far-flung organization of E.C.A. had been set up, with its central office in Washington under Mr. Hoffman, its Paris office under Mr. Harriman, and its American delegations in the individual European countries[2] covered by the Marshall Plan. Sir Oliver Franks' European Committee (C.E.E.C.), which at Secretary Marshall's invitation had made the original survey of the problem in Paris in the summer of 1947, had been followed in April by the permanent Organization for European Economic Coöperation, consisting of a Secretariat under Robert Marjolin, an Executive Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Edmund Hall-Patch, and a Council headed by Premier Spaak of Belgium.

It was a strenuous period, with everything needing to be done at once — the recruiting of personnel, the finding of quarters, the setting up of administrative procedures, the determination and allotment of the amounts and kinds of aid and sources of supply, first for the spring quarter of 1948 and then for the first full year, July-June 1948-49. From the start it was recognized that means must be found to revive trade within Western Europe itself, which was seriously lagging behind the recovery both of European production and of trade with the outside world; and, as one main approach to this problem, the European and American organizations devoted about four months to the difficult task of working out the Agreement for Intra-European Payments and Compensations, which was adopted last October. By then it was time to prepare the program for the second year, 1949-50, for presentation to Congress in February.

All this, quite apart from the immense detail involved in the day-to-day administration, suggests a most busy calendar for the first year of the recovery program. Yet it leaves out the year's most significant development. The Marshall Plan had been con-

[1] John H. Williams, "The Task of Economic Recovery." *Foreign Affairs*, July 1948.

[2] Sixteen countries plus three occupied territories, the Bizone and the French zone in Germany, and Trieste.

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ceived from the beginning as a long-term program, combining self-help, and mutual help, on the part of the European countries, with the provision of aid on our part, with the objective, as stated in our Act, of making Western Europe independent of "extraordinary outside assistance" by July 1, 1952. Mr. Hoffman, therefore, in July of last year called upon the European Organization to produce a master four-year plan for reaching this objective. The O.E.E.C. Secretariat promptly sent out a questionnaire to the 19 European participants with a request that they prepare their individual four-year plans. In November and December these plans were presented to the Executive Committee by each country in turn and subjected to discussion by the others. Meanwhile, the Secretariat and the Executive Committee undertook an over-all analysis of the plans, which was approved and published by the Council on December 30 in the form of an "Interim Report on the European Recovery Program."

II

This report has been hailed by *The Economist* as "one of the great economic texts of our generation." It is not a "master plan," but a further step in the analysis of the problem in the light of the composite picture which emerges from the 19 individual plans. It was to be expected that, at least on paper, the individual countries, faced with their solemn undertaking under the Marshall Plan to achieve viability in four years with our aid, would find a way to do so. But it was to be expected also that the plans, prepared separately, would when put together reveal incompatibilities. One thing that the summing up brings out is that the countries in the aggregate were counting on an intra-European surplus to pay part of their dollar deficit, and when this manifest impossibility is allowed for, they come out with a dollar deficit of $1.3 billion, a sterling area (outside Europe) surplus of $700,000,000, an almost even balance with the rest of the world (a $200,000,000 deficit), and a net dollar deficit of $800,000,000. But this the O.E.E.C., after a most thorough analysis, finds much too optimistic; and it concludes that, unless "drastic changes in present policies" are made, Western Europe will in 1952-53 fall short of covering its planned imports from the outside world by $3 billion. This means that as compared with the current year, July-June 1948-49, when the amount of

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aid being provided is $4.875 billion, we shall by June 1952 have gone considerably less than halfway toward our objective, unless "drastic changes in policies" are made.

This conclusion, if accepted as valid, will come as a shock to the American people, who have been assured that the Marshall Plan is a program of aid to end aid. It should also shake whatever complacency there may have been in Europe. But the report, though realistic, is not defeatist. A joint recovery program, as it points out, must be prepared in three stages: first the individual plans, second their examination in the present report, to isolate the problems and clarify the issues, and third the "plans of action," which, in association with E.C.A., the European Organization now proposes to undertake "to resolve the serious problems that have emerged."

Thus far, though substantial progress has been made in expanding European production, and some countries, notably Britain, have made definite headway in closing the gap in their external balance, there has been little coördinated attack upon the problem as a whole. The emphasis in Europe has been mostly on self-help rather than on mutual help; and here at home, except perhaps in point four of the President's inaugural address, our thinking seems not to have got much beyond the providing of aid on an *ad hoc,* year-to-year basis.

III

The important question, of course, is how good a case the report makes out for its conclusion. In work of this sort the margins of error are inevitably large. The national programs vary widely in quality and contain various sorts of estimates, many of them merely forecasts in areas of economic activity in which governments exert little positive control. The general outcome in 1952 will be much affected by conditions in the outside world. It must be recognized, too, that the external balance is a net figure; even the O.E.E.C. estimated dollar deficit is only 12 percent of the planned imports, and about 7 percent of total foreign transactions, export and import; and a very small fraction indeed of total Western European production, which is estimated for 1952 at $170 to $180 billion.

On the other hand, the report itself, though decidedly more pessimistic than the individual plans, contains, as I shall indicate later, some estimates that might be considered optimistic. But

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perhaps the most significant fact is that all three surveys that we have had of this problem — the C.E.E.C. report of September 1947, the Harriman Committee appraisal of that report, and now this one — have come out with a substantial dollar deficit still remaining in 1952. One of the things that interest me most about the present report, as compared with the initial Paris report, is that while in the earlier years the deficits are this time smaller — the Paris report estimated a deficit in 1948 of over $8 billion against an actual deficit of about $5 billion, and a 1949 deficit of about $6 billion against perhaps $4.5 billion actually — the estimated deficits for the later years are in this new survey larger than in the old one. For some time it has been my view that such an outcome might well be expected, and that the problem might increasingly present itself as an approach to a plateau, which might be fairly quickly reached, but which once reached might prove difficult to get beyond.

IV

Granted that the estimated dollar deficit after the Marshall Plan has ended may be subject to a considerable margin of error, what we are mainly concerned with is the nature of the problem, and the reasons why, after this more intensive analysis, the O.E.E.C. is led to conclude that the gap will be serious. I would not myself hazard a guess as to what the deficit may be in 1952, but I am much impressed with the stubbornness of the problem, which is not merely whether the deficit can be wiped out in 1952, but whether means can be found to prevent its reappearing.

There have developed in the literature two schools of thought that are traceable as far back as the controversies over German reparations after World War I. They might be called the national income approach and the balance-of-payments (or, as we then called it, the transfer) approach to the problem. The difference lies mainly in the emphasis placed on internal and external aspects. The old problem was how to (a) produce within Germany and (b) transfer to other countries substantial yearly amounts of reparation payments. This time the question is how to expand Western Europe's production sufficiently beyond the prewar level to enable it to pay with current goods and services for imports which formerly were received in payment of "invisible" income representing the earnings from foreign invest-

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ments, built up over generations, and from services. Western Europe's invisible income before the war was roughly $2 billion a year, whereas in 1947 there was a net deficit on invisible account of about $750,000,000. The actual trade deficit in 1947 was, of course, much larger than this shift of $2.75 billion in the invisible account, the difference representing in large part the wartime destruction and disruption of production and trade. But the loss of invisible income is the hard core of the problem. To overcome it involves much more than simple recovery from war.

This brings us back to the question of relative emphasis on internal and external factors. By emphasizing the expansibility of production and making optimistic assumptions about the external trade and payment adjustments expected to follow, the attainment of Western European viability by 1952 can be made to appear less difficult than the O.E.E.C. report suggests. The national programs call for an expansion of 30 percent beyond prewar in industrial production, and 15 percent in agriculture, for a combined total of $170 to $180 billion by 1952. Though the report estimates that actual production may fall short of this goal by 4 to 8 percent, or by as much as $15 billion, it would still seem that, unless the external aspects of the problem are very difficult indeed, such an expansion of production should be adequate to overcome Western Europe's dollar deficit. Moreover, the expansion that has already been achieved is impressive. For the full year 1948, industrial production, excluding Western Germany, was 14 percent beyond 1938, and including Western Germany, about equal to 1938; whereas after World War I, production did not recover to the prewar level until 1925. Even in Western Germany there has been marked improvement since the currency reform last June, though it is yet too soon to say whether inflation has been permanently halted.

This improvement in production is encouraging. But its implications for the future are subject to important qualifications. European recovery since the end of the war has been irregular. There was pronounced expansion up to the end of 1946, followed by a serious setback in 1947 because of bad harvests, the drawing down of domestic stocks in the preceding expansion, the fuel shortage, and the need of raw materials from abroad. Over the whole situation hung the interrelated maladies of domestic inflation and external deficits which led to such events as the British

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convertibility crisis and the astonishingly rapid melting away of our loan, and to a runaway rise of prices in France and the threatened exhaustion within a few months of French gold and dollar reserves. But by the last quarter of 1947, the recovery had been resumed, and the most significant fact about 1948 appears to be that the level of output, though much above 1947 as a whole, has revealed a sidewise tendency, not much above the level reached at the end of 1947. As stated in a recent United Nations report, "in many branches of industry production seemed to have reached the limits of available capacity and manpower."[3] Even in England, an approach to a plateau seems to be indicated in the figures of production (though not as yet in exports) since the last quarter of 1947. In Italy there is substantial unemployment, and even Belgium, which was a leader in the earlier recovery, has been recently encountering difficulties, with reports of unemployment in certain industries.

Another important qualification, of course, is that European progress thus far has been accompanied, practically throughout the postwar period, by substantial American aid and affords by itself little indication of what the level of production will turn out to be when the aid is cut off. This leads to the investment aspect of the problem. The Western European countries have been quite right in recognizing that it is only by increasing their productive capacity and their productivity through investment that they can hope to overcome their external deficit. With the level of consumption some 20 percent below prewar, there is surely not much further room for belt-tightening. On the contrary, it seems clear, for political as well as economic reasons, that the scale of living must be raised, at the same time that exports must be expanded relative to imports. The European Recovery Program, if it is to be anything other than a subsidy indefinitely continued, must be directed toward investment. But an investment program for Western Europe presents difficult questions of timing, composition, and size. Most of the countries have investment programs amounting to 20 percent or more of gross national product, a ratio that is high even as compared

[3] "Major Economic Changes in 1948." New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. This statement relates to the first nine months of 1948. An E.C.A. report received since the above was written ("Recovery Guides," February 1949) indicates new peaks in both production and trade in the last quarter of 1948, combined output in the O.E.E.C. countries (including Western Germany) being "13 percent above the last quarter of 1947, and 5 percent above the 1938 level."

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with that of the United States in boom years. These plans will need to be examined carefully in relation to such factors as their possible inflationary effects, the level of consumption implied, the monetary, fiscal and direct control policies the programs will require, and the relation of investment to the changes in international trade and payments which constitute the goal of the Recovery Program.

In breaking down the aggregates, there should be a strong presumption in favor of shorter-run as against longer-run investment, and in favor of capital outlays that contribute directly to increased output and productivity as against (within the tolerable limits) those for housing and general welfare which contribute only indirectly. The most essential consideration is that the investment programs should be properly geared into the foreign trade and payment changes contemplated in the four-year programs. As they now stand, the national programs include much uneconomic duplication, and seem in considerable degree directed toward achieving national self-sufficiency rather than an integrated expansion of production and trade for Western Europe as a whole. The timing in some of them also seems badly conceived, since they attempt to crowd into four years plans for mechanization of agriculture, for example, which might require 10 or 15 years. There is excessive emphasis on oil and oil refining, for a continent that can be self-sufficient in coal, and should so far as possible make do with what it has when it is under the necessity of holding imports to the essential minimum. There is a very large emphasis on textiles, traditionally a major European export, but one that historically has proved particularly vulnerable as other parts of the world have become industrialized. One of the most significant announcements made by O.E.E.C. officials since the publication of the report is that they now propose to examine these investment programs intensively in consultation with the European Governments in an effort to obtain this year a better balanced and coördinated program.

One of the chief difficulties thus far has been the effect of investment on inflation. Investment expenditures increase money incomes without producing, until some time later, goods on which the incomes can be spent. Unless, therefore, increased investment is accompanied by increased saving, prices rise, pressure for wage increases follows, and there ensues the familiar

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inflationary spiral; or if attempts are made to hold down prices and wage rates by direct controls, the excess purchasing power generated by investment expenditures presses into less essential employments requiring ever-widening circles of control. Investment has been a major dilemma for most European countries. They cannot achieve external viability without it, but if its effects are inflationary they defeat the purpose by stimulating imports, reducing exports, and diverting to home consumption production and expenditure needed to reduce the foreign deficit. The cure is to take off the excess purchasing power through monetary and fiscal restrictive measures (supplemented in varying degree in different countries by direct controls), [4] and so far as these are not fully effective to cut back the investment programs. Following the British convertibility crisis in 1947, Sir Stafford Cripps found it necessary to use all of these methods, though still leaving British investment at 20 percent of gross national product; and the success of the anti-inflationary policies has undoubtedly had much to do with Britain's marked progress over the past year and a half in overcoming her external deficit. The Bizone currency reform, though the final outcome is still uncertain, is having similar effects. Belgium's method has been to follow up her early, and strikingly successful, currency reform with a policy of keeping the gap between money and goods filled with consumption goods produced for home and foreign markets. But this policy not only collides with the need of other countries to restrict consumption — the "austerity" policy — but is definitely short-run since it threatens to leave Belgium behind in the race for productivity and productive expansion which the logic of Europe's position makes imperative.

The most stubborn case of inflation has been that of France. Traditionally, the French economy has been the best balanced, as between industry and agriculture, in Western Europe, and France has today less of a problem of structural change in her balance of payments than most of the other major countries. Yet she is now receiving, directly and indirectly, the largest amount of E.C.A. aid — more than a quarter of the whole — and Britain, which has the most difficult international problem (unless it be the Bizone) and the one of greatest consequence for world trade equilibrium, is now in effect sharing in the

[4] There is not room for discussion of general versus direct controls, or "open" versus "repressed" inflation; see my earlier paper, *op. cit.*, p. 624–626.

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provision (or more precisely in the direction) of that aid under the Intra-European Payments Agreement. The main road to viability for France is through correction of inflation, and the chief question to be asked of the French program is whether the corrective measures outlined will be adequate and will be feasible. Until an answer is given, inflation constitutes a threat not only to viability for France but to the success of the entire E.C.A. program. While it lasts, French imports will remain abnormally high and exports abnormally low; the flight of capital, both externally and into hoarding at home, will continue; and France will threaten to divert increasingly to herself E.C.A. aid which should go to others. The French inflation presents a many-sided problem. One thing, if the statistics are right, it seems not to be is a scarcity inflation, which is always more difficult to correct. The increase in production, and particularly in agriculture since the bad harvest of 1947, has apparently kept pace with that of other countries. But bank credit has been too readily available, including borrowing from the Bank of France; taxes have been too low and tax evasion widespread; capital flight indicates a fundamental lack of confidence in the currency and in stability of the Government. The problem is more political than economic, and a strong government might, as once before, work a miracle overnight. The worst feature has been the outrunning of wage rates by prices; this is definitely an inflation at the expense of the poor. The solution must be to bring prices down, rather than put wages up; and until that happens, France may continue to be fertile soil for Communist-inspired unrest. There may, however, now be grounds for hoping that the French inflation has passed its worst phase.

V

Until inflation is overcome, we cannot get the true measure of Western Europe's external problem. But the relation runs both ways, and in varying degrees the pressures imposed upon the countries by their international position are a cause as well as an effect of the internal inflation. Even where inflation has been arrested, the expansibility of production is dependent upon finding foreign outlets for goods and foreign sources of supply. In 1938 imports were 13 percent of national income for France, 20 percent for the United Kingdom, 29 percent for the Benelux countries, and 32 percent for Norway, as against less than 5

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percent for the United States. In 1952, according to the national plans, 80 to 90 percent of exports to the outside world will consist of manufactured goods; and on the import side raw materials and fuel supplies will constitute 55 percent, and food 38 percent. One of the greatest difficulties for such countries is that the close interdependence of imports and exports imposes severe limitations upon the possibilities of reshaping the structure of trade, and hence the internal economy. It is from this point of view that the reducibility of Western Europe's dollar deficit presents its most stubborn aspect; and it is in this light that the loss of invisible income is most serious. In 1938, 65 percent of Western Europe's imports were financed by exports to the outside world, 30 percent by invisible earnings, and 5 percent by reserves, borrowing and gifts; in 1947, these proportions had changed to exports 38 percent and use of reserves, borrowing, and gifts 62 percent, with a net deficit of 4.8 percent in invisible earnings. According to the national plans for 1952-53, exports and invisible earnings are expected to expand to a point where they could pay for 94 percent of the imports from the outside world.

How this is to be attempted, and with what prospects of success, is the central theme of the O.E.E.C. report. As I said earlier, some of the report's own assumptions may be optimistic. Though not without some questioning, it takes over from the individual reports a conversion of a deficit of $750,000,000 on invisible account in 1947 into a net surplus of $1.3 billion in 1952. This is to consist wholly of income from services (with income from investment showing a net deficit of $200,000,000), which would mean more than doubling the income from services in 1938. Generous allowances are made for the growth of tourist expenditures, immigrants' remittances, shipping earnings, and "other items" ($555,000,000), which appear principally to be earnings from oil properties and to derive mainly from the British plan. This expected change in the invisible account must be emphasized, because, though the figures are not large as related to total foreign trade, they are large in relation to the net dollar deficit. A change of $2 billion, such as is here indicated, is more than twice the size of the net dollar deficit shown in the individual plans, and two-thirds as large as the deficit estimated in the O.E.E.C. report. To the extent that the loss of the invisible earnings can be thus restored directly, the

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need of changing the structure and pattern of Western Europe's trade is reduced, quite out of proportion to the total magnitude of trade. This should surely be one main line of attack on Western Europe's problem; and it raises serious questions — for example, about shipping and oil — as to how American policies and actions are involved, in ways that go beyond merely charging the taxpayer for E.C.A. dollars, if we really want to see a viable Europe.

But it is only after allowing for this favorable change in invisible income that the O.E.E.C. report makes its estimate of a net dollar deficit of $3 billion in 1952. This is based on an analysis of the trade changes envisaged in the individual plans. The focal points of the problem are the behavior over the next three years of the United States balance of payments in relation to that of Western Europe, and the behavior of both toward the outside world. These relations, together with any change in the proportions of intra- and extra-Western European trade, embrace all possible alternatives. As to intra-Western European trade, the plans reveal that the volume, which in 1947 was about 60 percent of the 1938 level, is expected to recover by 1952-53 only to the 1938 level. This at first sight seems surprising. There is a presumption that an area which has lost its means of obtaining an excess of imports (the invisible income) from the outside world would feel compelled to provide a larger proportion of its needs from within. Yet the fact that thus far this trade has lagged so badly is perhaps the most striking proof that the loss of invisible income is the hard core of the European problem. Formerly the pattern of intra-European trade rested on a German export surplus to the others and a large surplus of imports (some half billion dollars) by Britain from the Continent; but this triangle rested in turn upon Western Europe's — and particularly Britain's — invisible income from overseas. With the loss of the latter, the whole internal structure has collapsed. Now Britain is a net exporter to the Continent — though only our E.C.A. dollars makes this possible — and in her four-year plan she is counting on a moderate export surplus with Western Europe after 1952, while the plans of the other countries reveal that they are counting on getting back their export surplus with Britain, on about the prewar scale. Meanwhile, with the German economy so drastically altered by partition, and with a compelling urge throughout Western Europe toward austerity, which

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works heavily against luxury goods previously so important in intra-European trade, there are strong arguments for the view that Western Europe must be more, rather than less, dependent on its trade with the outside world than she was before the war. The figures, moreover, are large. To regain the 1938 level of intra-Western European imports by 1952 will mean that these imports must be increased by $3 billion, or about 50 percent, over their level in 1947. No other trade change in a single area contemplated by the plans approaches this in size, excepting only the planned contraction of imports from the United States, which is the other main horn of the dilemma. Though there is not space for discussion, it seems clear that one thing badly needed for recovery of intra-Western European trade is revision of the Payments Plan, which as it now functions provides the wrong incentives. Bad performance by a country (in the sense of failing to expand exports to the other participants) is rewarded by that country's getting in effect a larger share of E.C.A. dollars, through the operation of the scheme of "drawing rights" and "contributions," and good performance is penalized. Perhaps the most feasible objective for the next few years with respect to intra-Western European trade, and the one promising the most expansion of trade, would be to aim at more balanced trade within the area, reducing the present substantial debtor-creditor positions.

VI

Though one of the main tasks for Europe this year, in appraising and coördinating its national programs, must be to see to what extent and in what ways intra-European trade can be developed, the solution of the dollar deficit problem must be mainly sought through expansion of Western Europe's exports to the outside world, and through a shift in the sources from which it draws its imports. The national programs call for imports from outside the area in 1952-53 about equal in volume to those in 1938, and very slightly larger than in 1947; but within this aggregate Britain is planning a drastic reduction, to 78 percent of 1938 (she has got imports down already to about 82 percent), and most of the others are planning increases — France 7 percent beyond 1938, Western Germany 14 percent, Italy 37 percent. Granted that real income is higher in Britain than on the Continent, and that her ability to make direct controls

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effective is superior, it does seem questionable for the Continental countries to put the whole burden of achieving viability upon the expansibility of exports. Britain began that way, but after the convertibility crisis of 1947 when our loan ran out, she had to tighten import controls further, cut consumption further, and supply a larger fraction of it out of home production. Britain is planning a 50 percent expansion in agriculture over prewar, France 25 percent, and the others, in the aggregate, no change. More food from within, less of nonessential or less essential imports (I have mentioned oil), in these and other ways there should be some room for reducing imports even though, as I said earlier, the scale of living on the Continent must be raised above its present dangerous level.

Yet the main solution must be sought through expanding exports and shifting the sources of imports. The national plans call for an expansion of exports to the world outside Western Europe by one-third beyond 1938. But in 1947 such exports were only about two-thirds of 1938, so that what is involved is virtually doubling the 1947 exports by 1952; this would be an increase of $5.1 billion over 1947, and $2.65 billion over 1938. In what markets could such a volume of goods be sold, and where, except here, could the necessary materials and food supplies be found? It is after asking these questions and examining the data and the conditions area by area throughout the world that the O.E.E.C. report concludes that the plans are unduly optimistic. It concludes that, unless the policies of the Western European countries are "radically changed," it is unlikely that total exports to the outside world will greatly exceed the 1938 level. The individual plans call for exports in 1952-53 of $10.6 billion; this the report reduces to $8.5 billion, which would be only 7 percent above 1938 but 57 percent above 1947.[5] A further very interesting conclusion is that even a "radical change" in policies (what is meant I will consider later) would not, in O.E.E.C's opinion, increase exports by more than $1 billion or $1.5 billion and would thus still leave a substantial dollar deficit in 1952.

It is the area analysis that is the high point of the O.E.E.C. report. The two chief questions are how to shift Western European imports away from the United States, and how to find markets for exports. Before the war, less than a third of West-

[5] Thirty-seven percent over the level planned in the 1948–49 program.

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ern Europe's imports came from North and Central America, as against about 60 percent in 1947. Imports from the rest of the world in 1947 were down $3.6 billion from 1938,[6] and those from North and Central America were up $3.2 billion. The national programs propose to swing the composition back to something like that of 1938, to cut the imports from North and Central America by nearly half, a cut of $3.5 billion, and make this up by expansion of imports from the rest of the world. To do this, and at the same time find markets for an increased volume of exports, the plans strike out boldly in every direction. By 1952, exports to North and Central America are to be increased by nearly half over 1938 (more than double 1947) and exports to South America almost doubled (165 percent over 1947); exports to the sterling area are to be increased by two-thirds, exports to Eastern Europe are to be increased to 80 percent of 1938 (almost treble the volume of 1947), and those to the Far East are to be expanded to beyond the prewar level.

The export targets to the areas outside North America constitute the main grounds for pessimism in the O.E.E.C. report. With the chaotic conditions in the Far East not much can be counted on there. About South America, the facts are that imports have expanded by 75 percent over 1938, and will probably have to contract, now that the South American countries are running out of gold and dollars. Practically all of the increase in imports has been from us; to reach the export target set in the O.E.E.C. national plans ($1 billion over 1938, and $1.25 billion over 1947) would require a "reduction of at least one-half in the United States market in South America in 1947." Prospects for expansion of exports to the sterling area are not encouraging. This is the only area in which Western Europe's exports have already recovered to the prewar level; she has 70 percent of the market there for manufactures. But South Africa is now in trouble, through the fall in the purchasing power of gold, and must restrict her imports. India has a program for industrialization, involving restriction of competing imports. Australia's and New Zealand's ability to import has been stimulated by high prices for their agricultural exports, but now the tide is turning. A further increase of a billion dollars, such as

[6] The breakdown of the decline in 1947 compared with 1938 is: sterling area (outside Europe) $900,000,000, Eastern Europe $2.1 billion, other countries (China, Japan, parts of the Middle East, Spain) $700,000,000.

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the plans call for, in Western Europe's exports to the sterling area by 1952 does not seem likely.

It may well be that the most promising area, apart from exports to us, is in the east-west European trade. Before the war, Western Europe's exports to Eastern Europe amounted to $2.5 billion. The collapse of this trade after the war represents one of the most damaging gaps in the whole trade structure. But, as I said in my paper last year, it may be fully as damaging to the east as to the west. Since then, there have been a number of signs that point in that direction. In 1948, there was a substantial revival of east-west trade. British trade, in particular, is now higher in money terms than in 1938, and about two-thirds of it in volume; and British determination to develop it further is evidenced by the recent Anglo-Polish five-year trade agreement. What is now mainly lacking to restore east-west trade to the prewar level is the participation of Western Germany and Russia, with the former — so far as the trade comparison with prewar is concerned — being much the more important. The Bizone four-year plan calls for a rise in exports to and imports from Eastern Europe of half a billion dollars each. Ambitious though this is for so short a period, it has a solid basis in the prewar exchange of German manufactures (including capital goods) against Eastern European food and raw materials; and it deserves the most careful consideration by the Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva, which includes representatives of both eastern and western countries. That Commission is now engaged, apparently with general consent, upon a systematic survey of export-import requirements by each group from the other. Such a study, if it results in action by the governments, could be an important supplement to the work of O.E.E.C. in Paris. The O.E.E.C. countries, according to the national programs, are planning to import $2.3 billion of goods from Eastern Europe in 1952-53 (17 percent of their total imports) and to export $2 billion (19 percent of their total exports). Next to the relations with ourselves, nothing would go farther to create a viable Europe than the success of these plans for east-west trade.

VII

The main problem, however, lies in the direct trade with us. Western Europe's exports to North and Central America in

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1941 amounted to only $1 billion, against imports from this area of more than $7 billion. We provided 60 percent of Western Europe's imports but took only 20 percent of her exports. Her total imports were about equal in volume to those of 1938, but her total exports were only about two-thirds of 1938. These figures give the main explanation of the dollar deficit, and the magnitude of the problem involved in trying to remove it with our E.C.A. program by 1952. If the program is to succeed, the imports from us will have to be cut back at least to the pre-war volume, a cut of some $3.5 billion, or financed by some other means than E.C.A. dollars. It would seem, too, that exports to us would have to increase by about as much, if the figures of the O.E.E.C. report are to be accepted. No other way of removing the $3 billion net deficit which the report estimates for 1952 is suggested by it; nor would any other alternative carry much conviction in the light of the analysis of the whole problem as I have reviewed it.

As between cutting imports from us and expanding exports to us, it seems correct to say that, if E.C.A. aid is cut off in 1952, the former is more certain than the latter. It cannot of course be merely assumed that our export program will end, since it is the result of economic and political (and military) compulsions which may in some degree be continuing after 1952. It cannot be overlooked that the whole program is based on the conception of a tolerable living standard, which it is in our interest as well as Europe's to maintain. But it has up to now been our national intention, firmly and repeatedly expressed, to cut the program off on schedule; and I am merely indicating that if we do, there will be more certainty of our exports to Europe declining drastically than of Europe's exports to us rising in anything like the same volume. One is struck in reading the national plans, and even the O.E.E.C. report, by how little real confidence there seems to be in the expansibility of Europe's exports to this country. Though the national plans call for an expansion of exports of $5 billion between 1947 and 1952, which would mean doubling them, they expect to get only one billion of this increase in our market; and though the O.E.E.C. report writes down the other export targets, and quite rightly says that the large potential market is here, it does not hazard any figure beyond saying that "if enough vigor is applied, the estimates might be exceeded." Even the very decided improvement in

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Britain's trade position in the last 18 months (which has led to Sir Stafford Cripps' recent statement that Britain is already almost viable, except that she cannot use her non-dollar surplus to cover her dollar deficit) has not included any substantial increase of exports to us. Our total imports in 1948 were about 50 percent higher than in 1938 and appreciably higher than in the good year 1937. But imports from Western Europe have not recovered even to the low 1938 level, and the share of Western Europe in our imports has fallen from 23 percent in 1937 to about 13 percent in 1948.

This pronounced dragging of Europe's exports to us may be due to various causes. No doubt in part it indicates the need for greater initiative, more attention to trade organization and distribution, greater emphasis on market research. It suggests, too, the desirability of examining our tariff, with specific reference to the Marshall Plan. Much has been said in recent years about how our tariff has been liberalized since the middle thirties, by the reciprocal trade agreements, the rise of prices which has reduced the burden of the specific duties, and the further steps we have taken in connection with the I.T.O. negotiations. But I suspect that our tariff still accords effective protection in just the range of goods in which Western Europe might otherwise compete; and beyond the actual protection, there is the potential, which comes to view in discussions, for example, of the effects of Swiss competition on our watch industry, or of British competition on New England woolens. The British now speak hopefully of our market for their small cars, but two answers that I have had from persons in our automobile industry are: first, that the market is only temporary and reflects the scarcity of American new cars, and, second, that if, however, there is a market, we will go after it.

A much larger question is whether the dollar is not now undervalued in relation to European currencies. This would help to explain why Western Europe's exports have done so much better in the sterling area, and even in South America, than here. Undoubtedly the references in the O.E.E.C. report to the need for "radical changes" in policy if Western European exports are to expand substantially mean precisely this; and this clearly is the meaning of the recent announcement by O.E.E.C., since its report was published, that analysis of the problem of "stabilization of currencies" will be one of the major matters on

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its agenda this year. So long as a condition of sellers' markets existed after the war, the European countries were more concerned with avoiding increased cost of imports — so much needed for recovery and reconstruction — than with stimulating exports, which in the world at large were mainly limited by short supply rather than by cost. But with the present indications of change toward buyers' markets the case for currency depreciation has become much stronger, though, if the experience after the first war is any guide, there is a presumption that internal inflation must first be brought under control. I agree with the conclusion, which one can readily read between the lines of the O.E.E.C. report, that there should now be a thorough examination covering the whole field of currency relations. This is a task for the International Monetary Fund as well as for the O.E.E.C. It should include the whole question of discrimination, through direct balance-of-payments control as well as exchange-rate adjustments. This is too technical a subject for discussion here. One important aspect is whether it should be directed against the United States or in favor of Western Europe, which are not necessarily the same things. One effect of the growing scarcity of dollars throughout the world is the incentive it provides for other nations to make reciprocal trade arrangements which bypass us. There have recently been reports, for example, of discrimination in Latin-American countries against our cars and certain other goods and in favor of British, and against American oil-refining equipment in favor of European, even though this may involve serious delay. Such arrangements we can of course deplore, in the name of multilateral trade, but so long as such a pronounced bias of world trade in our favor persists, we ought not to stand in the way of measures which may help to correct it.

VIII

In the background of the whole European trade problem, however, and much the most discouraging aspect of it, is the prewar trend. I have spoken of Western Europe's wartime loss of foreign assets and earnings as the core of her present difficulty. The war, however, merely hastened and completed the great change in regional relations which had been going on since well before the first war. The great expansion of world trade in the nineteenth century was based upon the exchange of Europe's

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manufactures for food and raw materials from the widening world outside; but since the 1870's, the world outside Europe has become increasingly industrialized. Between 1870 and 1913 world production of manufactures increased fourfold, and between 1913 and 1939 it doubled, but world trade in manufactures has been a decreasing fraction; in the 1870's, one-third entered into international trade, in 1913 one-fifth, in 1938 one-tenth. Meanwhile, the United States, with its great land area, its diversified resources, its rapid technological progress, has developed a rounded economy, on a high level of productivity and real income, to a degree never previously witnessed. It now produces more than 40 percent of the world's manufactures, but still relies predominantly on home supplies of food and raw materials. Over the last hundred years, its foreign trade has declined from about 10 percent to less than 5 percent of its national income, compared with percentages of 10 to 30 or higher for the Western European countries. Between the 1870's and the last war, imports of manufactures dropped from about 38 percent of our imports to less than one-quarter, while manufactures grew from one-seventh to about one-half of our total exports. In the process, the United States has looked increasingly to the non-European world for imports, largely in direct exchange for exports, and the share of Europe in our trade has undergone a continuing decline. The effect of the war has been to accentuate this shift, with the result that since the war the United States has been getting not only the bulk of its food and raw material imports from outside Europe but also a substantially larger part than previously of its manufactured imports, while the proportion of manufactures to total imports has diminished further.

This is the much discussed "chronic dollar shortage." One kind of solution of it might be found in American self-sufficiency, which might suggest that, once Europe was restored with our aid, trade would thereafter develop between Europe and the other parts of the world, leaving us comparatively in a backwater, but one which we could endure more readily than others. But, for the short run, this seems most unlikely since it is just the ground I have been covering in the above analysis. And, in the longer run, it seems even more improbable since the tendency for three-quarters of a century has been just the opposite. We have increasingly become a better market for the products of the younger countries and in the process have tended to

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push European manufactures out of their markets as well as our own. What the historical development suggests is that it is Western Europe that is in danger of being left in the backwater.

Exchange-rate adjustments, coupled with direct foreign trade controls, and combined into a policy of discrimination aimed at us, may, together with the E.C.A. program, supply a short-run answer for the problem of Western European viability. But what the longer run answer is to be does not readily suggest itself. Basically, the cure is productivity, and to this the E.C.A. program must be directed, but it seems optimistic indeed to suppose that that kind of solution can be found in four years. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the problem is one in comparative productivity. Our own economy cannot be expected to stand still, and there is much in the history of international trade to suggest that a productivity advantage, once achieved, is cumulative, and thrives even on the measures that, under static conditions, might be expected to offset it. Thus, in the nineteenth century, England's foreign investment increased her own productivity fully as much as that of the countries where her investments were made. Foreign investment is a dynamic process which operates on both ends. This has to be borne in mind when we speak, though still rather vaguely despite Mr. Truman's fourth point, about foreign investment and the export of know-how, as being the logical accompaniment or follow-up policy for the Marshall Plan. Its most likely direction would be to the less developed parts of the world, rather than to Western Europe, in search — on the nineteenth century analogy — of raw materials. We speak hopefully now, as a possible solution of the chronic dollar shortage, of our growing need for petroleum, copper and other materials, though postwar growth of such imports has been, at least in part, the result of wartime shortages. Though for some products, such as rubber and silk, the war has probably reduced our dependence on imports, it does seem probable that in the longer run we shall become more dependent on other countries for raw materials, and that our trade will take on increasingly the character of European nineteenth century trade, an exchange of manufactures for raw materials and even foods. But it is not clear that a flow of capital from us, fostering this process, would greatly benefit Europe, except as, in an expanding world, there might be some room for all to benefit. One

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holdback that European countries seem to have on direct American investment there is that, unless accompanied by substantial increases in productivity, it would further burden their external balance. The experiences of the interwar period with its problems of blocked currencies growing out of private investment have not been forgotten.

IX

In concluding this paper, I am only more impressed with the gravity of the problem. The O.E.E.C. report has prepared the ground for a more intensive discussion of issues and plans of action. It will involve the work of many minds and the weighing of many interests. The announcements by O.E.E.C., since its report, show the direction of thinking in Europe. Besides currency readjustment and coördination of the investment programs — certainly two major facets of the problem — they have emphasized further exploration of the development of Western Europe's overseas territories, an important, but not I think a major short-run, factor, and perhaps somewhat on a par with our own thinking, still vague, about foreign investment as a follow-up on E.C.A. One suggestion, I think by us, which seems to me of major significance, is that O.E.E.C. should take the initial responsibility for the use of the counterpart funds in local currency, which the Western European countries must deposit in amounts equal to our E.C.A. grants, with a view to achieving a better coördinated policy, as regards their relation both to inflation and to investment. Heretofore, these funds have been handled by our local E.C.A. delegations directly with the individual governments. The most significant developments have been the appointment of a steering committee, or super-board, for O.E.E.C., to be composed of representatives of cabinet rank, and the announcement that O.E.E.C. has formally decided to stay in existence after 1952. This, too, I believe, has been, at least in part, the result of E.C.A. suggestion. Another development has been to "extend the understanding of the European public" by authorizing Secretary-General Marjolin to give more frequent information to the press.

One of the basic questions, I believe, in attempts to coördinate European plans for investment and trade relates to the kind of production and trade that Europe should be trying to develop. Heretofore she has to a large extent specialized in the lighter manufactures and in fine quality products, and to the extent pos-

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sible these should be continued. There could be much lost motion involved in throwing out of work crafts and skills acquired over generations, and this is often forgotten when we speak of ambitious plans of integrating Europe on the American pattern, industrially and agriculturally. But this war, like others previously, has given a fresh impetus to industrial development in other parts of the world, and typically it is the imports of lighter manufactures which are restricted by such countries in favor of imports of capital (and consumer durable) goods which they need for development (and greater satisfaction) but have no nearby prospect of producing for themselves. It is interesting that the Economic Commission for Europe in March 1948 emphasized capital goods exports, and in a subsequent report on East-West trade emphasized the need of the Eastern European countries for capital goods from the west.

Particularly important are the questions for ourselves. As I indicated earlier, about oil and shipping, there are questions involved in the Marshall Plan that go beyond merely charging the taxpayer. One of our chief dangers is the development of a vested interest (and quite possibly a serious economic dependence) in our exports. They have been so large and have gone on now for a decade. Large foreign sales of agricultural products, and of many industrial products, are obvious alternatives to reducing prices at home, and it is no secret that the jockeying for allotments in the annual E.C.A. programs is by no means confined to the European recipient countries — or even to private business interests here. Such questions have an obvious political tinge. With the filling up of domestic deferred demands we can expect this kind of interest to increase, particularly if we should come to feel — what yet seems to me unwarranted — that we are sliding into depression. On the import side, it remains to be seen how much our traditional attitude toward commercial policy has changed, or rather whether it has changed enough. How, for example, will the American public react to the conclusion that, following our E.C.A. contributions of, say, some $15 billion, which come after earlier substantial postwar grants and loans, an essential part of the solution of Europe's imbalance will be exchange-rate and other adjustments intended to discriminate against us, even though the "discrimination" merely means putting us back in relation to others to where we were before, and is for the general good?

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These are some of the questions which we should face, not in 1952, but now. Some others, such as the effects of the military expenditures that will be involved in the North Atlantic Pact, I feel quite incompetent to discuss, except to say the obvious — that they much increase the complexity of the problem. Sticking strictly to the E.C.A. program, there is one aspect that permits me to end on a more cheerful note. I have said little about conditions in particular countries; the effect of the Marshall Plan has been to make us think in terms of Western Europe as a whole. But earlier, I had in many of my papers attached special importance to the plight of Britain, as the key to the problem of restoring postwar international trade equilibrium. Up to a year and a half ago, Britain's position looked by all odds the blackest, excepting only Germany. Now the British are able to announce that they are approaching viability, though not in dollars. Their four-year plan carries conviction that it will succeed, though quite probably, as some of the Continental countries insist, in part at their expense — in the same sense that our progress has been at Europe's expense. A correction of the French inflation would be another long step forward.

Having watched Britain's performance, I would like to believe other miracles are possible, including even Western Europe's achievement of viability. This will require hard work all round and an impelling sense of pressure. Until the full results of such a policy are seen, I think we would do well to stick firmly to our schedule. British advice, and I think O.E.E.C. advice, is to put zero aid opposite the date July 1, 1952, but with full realization of the "radical changes" in policy which this implies.

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TURKEY FACES THE SOVIETS

By Necmeddin Sadak

FOR reasons which are obvious, the average American knows very little about Turkey. In the past, America was a world apart, a world complete and self-sufficient. The vast ocean which separates it from the old Continent and certain doctrines to which it subscribed kept it isolated from the complex problems which torment the little territory called Europe. Then things changed suddenly. Distances are no longer great, and in the United States people are coming more and more to understand that a danger which threatens Europe cannot leave them indifferent.

In this development of interest, the extent of which was unimaginable before the Second World War, Turkey holds an important place. The policy embodied in the Truman Doctrine and the military aid given to Turkey attest this fact. For the average American, nevertheless, Turkey's policy may seem to be the result of chance. Its origins and reasons why it has developed as it has are not known. My country has had very limited means for making itself understood in the United States, while for long years a widespread propaganda has been carried on by Turkey's enemies.

The foreign policy of the Turkish Republic, which has remained the same for 25 years, is the historical result of two main elements. After the First World War, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and Kemalist Turkey was born. The men who at that time presided over the destinies of the Turkish people sincerely renounced the ancient dreams of the Sultans. In 1919, they drew up a program known as the "National Pact," which clearly defined the strictly national frontiers of the new Turkey. Of her own free will, Turkey renounced all claims to territories not included within those limits. Out of the vast lands given up by Turkey at that time were formed seven independent countries that we know today as 'Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

This first factor which dominated the birth of Kemalist Turkey supplied the basis of her policy: the Turkish people, who for six centuries controlled half of Europe and a part of Asia and Africa, resolved to live within the confines of their

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fatherland, and traced its boundaries according to strictly national lines. Hence Turkey does not have and cannot have ambitions which threaten the territories of other peoples. She necessarily respects the independence of others. The very circumstances of Turkey's birth made her an anti-imperialist country.

The second factor which dominated the formation of the new Turkey was her struggle for independence. Despite the great territorial sacrifice willingly made by the Turkish people, the victorious Powers of the First World War, encroaching upon President Wilson's famous Fourteen Points, tried to impose upon Turkey the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920), which divided Anatolia and Istanbul into various spheres of influence. The independence and integrity of Turkey were thus to be reduced to nought. Moreover, the Greek army, supported and encouraged by the British Government under Lloyd George, landed at Izmir (Smyrna), invaded Anatolia and approached the outskirts of Ankara.

Turkey was prostrate and exhausted, without an army and without any resources whatsoever; Istanbul and the government of the last Sultan were under the control of the Allied occupation force. These were the darkest days of Turkish history. Then it was that Mustapha Kemal arose, formed a national army and began the struggle for independence. Out of this struggle the new Turkey was born, free and sovereign, as recognized in 1923 in the Treaty of Lausanne. In the negotiations for this treaty, Ismet Inönü, commander of the national armies, represented his country. The circumstances of her rebirth have made Turkey especially jealous of her freedom and independence. She is always ready to fight any force whatsoever to safeguard them. This much being understood, it is easy to understand the main lines of her foreign policy and how they must develop.

II

The first diplomatic act of the new Turkey was to sign a treaty with her neighbor, Russia. The greatest revolution in Russian history had just been accomplished. The Tsar had been overthrown. Nothing was left of the Russian policy of expansion. Turkey, which had been obliged to war with Russia seven times in the course of two and one-half centuries, was now delivered from the nightmare of Muscovite imperialism. Furthermore,

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Russia, emerging from the Bolshevik revolution, established a democratic régime and fought against the invading forces of other states. Everything pointed to a rapprochement between the two neighbors.

Turkey signed a treaty with Russia — the first treaty of Kemalist Turkey — at Moscow, March 16, 1921. In it the two countries recognized "their solidarity in their struggle against imperialism, as well as the fact that any difficulty encountered by either of the two peoples would worsen the position of the other," and declared themselves "animated by the desire always to have a cordial understanding and relations of continued sincere friendship based upon the mutual interest of the two countries." This agreement fixed the boundary which today separates Turkey and Soviet Russia. Yet in the past few years propaganda has been carried on against Turkey to promote Russian desires for Turkey's eastern provinces. Today the Russians contend that these territories, which were returned to Turkey in 1921, were torn from Russia in her moment of weakness! Not even children would believe this. In 1921 Turkey was exhausted and cut in pieces, and was carrying on her national struggle against Greece, Great Britain, France and Italy.

At first, however, Soviet-Turkish friendship prospered. In Paris in 1925 the two countries signed a treaty of neutrality, nonaggression and mutual consultation which was renewed upon several occasions and constituted the basis of relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia for 20 years. The Soviet Union denounced it on March 19, 1945. But though the relations of the two countries had been friendly, at least in form, they had begun to change soon after 1935 — the date of the last renewal of the Treaty of 1925. The change was not brought about by a shift in Turkey's own policy but by the forces of world politics. These external factors made themselves felt at the Montreux Conference on the Dardanelles in 1936. At this conference the traditional positions of the British and the Russians toward the Straits clashed from the start. Upon every occasion, the Soviet delegation passionately advanced the view that the Straits should be closed to foreign warships; even at the final session, the Soviet representative, M. Litvinov, while publicly expressing his satisfaction at the results obtained, could not refrain from once more repeating the views of his Government on the subject of the security of the Black Sea.

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The change in Soviet policy toward Turkey came with the signing of the Montreux Convention. Although its terms were favorable to the Soviets (as became plain during the Second World War), the Russian press from that moment on began to complain about Turkey and charge her with playing the game of the "imperialist Powers." Nevertheless, until 1939 the Soviets made no suggestion, either official or unofficial, that the Dardanelles Convention should be revised. That was a crucial year. By the spring of 1939 it was no longer possible to doubt that war was imminent. Germany was preparing for aggression, but the western democracies clung to the hope that they could devise some political combination which would prevent the war, or at least delay it.

Faced with the outbreak of war, Turkey, like all the other states, saw that she had to define her line of action. She accepted the suggestion which was made to her to align herself with the western Powers and began to negotiate with them. However, faithful to her general policy of friendship with Russia, she immediately informed Moscow of these negotiations and proposed (in the Saracoglu-Potemkin conversations at Ankara, at the end of April 1939) a pact of mutual assistance similar to the one which she was negotiating with Great Britain and France. A communiqué was issued recognizing the common views of the two Governments on international questions, as well as on issues directly affecting the two countries, and expressing their intention of remaining in close contact in order to exchange all political information concerning their common interests (May 6, 1939). It must be noted that at this time the Soviets were negotiating with the western Powers.

On May 12, 1939, a joint Turkish-British declaration was made simultaneously by the chiefs of the respective Governments in Ankara and London. On June 23, 1939, a similar declaration was signed in Paris between Turkey and France. Early in August, the Soviet Government invited the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saracoglu, to come to Moscow in order to negotiate a pact of mutual assistance; and this invitation was officially accepted. The Turkish view of the contemplated pact was that it should be limited in scope, "aggression" being understood in the broadest sense of the term; that it should cover land war as well as war at sea; and that it could be concluded either as a corollary of the Franco-British-Turkish tripartite pact, or independently.

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The Soviets answered that this view had seemed acceptable as a basis of negotiations as long as the Turkish proposals were being studied in the light of the Anglo-French-Soviet conversations. These conversations had now been broken off, however, and the Soviets pointed out that as a result, the situation was no longer the same. But they added that it was still possible to envisage the conclusion of an agreement concerning an aggression directed against the Dardanelles or the Balkans. It was finally decided that the negotiations should concern themselves with questions of assistance in the Dardanelles and the Black Sea, consultation regarding the Balkans, and a reservation as regards Britain and France. This reservation, which the Turkish delegation insisted must be inserted into the projected Pact, would establish the fact that any obligations thereby assumed by Turkey could not involve her in an armed conflict with either of the two western Powers.

Official conversations began in Moscow on September 26, but immediately reached an impasse. The Soviets demanded that clauses be inserted in the Franco-British-Turkish Pact which would make it ineffective. They demanded a reservation regarding Germany similar to the one regarding France and Britain, *i.e.* a clause saying that, because of the engagements which Soviet Russia had assumed by virtue of Article 4 of the German-Soviet pact, she could not be involved in any aggressive act against Germany. Finally, and above all, the Soviet Government demanded that Turkey sign a protocol which would modify the Montreux Convention to bring it in harmony with the classical Russian view, that is, that the Dardanelles would be closed to the fleets of countries whose territories do not border upon the Black Sea, and that the Soviets would control all Turkish decisions relating to these seaways.

After several fruitless attempts to reach an understanding, during which the Soviets held to their point of view (which at one moment they had seemed ready to alter), the negotiations completely collapsed on October 16, 1939. Three days later, the Franco-British-Turkish mutual assistance pact was signed at Ankara in its original form.

Soviet Russia had signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Germany on August 23, 1939, which made it possible for the Nazis to attack Poland and unleash the Second World War. She contended that the western Powers had tried

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to profit from Turkish-Soviet friendship (as displayed by the Turkish-Soviet negotiations) to draw her into an attitude of opposition to Germany and Italy, but that she had unmasked this game. She said her refusal to enter the tripartite pact helped guard the peace.

In a speech delivered at the fifth special session of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. on October 31, of the same year, Mr. Molotov declared that he wished to deny the rumors then circulating to the effect that the Soviets had demanded the retrocession of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan, during the Turkish-Soviet negotiations held in Moscow, as well as certain privileges in the Dardanelles. All these rumors were pure inventions, he said, and the negotiations in question had failed because the Turks would not accept the reservation in regard to Germany and would not agree to close the Dardanelles to the warships of Powers whose territories do not border upon the Black Sea. M. Molotov added in the course of this speech that, by concluding this pact with England and France, Turkey had linked her fate to that of the western Powers and had thus "taken a hazardous line" which she would regret.

It is interesting to note the date of this declaration and to compare its substance with much later remarks by the same Soviet statesmen. In October 1939, the Soviets insisted that they were faithful allies of Germany. Today they have reversed the picture, and pretend that it was not they but Turkey who from the start adopted a line of conduct favorable to the Axis Powers.

III

As it happened, the course of the armed conflict, following an uncertain beginning, developed in favor of the Axis Powers too rapidly to suit Soviet Russia. She had counted upon a slow and difficult victory for Germany, to whom, despite the entente between the two countries, she had determined to give only the necessary minimum of assistance. She hoped that the war would end in the total destruction of the imperialist Powers and would leave no one the victor. She reasoned that Germany would be exhausted, even though victorious, and for a long time would lick her wounds and seek expansion in the colonies which she had recovered or conquered. This would give Soviet Russia, who had remained neutral in the conflict, a free hand in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

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However, the lightning victories won by the Germans compelled the Soviet leaders to abandon this dream, which was indeed turning into a nightmare. Turkish friendship again began to seem precious. In July 1940, Premier Stalin accepted the good offices of the British Ambassador in Moscow for the improvement of Turkish-Soviet relations, but he again made clear that this depended above all upon the participation of the Black Sea Powers in the control of the Dardanelles. When the British Government asked the Turkish Government if it were willing to have the British ask the Soviets to define their point of view in greater detail, Turkey answered that she had no objection to this on condition that no discussions of that basic aspect of the question were undertaken.

The British effort was not to have any immediate results, for we know — thanks to the documents published by the American State Department concerning German-Soviet relations between 1939 and 1941 — that while Soviet Russia thus seemed to be giving Great Britain proof of her good will toward Turkey, she was secretly negotiating with the Germans. The negotiations concern the conditions — and, so to speak, the price — of closer collaboration with the Axis Powers and adherence to the German-Italian-Japanese Pact.

During an interview with Mr. Molotov in Berlin on November 12, 1940, the Führer and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs dangled before the eyes of the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs the vision of a new world dominated in the west by the Third Reich and in the east by Soviet Russia. At that interview it was declared that Germany had no interest of any sort in the Balkans. Her temporary presence in that region was due to purely military necessities. As for Great Britain and the United States, they were to be completely excluded from the affairs of the European continent.

In his preparatory conversation, von Ribbentrop, in taking up the question of Turkey, supported a thesis which he knew in advance would please Russia. Turkey, he said, should be led progressively to relax her ties with England. He thought that the Montreux Convention should be scrapped and replaced by a new arrangement. Obviously Soviet Russia could not be satisfied with the present situation, he said; she was right to claim certain privileges in the Dardanelles. It seemed to him opportune that Russia, Germany and Italy should pursue a common

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policy toward Turkey, designed to lead that country to free herself from her ties with England, which naturally were displeasing to Germany, Italy and the U.S.S.R. Turkey would thus be induced to accept of her own free will the replacement of the Montreux Convention by another document.

The same evening the Führer asked Mr. Molotov how Russia viewed the problem of safeguarding her interests on the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. He assured the Soviet Foreign Minister that Germany would be ready at any time to help him achieve an improvement in the Dardanelles régime.

Mr. Molotov answered that he agreed in general with the Führer's view of the future world situation. He asked Hitler several questions, and added that certain points were also to be elucidated with regard to Soviet interests in the Balkans and on the Black Sea, relative to Bulgaria, Rumania and Turkey. He was in agreement with the declarations of the leaders of the Reich as to the rôle of Great Britain and the United States. The principle of the participation of Russia in the Three Power Pact seemed to him entirely acceptable, with the reservation that Russia must coöperate as a partner and not only as a supernumerary. Furthermore, the objectives and import of the Pact must first be more clearly defined.

The next day, November 13, Turkey was the subject of a much longer discussion between the two statesmen. Molotov raised the problem of the Black Sea and the Danube, emphasized the interests of Russia in these regions, characterized the Dardanelles as England's historic path of attack against Russia, and declared that the relations between Soviet Russia and the other Black Sea Powers were of primary importance. He asked the Führer what Germany would say if Russia gave to Bulgaria — the independent country nearest the Dardanelles — a guarantee similar to that given by Germany and Italy to Rumania.

Hitler answered that Germany had already accepted the principle of revision of the Montreux Convention in favor of the U.S.S.R. Molotov countered with the statement that Russia wished to be guaranteed against an attack coming from the Dardanelles and would like to settle this question with Turkey, but that she would also like to obtain a guarantee against such an attack not only on paper, but "in reality." He again raised the question of a Soviet guarantee to Bulgaria.

Plainly, the Soviets, while trying to take advantage of the

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general situation and of the German advances in order to get their hands on the Dardanelles, did not want anyone else doing the same thing. They feared a German movement into Bulgaria and a revision of the Montreux Convention which would permit the Germans and Italians to have their say, and their share of privileges.

After the Berlin interviews, work was begun in Moscow on the draft of an agreement between the countries of the Three Power Pact and the U.S.S.R., with the aim of establishing a new order in Europe, Asia and Africa. Each member of the pact would operate in its natural sphere of influence, and the new order would serve the welfare of all. The pact would lay a firm and lasting basis for the common efforts of the four interested parties in behalf of this aim. However, after Bulgaria joined the Axis and German troops entered that country, Russia hastened to approach Turkey once more. As a result, the two governments issued a joint declaration (March 25, 1941) which stated that "the reports appearing in the foreign press to the effect that, if Turkey were led to enter the war, the Soviets would take advantage of her difficulties to attack her . . . in no way corresponded to the position of the Soviet Union." In such a case Turkey could, "in accordance with the terms of the non-aggression pact between herself and the U.S.S.R., count on the full understanding and neutrality of the U.S.S.R.;" and the U.S.S.R. on her part "could count on the full understanding and neutrality of Turkey if she found herself in such a situation."

Such was the position of the two countries when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

IV

As early as the beginning of March 1941, Hitler had informed the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin of the Soviet aims in the Dardanelles, though he did not, of course, add any information about the bait which he had held out. He wanted to arouse Turkey's fears and estrange her from the U.S.S.R. In spite of this, Turkey had not hesitated to publish the joint declaration of March 25 with the Soviet Union. Soviet ambitions in Bulgaria and the Dardanelles, fully enlarged upon in the German press, were even cited by the Germans as a reason for going to war against the Russians.

After the entry of German troops into Russian territory, the

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Soviet Government suddenly remembered that the Montreux Convention contained certain clauses which were extremely helpful to Russia and which gave Turkey the rôle of the faithful guardian of Soviet security in the Black Sea. Thus the Soviet Union hastened, on August 10, 1941, to hand to the Turkish Government, jointly with Great Britain, a note in which it reaffirmed its fidelity to the Montreux Convention and assured the Turkish Government that it had no aggressive intentions or claims concerning the Dardanelles. The note added that the Government of the U.S.S.R. was ready scrupulously to respect the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic, and that while it fully understood the desire of the Turkish Government not to be drawn into the war, was nevertheless equally ready to grant Turkey all aid and assistance in the event that she was attacked by a European Power.

Yet as soon as the war was over — on March 19, 1945 — the Soviet Government, as noted above, denounced the 1925 friendship treaty with Turkey. The treaty had to be adapted to the new circumstances, the Soviets declared. At the same time, a furious campaign was launched against Turkey, without any plausible reason, in the Russian press and radio.

Turkey still desired to renew good-neighbor relations with the U.S.S.R., and therefore approached Soviet statesmen through her Ambassador in Moscow in order to learn the conditions under which a new agreement could be concluded. During the interview which took place between Ambassador Sarper and Mr. Molotov on June 7, 1945, the Soviet Foreign Minister said that there were two conditions for the conclusion of a new agreement between Turkey and Soviet Russia: the eventual rectification of the Turkish-Soviet frontier fixed by the Treaty of 1921, and the granting of bases for Soviet Russia on the Dardanelles. The U.S.S.R. and Turkey must defend the Straits together, he explained, since the Dardanelles are the gateway to Russia, and Turkey is not strong enough to defend them alone. Turkey completely rejected these conditions.

Russian journalists, learned geographers and historians then wrote long articles attempting to prove that the eastern provinces of Turkey, even including Trebizond, belonged to Russia. In a note delivered to Turkey on August 8, 1946, the Moscow Government demanded the modification of the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles, declaring that the establishment of

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the new régime for these straits was a matter to be settled by Turkey and the other Black Sea Powers by themselves. At the same time Russia demanded that she be associated in the defense of the Dardanelles, without defining the form of this military association. It could only mean the occupation by the Soviet army of the Dardanelles, Constantinople and, obviously, the entire hinterland. After an exchange of notes, Turkey rejected these proposals, contending that all the signatories of the Montreux Convention should confer, and that a common defense of the Dardanelles with Russia was inconceivable for sovereign and independent Turkey.

Thus was the propaganda war unleashed against Turkey by the U.S.S.R. In the daily tirade, the charge which the Russians seemed most to enjoy repeating was that Turkey had remained neutral during the war. Indeed, one can readily believe that Russia's greatest regret is that Turkey was not occupied and then "liberated." If Turkey had gone to war when she was without arms, completely isolated and without any hope of aid, the German armies would have occupied her territory within a few weeks. Later on, the Red Army would have come to liberate her, as it liberated Poland, the Baltic countries, Rumania, Bulgaria. . . . A lost opportunity!

V

This brief survey of the development of Russian policy toward Turkey has been made as objectively as possible. It shows that Russian policy has not changed since the time of the Tsars. At the beginning of the war Soviet Russia laid down her conditions: the Dardanelles. During the war, she bargained with Hitler: the Dardanelles. After the war, she stated her conditions clearly to Turkey: the Dardanelles.

In 1945, when Russia was emerging victorious from the war, when Turkey's ally England, wounded and impoverished, could not give her any help, and when the United States, still far from Europe and even further from Turkey, revered her Soviet ally and had full confidence in her, Soviet Russia, convinced that the right moment had come, revealed her designs: she demanded Turkey's eastern territories, she demanded the Dardanelles. Would all that have satisfied her? We think not. If there had ever been a Turkish government willing to yield to these demands, Turkey still could not have reached an agreement with

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Moscow. For, after the occupation of the Dardanelles, the Soviet Union would demand a Communist Government at Ankara and would impose one upon Turkey. "How," Moscow would ask, "can we have confidence in a Turkish Government which is politically linked to the capitalist Powers?"

Turkey sought sincerely to renew good relations with Soviet Russia. But since those relations had to be compatible with the honor of a people attached above all to its freedom and independence, Turkey did not hesitate for one moment to reject the Russian demands in 1945, despite her isolation. The Turkish people were determined to defend themselves to the death — alone, if the other Powers had been against her as in 1920.

Turkish policy is not accidental nor hard to account for. It is inherent in her historical development. It is the result of the essential factors which created the new Turkey: renunciation of the past at the cost of great sacrifices, and respect for the future. Those factors expressed themselves in a national struggle to the death for independence, against overwhelming forces and despite the extreme exhaustion of the country. "Peace in the land, peace in the world," said Atatürk.

We still hope that a better understanding of things on the part of our great neighbor will make possible better relations between our two countries. We believe it will be possible if the Soviets, accepting our candid and straightforward policy for what it is, and recognizing the value which the Turkish people attach to their sovereignty and independence, will treat with Turkey on equal terms. Meanwhile we have a clear conscience. We have always sought, and shall continue to seek, to renew better relations within the framework of our policy — a policy of honor and dignity.

The United States has understood Turkish policy and judged it correctly, despite the very limited relations it has had with Turkey in the past. For there is a great affinity between the peaceful ideals of the two peoples, a perfect similarity in their struggle for independence and their devotion to freedom and sovereignty, and a mutual bond in the respect which both feel for the freedom and independence of others. It is this honest and firm policy of Turkey's, put to the test at the most difficult moment in the history of Europe, and a common interest in the maintenance of peace, which have won for Turkey the friendship of the United States.

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This friendship has expressed itself by moral support and by material assistance. The Truman Doctrine was a great comfort to the Turkish people, for it made them feel that they were no longer isolated. They saw that a great nation, the most powerful in the world, was interested in their independence and integrity. The aid in military equipment which Congress granted as a logical consequence of the Truman Doctrine was vital for Turkey. The strengthening of the Turkish Army by the most modern weapons will serve the cause of peace in our part of the world, for it will strengthen our power of resistance to any aggression. The Turkish people and Army know how precious this aid is, and they know perfectly well that, no matter what sacrifices their country was willing to make, it could not have procured this equipment in any other way. We are happy to know that this military aid will continue until at least the most important of our essential needs have been met.

The present situation offers the most difficult test with which Turkey has been faced. The dilemma is tragic for Turkey and for all Europe: economic recovery demands, first, political security, and then the use of all the resources of the country for that purpose. But insecurity and constant danger necessitate heavy expenditures for national defense. And, to complete the dilemma, a sound national economy is necessary to maintain military strength. Modern armaments are very expensive and demand a degree of scientific and industrial proficiency which very few nations are capable of achieving. The resources even of a nation as rich and powerful as the United States are not limitless, particularly since — alas! — weapons are continually changed and developed.

Peace and security cannot be made to depend indefinitely upon mobilization and armament, above all for countries which are not rich. All the peaceful countries must, as soon as possible, organize a defensive security system capable of halting in advance any war of aggression. Until the United Nations is capable of carrying out this task, the European countries, in association with the most powerful idealist of peace, the United States, must assume it, needless to say, within the United Nations framework. Thus alone can war be avoided, thousands of human lives spared and modern civilization saved from collapse. The proposed North Atlantic Pact seems to be the first result of the recognition of this necessity by the United States.

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THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO POLITICS

By Byron Dexter

IN 1894, the tax reform of Sir William V. Harcourt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, brought a formal end to the privileged position of the British landed aristocracy. Yet only about 50 years later, the Labor Government of Great Britain has felt it necessary to move once again to restrict the power of the peers. The vitality of the old ruling class as shown by its long tenure of power, and the British record of two and a half centuries without revolution, take on new significance for Americans in the present international situation. When one Great Power is deliberately fomenting revolution in every country which it does not wholly control, every other country will in the literal sense of the word be conservative; and the United States, which enjoys a higher standard of living than any other, will be so most inescapably of all. But as the requisite for the enjoyment of their wealth and power, Americans are at the same time faced with the necessity of taking the lead in bettering the conditions of men and nations within the world they wish to preserve. This is the task which the British aristocracy performed so successfully in its own country in the nineteenth century, when it set the classic example of intelligent conservatism.

Lord Salisbury described what might be called the minimum components of the conservative approach to the adjustment of conflicts of interest, in a letter which he sent to Lord Randolph Churchill, in 1886. His effort was to compose an inter-party dispute, just before Lord Randolph impetuously resigned from Salisbury's Government. He wrote of the "varying elements" of the Tory Party and of the difficulty of satisfying "the masses" without antagonizing "the classes." "But I believe," he concluded, "that with patience, feeling our way as we go, we may get the one element to concede and the other to forbear."[1]

"Concede and forbear," in the last analysis, is the principle of majority rule; but the last analysis was something with which Salisbury was totally unconcerned. How different is this low-

[1] "Lord Randolph Churchill," by Winston Spencer Churchill. New York: Macmillan, 1906. Vol. II, p. 224.

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pitched plea for conciliation from that given in John Morley's essay, "On Compromise," for example — a searching theoretical analysis in which the long-range interest provided the criterion which distinguished principle from expediency. Salisbury was interested only in an immediate and plain objective — to hold his party in office and, for that purpose, to prevent young Churchill from committing political suicide. The advice was useless because it depended for success upon a temperament which, as it happened, Lord Randolph lacked. It was an appeal to knowledge of the world, motivated by a desire to keep the world much as it was for as long as might be, and in pursuit of that objective to forestall great changes by small ones.

To trace the body of experience on which Salisbury drew would be to attempt a history of England. The British aristocracy was never a closed caste; even to the outside view all aristocrats plainly are not peers, and all viscounts are not aristocrats. The third Marquess of Salisbury never spoke to Viscount Morley — as Morley himself rather bitterly remarks in his memoirs — though they began their careers in the same anteroom of the *Saturday Review* and moved onto and off the same political stage throughout their lifetimes. No American can disentangle the blood lines, or would be taken seriously if he could. But which of this group of Whigs or Tories at the summit of British power and prosperity toward the close of the century does not tempt analysis as a politician? They were all unalike; yet they were as compact a political group as the modern world has seen. Perhaps this is the common bond: simply that they enjoyed the world they lived in very much. And one of the most enjoying of them all is the one nearest to us in spirit and easiest for us to comprehend — Sir W. V. Harcourt himself, a notable figure in his day, a great House of Commons man, younger son of a great family, who married a pretty Boston girl, twice Chancellor of the Exchequer, foremost Liberal orator after Gladstone, author of the famous quip "We are all Socialists now," and of another even more relevant — "We are all Americans now!"

William George Granville Venables Vernon Harcourt was six feet three and a half inches tall and cut to suit in all particulars. His vitality and his appetites were immense — not least his appetite for combat — but the details of his tumultuous life throw no light on the obscure practices of the human heart or of the political animal. As Gardiner, his biographer, says, he wore

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his heart on his sleeve, and his mind was "all daylight." He took for granted that he would devote his life to governing the English people, and he did so in the grand manner. He did so likewise in the parliamentary manner, by gaining power through gaining votes. He was called an opportunist, a charge in the main irrelevant, and sometimes called a traitor to his class, a charge in perspective false. He was domineering in personal relationships, but the weakness is interesting, for we see that, placed within the parliamentary system, it acted to diminish his power, not to aggrandize it. His contribution is that he made the nature of the system a little more plain, and that he helped men of his time to take a step or two toward the decent life on earth which is that system's objective.

Though Harcourt's older brother inherited the large estate of Nuneham Courtney, the family was not wealthy. Harcourt could count on no money at all. But as a younger son he was perfectly located for a political career. What he could count on was that influential people would think it to their advantage to help him, if he was capable of providing the central impetus for the career himself. The family was Tory, but at Cambridge Harcourt acquired what his father, Canon Harcourt, called "wild convictions," that is to say, a belief in free trade. This was in the late forties; in an undergraduate, a stand for free trade was a sign of intellectual emancipation. The less easily explicable attribute of a kindly nature was to draw Harcourt on to humanitarianism, and thus to Gladstonian liberalism. But in temperament he was always a Whig; he chose Gladstone's party but Hartington's company. (Whenever I make a joke, Mr. Gladstone misunderstands me, Hartington once remarked sadly.)

Harcourt lost no time in attracting attention. When he was 20, J. D. Cook, whose instinct for locating brilliant young Englishmen was one of the wonders of the day, sought him out at Cambridge, where he was a prize man and President of the Union, and engaged him at a handsome honorarium to send in editorials to the Peelite *Morning Chronicle*. The Duke of Bedford, alert for promising Whig material, likewise noticed him, and offered then and there to back him in a political career. Harcourt sensibly declined so early a commitment, but he accepted Cook's offer. After he left Cambridge, he supported himself by writing for the *Chronicle* and then the *Saturday Review* while he was reading law. Though he was only a free

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lance in politics, he was listened to. A balancing aspect of the conservative British system was the willingness to make use of the drive and even the unorthodoxy of youth: the fences were so strong that there was not too much concern about the tether. A pamphlet of Harcourt's attacking the Derby Government scored a hit and was instrumental in overthrowing the ministry. He was an attraction at the salon of his aunt, Lady Waldegrave, one of the great political hostesses. He was sometimes also put down as insufferable.

All this, though evidence of ability, was unremarkable. As by predestination, the Victorian politicians seem to have gathered armfuls of school prizes (there were six Oxford "double first" men in Palmerston's cabinet of 1859), to have written for Cook and to have been confident young men. But Harcourt's first campaign for Parliament, at age 31, revealed his special style. He heard that the electors of the Kirkcaldy Burghs were weary of the local squire who had for years represented them by prescriptive right, and were on the lookout for an alternative candidate. With a by-your-leave to no one he took a train for Scotland, summoned a meeting at the town hall, and explained that the call had been answered. The Scots were no less interested than surprised, and he was nominated on the spot. It was flagrant buccaneering, for the incumbent was a Liberal, and so, said Harcourt, was he. Lord John Russell, appealed to by the indignant M. P., was unable to say the same; the welcome which as leader he would otherwise have been delighted to give Harcourt could not cover such a breach of the rules of party politics. Harcourt, scion of a Tory house and grandson of the Archbishop of York, had no recommendation to the Free Kirk save his own joy of battle. It came within an ace of electing him; the poll was 294 for Harcourt to 312 for the much-put-upon incumbent, and it united Harcourt and the majority of the townspeople in bonds of exuberant mutual admiration.

"I have had the very best fun I could possibly have conceived," wrote the defeated candidate to a friend, Lady Melgund. "I have learnt to talk to mobs which is a blessed experience, I have sat under the Free Kirk and am greatly edified, I have pitched right and left into my foes and have returned amidst the benedictions of my friends. Can human felicity reach a higher point? There are two things which I am most proud of: (1) I have kept a whole Scotch community for a month in a state

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of laughter and enthusiasm; (2) I have made them put their hands in their pockets." [2] The non-electors had subscribed £53 for a silver claret jug as a mark of gratitude, and the electors scaled the Victorian heights with a presentation épergne costing £125: a silver giraffe beneath silver palm trees. "I believe that I am absolutely the first Saxon who has ever taken bullion out of Scotland," said the enchanted recipient.

Underlying the enthusiasm was the fact that he had an issue, and a good one. Kirkcaldy was a flourishing port and manufacturing center, and it joined with four neighboring towns to choose one member of Parliament; yet in this heated election only about 600 votes could be cast. Harcourt played up the question of extension of the franchise for all it was worth, to the disgust of his opponent and the delight of "the mob." But what he said in 1859, though less dignified than Lord Grey's famous promise of 1810 to move for reform when the English people had taken it up "seriously and affectionately," was in effect the same thing, and followed directly from it. The requirements of practical politics had in the interval made the identification of the self-interest of the old ruling class with the development of democracy more explicit. It is interesting to note that at Kirkcaldy Harcourt spoke against the secret ballot; he believed that it would cause corruption, as did many proponents of electoral reform at that date. Seldom in his career was he ahead of his time. His distinction was that he was able to give expression to its realities. In a word, he was representative. Perhaps one of the costly illusions of parliamentary government is that this is a commonplace quality. Only a very intelligent man could estimate himself and his relation to others with as few concessions to pretense as did Harcourt in a remarkable letter written a few years later to a woman whom he had once hoped to marry:

I don't pretend to originality, because I don't possess it. I think I have pretty fairly and honestly gauged myself and know what I can and what I can't do. I have fair, not extraordinary, intellectual powers, rather above the average logical faculty, a power of illustration rather than of imagination, a faculty of acquiring knowledge of particular things rather than much store of knowledge itself, a passion for politics as a practical pursuit, which has been cultivated by a good deal of study (a thing nowadays rare) so that I appear less ignorant of them than ordinary politicians. A tendency to believe in general principles rather than in small expedients. A natural disposition towards vanity, wilfulness, and

[2] A. G. Gardiner, "The Life of Sir William Harcourt." New York: Doran, 1923. Vol. I, p. 107.

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exaggeration, which I have tried a good deal to correct. An ambition not of an ignoble order which cares little for place or pelf but a good deal for honor. A nature not ungenerous in its impulses, but strong in its passions and its prejudices.

With all this a good deal of courage, obstinacy and determination, not discouraged by mistakes or deterred by disparagement. Too careless of the feelings and too little respectful of the power of others. Positive, confident, I fear I must add overbearing. With a profound belief in myself. A queer jumble of good and bad. A good deal that is high, still more that is weak, not much I think that is mean. That is what nature has made me, and which I have done too little to alter. A character which may end by being a great failure but which will never be a small success. I was not made to be a philosopher or a discoverer. I should never have found out steam, but I can make a steam engine — and drive it. I am a thoroughgoing Englishman, and perhaps may one day govern Englishmen, not (as you suppose) by practising upon their weaknesses but by really sharing them. I forgot to claim for myself a certain power of discourse which in a debating country is valuable, as it seems to me, principally because it is rare.

Why do I tell you all this? Because I want your good opinion; because I want you to see that I don't deceive myself and don't wish to deceive others.[3]

In the interval after Kirkcaldy, Harcourt became a leader of the bar, and his series of "Historicus" letters to the *Times,* which exerted strong influence upon the Government for neutrality in the American Civil War, led to his appointment as first Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge. He was elected to the House as member for Oxford in 1868, and entered Gladstone's Cabinets as Solicitor-General, Home Secretary, and then Chancellor of the Exchequer. In the Cabinet, the traits which he had "done too little to alter" made him at times an annoying colleague. When Gladstone retired as Prime Minister in 1892, Harcourt was the logical candidate for the succession, and the choice of the Liberal rank and file. But the post went to Lord Rosebery. In view of Rosebery's far more difficult character, and of the forbearance which Harcourt could display when in a position of plain responsibility, it is a pity that he did not have the chance of leadership. John Morley, whose personal opposition to Harcourt was the deciding factor, could smart after a quarrel long after his huge friend had joyously celebrated the reconciliation; and more than sensitive feelings were involved at this juncture, for Morley had his eye on the Foreign Office, which he hoped he could obtain by elevating Rosebery. But it is likely enough that had not Morley's attitude turned the scales against Harcourt, something else would have, for no one in a position of influence, save his own son, was prepared to

[3] Harcourt to Mrs. Ponsonby. Gardiner, p. 175–176.

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fight for him.[4] Harcourt was careless of the feelings of the powerful, and he paid a price for the luxury.

But in perspective it seems a venial sin. And, after all, only three Liberals besides Gladstone became Prime Minister of Great Britain in the half century of the apogee of Liberalism from the sixties to the First World War. It is not the defect of a hasty temper, but Harcourt's very happiness and his overflowing confidence in himself and in the English people that provide the significant aspect of his career. An exchange with Balfour on the floor of the House, during the debate on the Budget of 1894, may be put beside the story of Kirkcaldy to suggest how little Harcourt's approach to politics changed with the years:

> Mr. Balfour wished to remind Sir W. Harcourt that he had not only to consider the interests of the Exchequer, but also the equities of the case as it affected the individual. He was told a story the other day of an eminent counsel, Mr. Scarlett —
>
> Sir W. Harcourt: I told you. (Much laughter.)
>
> Mr. Balfour: Oh! You told me. (Laughter.) Then I will not repeat it. (Renewed laughter and cries of "Go on.")
>
> Sir W. Harcourt: But it was about Lord Erskine. (Laughter.)
>
> Mr. Balfour could not understand how the Chancellor of the Exchequer could have told it. (Laughter.) As he had been invited to tell the story he would do so. The eminent counsel being asked on his deathbed if he had not got off a great many scoundrels in his time, said: Unfortunately that was true, but at the same time he had got a good many innocent persons condemned so that on the average justice was done. (Much laughter.) No doubt the average claims of the Treasury were just, but in the case of a great many individuals great injustice was done, and he therefore supported the clause.[5]

Harcourt's realism gave rise to a charge of insincerity. Can a man who enjoys political life so much and so frankly be in earnest? Or, in the terms of the indictment so familiar in our own time, was all this parliamentary procedure sham warfare, diverting the attention of the English people from the struggle for their own interests, which lay in a different arena?

The use of humor as a weapon in politics can hardly be the substance of the charge. Instances of uproar and indecorum in the Victorian House of Commons that would today shock the supposedly less-inhibited American legislatures can as readily be

[4] Queen Victoria preferred Lord Rosebery, and on her own initiative sent for him. But by that time it was apparent that Harcourt did not have the support of his colleagues. Lewis Harcourt, who conducted his father's campaign for the Prime Ministership with skill and intense application, never thought of Windsor as a source of the difficulty. "J. M. is *the* man who has deprived W. V. H. of first place," he noted in his Journal.

[5] *Westminster Gazette*, July 10, 1894. Quoted by Gardiner.

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cited as scenes of entertainment and amusement; but though Harcourt thumped the tub with the best of them, his specialty was laughter (as Balfour's was the dialectical stiletto between the ribs, after the fraternal embrace). Like so witty a fighter as Alfred E. Smith, in American politics of our own day, Harcourt's laughter was reinforced by a painstaking knowledge of the business at hand. His industry was immense: even the Editor of the *Times* was staggered by the bulk of his researches. He was confident, for one reason, because he was an uncommonly able man. Central to his detachment and his humor, moreover, was his enjoyment of the prerogatives of younger son — that "happy estate," as he called it. He looked about him secure at the center of the world, seeing in the main what others saw, and seeing it a little at an angle only because he was more at ease than most who were there.

He was blessed also with great good health; he loathed exercise, smoked 16 cigars a day, and was never ill. His life was not without tragedy. The death of his first wife, and then of his first son, were cruel blows. But when he had at length remarried, his personal life was cloudless. "What can be more enjoyable!" he would exclaim with irrepressible candor when he could take a friend around the gardens at Malwood, the house he had built in the New Forest. He loved the country, he liked to read poetry, he liked books about real people and events, he enjoyed the company of his friends and his family beyond satiety. Like Walter Bagehot, he had little desire to listen to music: the tangible world was more interesting. The material of politics is men and women; wherever these were, he was in his element.

The famous Budget of 1894 is a fair sample of the way the system operated. Since the reform is so often yet so vaguely referred to, we may note in some detail what this Victorian Chancellor actually did. When Harcourt took office in Rosebery's Ministry he found a small deficit, in the main from military appropriations. He proposed to balance the budget by increases in the income tax (one penny) and the tax on beer and spirits (sixpence on a gallon) and by instituting a graduated death duties tax which would yield £1,000,000. A graduated income tax had been the theme of constant agitation, notably by Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Randolph Churchill, and succession duties had been levied by Gladstone, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, as early as Lord Aberdeen's Ministry of 1853. They

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were not levied on the value of the estate, however, but by a somewhat complicated formula, on the "interest" of the successor. Harcourt proposed that land henceforth be appraised at its capital value, as was all property subject to probate duty.

The aristocracy, led by the Duke of Devonshire, argued frankly that unless the large agricultural estates continued to enjoy the exemption, they could not be maintained. The argument was not irresponsible. As Devonshire pointed out, such great country places as his Chatsworth were much more than private houses. They were not only museums and libraries used by scholars from all parts of the world, and open to the public, but were, in a sense, part of the governmental apparatus. The aristocracy had its share of the incompetent and the profligate; but its political leaders had a good conscience. The very existence of these great houses scattered about the countryside had been the guarantee that there would be no centralized absolutism such as developed on the Continent. Beside the record of the continental nobilities, the rule of the British aristocracy was incomparably enlightened. It is revealing that as late as 1899 the German Ambassador in London was careful to warn Wilhelm II's entourage, on the occasion of the Kaiser's visit to England, that in England a lieutenant was spoken to in the same tone as a colonel, or even a general. Von Bülow marveled at such democracy.

Democracy was scarcely an aim of the British landed aristocracy, but the welfare of the nation was. And with granting of household suffrage in Disraeli's day, the decision that England was to be one nation and not two had been taken. The fight against Harcourt's reform was sharp, and the opposition in the House took the unprecedented step of moving the rejection of a finance bill. Harcourt was conciliatory. He accepted amendments and reduced the scale of the tax; but he threatened to go to the people on the principle. It was not an issue on which the Tories cared to contest an election. The Budget was passed, though the vote on the second reading was close — 308 to 294 — and it was accepted likewise by the Lords.

It is said that had the aristocracy known to what length the death duties would be carried today they would never have accepted the bill. That is probable enough; a full view of the changes of 50 years ahead would be likely to paralyze political action by anyone. But in retrospect it is also apparent that had Britain retained the principle of supporting a landed aristoc-

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racy by granting exemption from taxes, the degree of privilege would have had to be made constantly greater and greater. Incomes of business classes and of wage earners were rising, but revenue from agriculture was steadily falling. That was the central fact of the matter in 1894. Had it been disregarded, the aristocracy would have entered the century of world wars and revolutions mortally exposed. Harcourt's tax completed the destruction of the economic base of the old ruling class, but by persuading that class to move with its time, he gave it a new lease on life.

If the test of earnest political activity is the shedding of blood in irreconcilable conflict, then Harcourt must indeed be written off as a superficial politician. Honest slaughter was not his ideal, and he gave unstinted allegiance to representative government precisely because, better than any political system that men have devised, it can adjust conflicts of interest without killings. But the charge of lack of earnestness levelled against Harcourt in his day was in fact brought by those who thought, not that he was ineffectual, but that he had too forthrightly and successfully supported the advance of the English people toward popular government. "I do not wonder at your casting a longing, lingering look on the 'variety and richness and intellectual forces' which have passed away, but these are not the appendage of democracy," wrote Harcourt to Lord Rosebery, one of those who made the protest. Whether that is the correct verdict upon government by all the people remains to be disclosed. But however that may be, Sir William Harcourt looked upon democracy with open eyes, and was one of its effective friends.

The charge of sham levelled against the parliamentary method is logical enough when brought by those who hold that popular welfare requires that conflicts should be sharpened, not ameliorated. In the nineties, Keir Hardie felt that Beatrice and Sidney Webb, working so successfully within the parliamentary system, were the worst enemies of the social revolution. Beatrice Webb agreed that he might be right. "What idiot believes that the armed bourgeoisie can be overthrown without a struggle?" asked Lenin in his courteous way. "It is simply insane to talk about abolishing capitalism without a frightful civil war or without a succession of such wars." [6]

[6] *Sozialdemokrat,* November 11, 1914. Quoted by David Shub, "Lenin." Garden City: Doubleday, 1948, p. 126.

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The actual possibility of a rapid succession of civil wars on a world scale in our time is the new factor which throws a fresh light backward on Harcourt's era, on which so many assumptions concerning both revolutionary and parliamentary methods have been based. Harcourt himself was nearing the end of his active career in 1894, and his own reform was the last he chose to sponsor. The Webbs' opinion of the skeptical Whig was almost as unflattering as Lenin's opinion of Fabianism. But despite cosmic differences in temperament, Harcourt and Beatrice and Sidney Webb were closer together than the Webbs admitted. The idea that they were propagating — that the power of the state should be used when necessary to meet a particular need — was as old as the aristocracy itself, and did not astonish or alarm Sir William. He was quite willing to agree to a prescribed eight-hour day, for example. Harcourt had been schooled in public finance by Gladstone, and had a habit of asking by what means the money to pay for various measures of social welfare was to be provided. But the central fact was that for him, no less than for the Fabians, the brief reign of laissez faire was over. That was the meaning of his famous jest, "We are all Socialists now." The much-quoted remark seems, incidentally, to appear nowhere on the record, and in the House of Commons on April 12, 1893, Harcourt said he did not know whether he had ever made it. References to it began to appear in print in 1888; but the significant thing about it, in any event, is merely that everyone took it up. By Socialism, he meant what we might call parliamentary Socialism, or ethical Socialism — economic reforms motivated by practical politics and a sense of fair play. Like his kind, Harcourt was interested in the thing, not the label. Talk of the unearned increment of land, which Joseph Chamberlain had taken up to promote tax reform, he dismissed as "perfectly philosophical." And at this time the Webbs' distaste for the generalities of Marxism differed from Harcourt's only in that they were inclined to weep where he would laugh. For Beatrice, attendance at a congress of Marxist Socialists in 1896 was "a public humiliation." [7]

Sidney and Beatrice Webb knew what they meant by liberty and by democracy. "Liberty is such conditions of existence in the community as do, in practice, result in the utmost possible development of faculty in the individual human being." And democracy, government by all the people, was the expedient

[7] Beatrice Webb, "Our Partnership." New York: Longmans, Green, 1948, p. 134.

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which secured liberty — "perhaps the only practicable expedient, for preventing the concentration in any single individual or in any single class of what inevitably becomes, when so concentrated, a terrible engine of oppression." [8] The opposite of democracy was plain and unambiguous: autocracy.

In the general disillusion of the First World War the Webbs abandoned their own tradition and asked of government, not particular actions to meet demonstrated needs, but a way of life for every member of society. Socialism, in the Marxist sense of equality of income based on state ownership of the means of production, was then an abstraction — and measured against the abstraction, progress toward economic betterment seemed insupportably slow. By the time an abuse has been remedied, a generation has been wasted, cried the Webbs in 1923, in their indictment, "The Decay of Capitalist Civilization." They indicted capitalist civilization in particular for inefficiency, idleness, bad manners, "the dysgenic influence of money selection on the race," *i.e.* restrictions on marriage (an idea of Shaw's); and they expected from Marxist civilization greater freedom for the individual to buy food, shelter and clothing, to travel, to select his own reading material, and to exchange ideas with the best minds abroad. Their great work done, they had closed their eyes and were reciting from the book.

That "economic" and "political" democracy are separate and probably antithetical was the conclusion of the generation of western intellectuals which the Webbs represented. It became the unexamined premise of the next.[9] But 25 years have passed, and in place of the Marxist abstraction is the actuality of Soviet autocracy. Marxism, which offered plenty, cannot even make peace. In the armed camp of the Soviet Union, power is the bright face of poverty. In the light of this dénouement, the pace of the advance to greater material well-being in Harcourt's era assumes a different aspect. The "unauthorized" Liberal program of 1884, to take but one example, which was thought the epitome of Jacobin radicalism, was substantially put into effect by Salisbury's Tory Government in 1892, seven years after the extension

[8] Beatrice and Sidney Webb, "Industrial Democracy," 2nd edition. London: Longmans, Green, 1911, p. 845, 847.

[9] The author of the Encyclopaedia Britannica's "English History" formulates the standard indictment with great simplicity: "Parliamentary politics [1880–1895] were not concerned with the English people, and the English people impinged but slightly on parliamentary politics." (14th Edition, Vol. 8, p. 538.)

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of the franchise of 1885. Neither those measures, nor others, solved "the problem of poverty." Nor, for that matter, had the extension of the electorate in 1885 given Britain a fully democratic franchise. That was not to come until 1928; and a national system of free education comparable to that in the United States was not to be achieved until 1944. But though Irish issues were always unassimilated in Britain, measures relating to franchise, free trade, free education, factory acts, local self-government and so on so plainly stimulated one another, and wages (including real wages) so steadily, if unevenly, increased, that in perspective it is apparent that democracy and economic advancement were not separate, and not divergent, but went hand in hand.

Perhaps the willingness to believe that man should find comfort and happiness on this earth is the weakness that Harcourt spoke of in his early letter of self-examination. Some in every age will say so. But after the wastage of the most recent revolutionary war, and with another foreshadowed in Communist doctrine, who that is free to speak will not now ask the chance for the liberty and material well-being that democracy has shown it can provide? It is in this sense that we may say — if it is said with a smile, as Harcourt said it to his friend Joe Chamberlain, who also took a bride from New England — that we are all Americans now.

"What is to be desired," wrote Sir William, when Home Secretary, to a correspondent who had demanded that he suppress itinerant shows, "is not only that people should live, but that they should enjoy life." He enjoyed it mightily. He died suddenly in 1904, one night in his sleep, at the age of 77. On his bedside table was a current periodical, containing an article with a complimentary reference to himself, which he had been reading. Harcourt had refused a peerage, for he wished to remain a House of Commons man to the last. "I have come to look upon human affairs as a great series of stratifications built up by slow deposits out of the wrecks of succeeding generations," he once said. Of these forward movements, the development of constitutional government seemed to him the greatest, for it offered man the best chance of happiness here and now. He found his satisfaction within the limitations of that conservative tradition and in the performance of the obligation of public service which it entailed.

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MUST BRITAIN PLAN MASS EMIGRATION?

By Brinley Thomas

SEVERAL prominent leaders of opinion in the British Commonwealth are convinced that a mass transfer of population and industries from Britain to the Dominions is desirable on economic as well as strategic grounds. On the one hand, it is held that Britain's stamina has been so weakened by two world wars that she can no longer support a population of 50,000,000 at anything like the prewar standard of living. On the other hand, it is argued that, even if the island could look forward to renewed prosperity, its security has been completely undermined by the grim possibilities of atomic attack.

One of the leading advocates of strategic dispersal is Mr. Calwell, Australia's Minister of Immigration, who would like to see as many as 20,000,000 people moved from England to other parts of the Commonwealth. Some of the military planners in London are thinking along similar lines. When the Prime Ministers of Britain and the Dominions met in April and May 1946, they had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff suggesting a radical redistribution of the manpower and the military and industrial resources of the Commonwealth. Since then the international situation has become critical; and at the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers held in London in October 1948 there seems to have been a new emphasis on the regional responsibility of each member of the Commonwealth to maintain adequate armed strength within its own geographical sphere.

In considering the problem of emigration we must distinguish between the economic and the strategic aspects. The first question is whether, on strictly economic grounds, Britain must now become a country of emigration. Has she reached a phase of her economic evolution in which an overflow of population is both necessary and desirable? Secondly, we must inquire whether the necessities of defense in an atomic age dictate a mass transfer of British manpower to less vulnerable parts of the Commonwealth. To phrase it bluntly, is Great Britain facing a supreme dilemma, a fundamental conflict between Defense and Opulence?

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II

We may begin by noting some facts about the heyday of international migration. Between 1836 and 1900 Great Britain and Ireland experienced a net loss by migration of 8,250,000, whereas the net inflow into the rest of the Empire was 2,330,000. The outstanding feature of that period was not the peopling of the Dominions but the overflow of 5,900,000 people to the rest of the world. Of the 10,000,000 emigrants who left Britain in the half-century 1845–1894, 68 percent went to America, 16 percent to Australia and New Zealand, and 12 percent to Canada.

There were three main forces tending to promote emigration from Britain during the nineteenth century. First, there was the difference between the marginal productivity (and, therefore, wages) of labor in the thickly populated old world and in underpopulated new countries. Secondly, thanks to Britain's primacy in the new technique of the industrial revolution, she was the predominant source of investment funds and capital goods required overseas. Thirdly, the class barriers in Britain's stratified society presented a sharp contrast to the equality of opportunity in the expanding American Republic. If there had not been obstacles in the old country preventing workers from improving their lot through "vertical mobility," the volume of emigration would probably have been less than it was. It is this last consideration which helps to explain the *direction* of British emigration. Under the influence of the ideas of Edward Gibbon Wakefield, British colonizers in mid-century had thought it desirable that the overseas dependencies should develop a class structure similar to that of the homeland. This policy, with its emphasis on the sale of land at a price which would keep it out of the reach of immigrant laborers, was doomed to fail. The rules of the Empire, in planning to build colonies which, as Wakefield said, would be "so many *extensions* of an old society," were running counter to a force far stronger than they knew. Their zeal might have borne more abundant fruit if they had realized that the only way to compete with frontier democracy was to admit the necessity of emulating it.

The last great burst of overseas settlement coincided with the opening up of the Canadian west in the early years of this century. It was the turn of Canada to be drawn into the vortex of international specialization, and British capital exports as well as

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emigration showed a sudden increase in the decade 1905–1914.

III

The change in the determinants of international migration which had begun to reveal itself before 1914 culminated in the drastic restrictions imposed by the United States in 1924. This practically stopped the inflow from the crowded countries of Southeastern Europe; and the difficulties of adjustment in the old world were seriously intensified. One direct result was the spread of agricultural protectionism in Europe. The damming of the main stream encouraged new channels of emigration, *e.g.* to South America and Canada. In the field of capital movements the American Immigration Act had a most disconcerting effect. Since European labor was not allowed to come to the United States, there was a strong incentive for American capital to flow to Europe. The sudden interference with the natural course of migration set in motion new movements of capital which carried with them the seeds of future trouble. The excessive American investment in Europe in the twenties, through its influence both on the boom in the United States and on the artificial expansion in Germany, helped to bring about the great world depression. Little did the American Congress realize that in passing the Immigration Act of 1924 it was helping to lay the foundations of a precarious and ill-fated edifice of foreign lending, the collapse of which was to have the most devastating consequences for the whole world.

In this new setting Great Britain tried to carry out a large-scale program of Empire settlement, but the results were disappointing. The Dominions were lukewarm and much preferred imperial preferences to assisted migration as a means of securing Commonwealth solidarity. The net amount of emigration from Great Britain to the Empire fell from 113,000 to 1922 to 63,000 in 1929, and the proportion that had to be assisted rose from 25 percent to 68 percent. During the thirties Britain actually received an *inward* balance of 126,000 migrants from the Dominions.

The advocates of Empire settlement failed to realize the significance of the declining power of Britain to export capital and the growing importance of internal savings in the Dominions. In the late twenties and the thirties it needed between £50 and £60 million to repair the annual wastage of British interest-bearing

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assets abroad; but Britain was not investing enough to meet this replacement. Between 1925 and 1932 Australia availed herself of only one-sixth of the inexpensive funds put at her disposal to finance settlement under the 1922 Act.

An outstanding feature of the inter-war period was the change in the economic relationship between agricultural and industrial countries. As the peoples of the advanced nations became richer, they tended to spend proportionately less of their income on foodstuffs. The margin for miscellaneous expenditure on personal services, distribution and entertainment was growing, and consequently a relatively larger proportion of productive effort was being devoted to these things and a relatively smaller proportion to providing foodstuffs. Despite this unmistakable trend, the policy of Empire migration clung tenaciously to the idea of extensive land settlement in the Dominions.

England in the thirties began to pay heed to the warnings of the demographers who emphasized that if the net reproduction rate continued well below parity it would not be long before a decline in population would set in. People began to be skeptical of an emigration policy which would bear heavily on the lower age-groups. In response to this concern over the unwelcome implications of a low rate of natural increase, the British Government in 1944 set up the Royal Commission on Population.

This brief survey of the inter-war period makes clear that the main determinants which had brought about the extensive and beneficial redistribution of population in the era ending in 1914 had ceased to operate. On the contrary, new forces were at work curtailing the scope and distorting the direction of migration movements.

IV

The marked revival of interest in emigration since the Second World War is reminiscent of what happened after 1918; but the problems facing England now are very different from what they were then. Today there is full employment, with a keen scarcity of labor in the industries which used to be depressed: in 1922, when the Empire Settlement Act was passed, the country was in the throes of a severe depression, with its mounting toll of unemployment. Since 1944 a Royal Commission (which owes its existence to fears of underpopulation) has been making exhaustive inquiries into demographic trends. But in the early twenties,

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thanks to the high birth rate before 1914, Britain's population was relatively youthful — though the grievous casualties of the First World War had left their mark. No one at that time saw any reason to worry about the prospect of too few people.

It is difficult to give a reliable estimate of the number of British people who are anxious to emigrate. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations stated in the House of Commons on June 4, 1948, that the names of 200,000 potential settlers were recorded at Australia House and about 35,000 other prospective passengers were registered with shipping companies. There were 90,000 waiting to go to South Africa and 42,000 to New Zealand. Shipping and housing accommodations were the main factors limiting the movement, but the Minister was assured that migrants for Canada were able to obtain passages without undue delay.

There can be no doubt that austerity and frustration are making some young people eager to settle overseas where the future seems to hold out a richer promise than at home. Others whose service in the forces took them to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa or Canada — to countries where a prolonged spell of sunshine is not a topic of conversation — are apt to shudder at the thought of spending the rest of their days listening to the gloomy monotony of the English weather forecasts. To the extent that the policy of the Labor Government has been detrimental to the interests of the middle class, there has been a tendency for young men, particularly those with business or professional ambitions, to look to the expanding Dominions where they hope there will be wider scope for individual enterprise. One of the effects of nationalization is to force large firms to seek new business, and this often means a wide extension of their activities abroad, thus enabling them to place key men in attractive posts overseas.

It would be wrong, however, to exaggerate the number suffering from a sense of frustration. The big battalions are on the side of the Labor Government. The millions of trade unionists, who after all comprise the nation's skilled manpower, feel that they have acquired a new status; the future of the country is being shaped by men of their own choice; and the welfare state which is being created at home, with its emphasis on equality of opportunity, compares favorably with any El Dorado overseas. Moreover, while there may not be much flag-waving, there is deep love of country still.

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A fact of major importance since the war is the change in the attitude of the Dominions toward immigration. With the exception of South Africa, they are now anxious to recruit skilled urban workers as well as capital from Britain. Under an agreement for free and assisted passages which came into force in April 1947, the Australian authorities announced that they particularly welcomed applications from groups such as welders, sheet metal and foundry workers, boot and shoe, textile and clothing operatives, machinists in the clothing, textile, printing, canvas and leather trades, doctors, dentists and nurses. A recent statement of the attitude of the British Government was made by the Under-Secretary for Commonwealth Relations on June 18, 1948. He said that

> the Government wanted to encourage and facilitate the flow of emigrants to various parts of the Commonwealth, but they did not want to force anyone to go. There was only one proviso, that they reserved the right to check too great a flow of certain types of highly skilled workers, but there was no intention of applying generally in this respect the Control of Engagements Order.

What would be the effect on Britain's economy at the present time if there were enough transport and housing accommodations to enable the Dominions to take a large outflow of migrants? To become viable, Britain must increase and redistribute her productive power so that she can sell abroad enough to close the gap. In a nutshell, the immediate postwar task is to bring about this internal redistribution of labor and resources within the time set by the Marshall Plan. Would large-scale emigration help or hinder the achievement of this goal?

The Dominions now want young skilled workers: in the past the vast majority of those who emigrated have always been in the lower age-groups. The loss of this productive power must undoubtedly weaken Britain's effort to eliminate the external deficit. A large outflow of migrants would tend to be accompanied by an export of capital, and this too would accentuate the difficulties.

Let me illustrate this point from what has already happened. It is noteworthy that in 1947 capital amounting to £181,000,000 migrated from England to the sterling area, and, in addition, the debts owed to sterling countries were reduced by £135,000,000 (after allowing for the gifts of £30,000,000 received from Australia and New Zealand). A good proportion of that £181,000,000 consisted of money taken out by emigrants and funds invested in Dominion securities by British citizens. In a year of severe crisis

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in the balance of payments, nearly a third of the toll on British reserves was caused by this export of capital. Why did it happen? I cannot help thinking that is was partly due to the Government's refusal to admit that emigration is an expensive and dangerous luxury for Britain at the present time. Up to April 1948 even emigrants to dollar countries were allowed to take with them £5,000 a head. At that date Sir Stafford Cripps partly recognized the error by reducing from £5,000 to a maximum of £1,000 the amount which each emigrant would be allowed to take to countries outside the sterling area (the country mainly concerned being, of course, Canada).

Large-scale emigration now would strengthen inflationary pressure. The supply of labor in essential trades would become even scarcer, and there would be a greater temptation for trade unions to ask for higher wages which, in turn, would increase the cost of exports. As buyers' market became more prevalent, the export gap would widen. In one breath the Government would be exhorting the trade unions to keep wages where they are, and in another it would tell the Dominions that they could have as many workers as they could carry. Whatever other interests this policy might serve, it could hardly be called a promising method of overcoming inflationary pressure.

It is unfortunate that Britain is obliged to make profound changes in her economic structure at the very time when the tide of new recruits to the labor market is at a low ebb. Such adjustments were much easier to make when a high rate of natural increase brought a relatively large number of juveniles into industry every year. And, to make matters worse, the industries now crying out for manpower, *e.g.* coal, textiles and agriculture, are those which were cursed by instability and unemployment between the wars. In these circumstances what better lubricant could the British labor market receive than a strong inflow of foreign workers? A high rate of immigration makes up for a low degree of internal mobility. The workers of a free society cannot be ordered about; but there is nothing unreasonable in stipulating that alien immigrants should enter specified occupations. Even the Dominions are careful to state the categories of British migrants they are prepared to welcome.

It is sometimes argued that immigration has its debit side which might well outweigh the advantages; the new workers have to be fed and clothed, and that means adding to the coun-

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try's imports. Moreover, the addition to the population leads to a disproportionate increase in the demand for capital equipment, such as houses. These arguments are not convincing. The foreigners are to be absorbed in the industries on which the whole program of recovery depends, and they are not reluctant to enter these jobs. Every immigrant taken on in the pits, or in textile mills, adds far more to essential output than he consumes of imports; and there is probably a good margin left over even when he brings a family with him. The essential point is that immigrants can be employed immediately to increase the types of output which are the limiting factors; the value of their marginal product is much greater than the quantity of hard-currency goods which they consume.

Nor is there any substance in the assertion that the country's capital outlay has to be expanded disproportionately in order to make room for these newcomers. In the first place, it would be rather farfetched to suggest that the aliens have added to the pressure of demand for new houses. Existing premises have been improvised in order to accommodate them, and young men have found homes as lodgers. Secondly, it is only recently that British trade unions have begun to drop their aversion to admitting foreign workers. If a willing attitude had been shown immediately the war was over, the immigrants would by now have made a valuable contribution to the battle of production in exchange for what the taxpayer spent. Would it not have been good economics — to say nothing of good strategy — to have welcomed thousands of skilled Czech workers to English shores before the dark shadow of the prison house came down on that unhappy country? What is required as an aid to attaining international equilibrium is immigration rather than emigration of young workers. Figures issued by the International Labor Office in October 1948 show that there are 2,500,000 workers available for emigration in Western Europe, a large number of whom are in Italy and the zones of occupation.

V

The strategic argument is the one which has played a decisive part in making the Dominions keen on immigration. There are broadly two ways in which strategic dispersal could be carried out: either by a planned transfer over a period of years of, say, 20,000,000 people comprising a cross section of the British com-

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munity, or by large-scale promotion of spontaneous emigration. The former method smacks of regimentation and could hardly be regarded as compatible with the free way of life. It is strange to see ardent democrats lightheartedly proposing a gigantic plan for intercontinental direction of labor when it is quite obvious that even the mildest form of compulsion of this kind is anathema within England herself.

The only tolerable way of dispersing Britain's population is for the Government to give every inducement to people to decide for themselves to go and live in other parts of the Commonwealth. All experience tells us that the vast majority of the settlers would come from the most vigorous and productive section of the population. If 2,000,000 men of all ages were to emigrate from Britain at the present time and their age-composition were the same as that of the emigrants of the twenties, the country would lose no less than 1,300,000 men between 15 and 30 years of age. At a time when the lower age-groups are showing gaps due to the low birth-rate of the twenties and thirties and the casualties of the war, a further large outflow of young men would have a crippling effect on the nation's economy. Mass emigration over the next 10 or 20 years would gravely weaken the incentive to make capital goods. The maintenance of full employment depends on the rate of investment: if year by year the population were falling at a rapid rate, the secular trend would be downward and the system would be highly susceptible to unemployment and external disequilibrium.

Some of the military theorists aim at creating in the Commonwealth four almost self-sufficient defensive zones based on the United Kingdom, Canada, South and East Africa and Australia. Now, it is clear that if the population of Britain is to be reduced until it is only slightly dependent on overseas supplies, it will be very small indeed. The surest way of ensuring the impotence of the island is to "pastoralize" it. What a grim joke it would be if the British, after saving the Germans from the Morgenthau plan, were obliged to take that medicine themselves!

Strength in war entails, among other things, having a national income which gives a relatively large margin over and above the minimum level of consumption which the people will tolerate. In this respect England was comparatively strong in both World Wars: by the same token the United States is now immeasurably more powerful than any other nation. Any attempt to buttress

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the combined power of the Commonwealth by stimulating mass emigration from Britain will weaken the heart far more than it strengthens the rest of the body.

Perhaps the most damaging weakness of this concept of Commonwealth defense is that it is out of date. The whole point of the plan is to rearrange Commonwealth resources so as to make aggression unprofitable. Can anyone seriously claim that a potential aggressor is going to think twice merely because the British Commonwealth has reshuffled its population? To devise a plan for the defense of the Commonwealth as if it were a viable unit is to be dangerously unrealistic. Surely the only power bloc which has a chance of deterring a potential aggressor is a world coalition of free nations led by the United States. Whether or not atomic bombs are going to rain down on England depends on the deterrent effect of that coalition and not on any narrow scheme of Commonwealth defense.

Of the sectors on which the security of this bloc depends, none is more important than Western Europe. This is a compelling reason why Britain should be strong: she has a dual rôle to perform, as the motive force behind Western Union and as the leader of the Commonwealth. She must be prepared to contribute her full quota to the land and air forces of Western Europe. How can she possibly perform these tasks which are vital to her very existence if her strength is going to be drained away by mass emigration? The most effective use of Commonwealth resources, from the point of view of defense, can be determined only on the wider canvas of the western world. The only hope of securing a permanent settlement with Russia is to convince her in realistic terms that Western Union, linked closely to the power of the free world, is impregnable. This implies a division of function both within the continent of Europe, including Britain, as well as between Western Union, the United States and the Commonwealth.

Thus, when we consider security in this wider setting, the dilemma regarding migration disappears. By pursuing the policy which best suits her economic recovery, Britain is at the same time doing what is vitally necessary for her own survival.

VI

There is no reason to be too pessimistic about Britain's long-run economic prospect. It is true that the terms of trade are

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likely to be unfavorable. The principle of "fair shares" in food allocations between rich and poor nations will no doubt mean dear food for the British people. Two world wars have left Britain impoverished, and the average level of living for most people is likely to be less comfortable in the future. However, this need not lead to mass emigration. If the people respond to the challenge by carrying out the necessary adjustments, there is no reason why a new equilibrium cannot be found for a population of 50,000,000. A free society will not prevent any of its citizens from settling overseas if they want to do so; nor will it compel anyone to go as part of a plan for the removal of a cross-section of the population.

The determinants of overseas settlement which held sway in the period before 1914 were rudely shaken after the First World War and have by now been replaced by forces of a different order. The source of capital for the undeveloped countries and to a large extent the British Dominions will be the United States, under whose auspices may arise a new international economic order within which the traditional pattern of Empire settlement may not be appropriate. In such a world the Dominions will best serve their own economic interests as well as those of Britain if they decide to widen the scope of their immigration policies to include people of non-British stock.

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THE PROMISE OF THE WORLD TRADE CHARTER

By Clair Wilcox

IT is not to be expected that the work of rebuilding a world economic order can be completed overnight or that the economy of the nineteenth century, destroyed by three decades of war and depression, can ever be completely restored. Unfortunately, the conditions that are prerequisite to an early or unqualified return to freer markets do not now exist. There is pronounced imbalance in the world's trade. Many nations are compelled sharply to restrict imports in order to safeguard their monetary reserves; they cannot abandon administrative controls until better balance is restored. There is a widespread feeling of economic and political insecurity; nations hesitate completely to surrender their defenses against the risks that greater interdependence would entail. In a few countries, economic activity has been completely collectivized; in most others, there is increased reliance on public authority. In neither case are the policies or practices of a planned economy readily to be fitted into the traditional pattern of free markets. From all of the less developed countries of the world, moreover, there comes an insistent demand for rapid industrialization and for freedom to promote industrialization by restricting trade. Such forces are neither to be ignored nor completely to be denied.

It is in this context that the Charter for an International Trade Organization, completed a year ago at Havana, must be appraised. As is necessarily the case with any such agreement, the Charter is a product of compromise. It follows the pattern and, in general, retains the substance originally proposed, in 1945, by the United States. But it differs, in important respects, from the American proposals. In some respects it is strong, in others it is weak. But its admitted imperfections should not be permitted to obscure its real significance.

The Charter is the most comprehensive international economic agreement in history. It not only establishes the constitution for a new specialized agency of the United Nations, but it also deals, in minute detail, with tariffs, preferences, discriminatory taxes and regulations, methods of customs administration, quota systems, subsidies, state trading, cartels, commodity agreements,

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economic development, international investment and the relationship between domestic stabilization policies and international trade policies. Unlike the many agreements adopted between the two world wars, it does not confine itself to resolutions and recommendations, but sets forth a series of specific commitments with binding force on governments. The signature of the Final Act of Havana by 54 countries thus represents the widest area of agreement ever obtained on national commercial policies.

II

The Charter has come under fire from four separate camps. According to the Communists, it marks an attempt by imperialist American monopoly capitalism to enslave the economies of weaker states. According to the isolationists, it will involve the United States in global economic planning, require it to surrender its sovereignty to a superstate, and commit it to international Socialism. In the eyes of the economic planners, it fails to recognize fundamental changes in the structure of world trade and seeks to restore conditions of freedom and nondiscrimination that are forever lost. In the opinion of uncompromising liberals, its commitments are weaker than they should be and its exceptions are open to possible abuse; it therefore holds little of value for the United States.

The first of these criticisms is obvious nonsense. It is true, as the Communists have said, that greater freedom of trade and general adherence to the rule of nondiscrimination will serve the interests of larger states. But freer trade will also open the door of opportunity to smaller nations and equality of treatment will assure to them the right to buy and sell where they please, on terms as favorable as those afforded to stronger powers. Far from reducing them to slavery, the Charter affords a guarantee of economic liberty.

The second criticism is demonstrably false. The I.T.O. will have no power to determine the volume or direction of world trade, to tell any country how much and to whom it may export, or to tell any country how much and from whom it may import. It will have no authority to intervene in the domestic economic policies of member states. The Charter will neither promote the adoption of Socialism nor require its abandonment, though it should operate to restore an international environment that is congenial to private enterprise.

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According to the third group of critics, the guiding principles embodied in the Charter are no longer applicable to the world in which we live. Relative freedom of trade and equality of treatment, it is said, are attainable only when international accounts are in balance and where governments abstain from intervention in domestic economic life. But it is possible that the world's trade may not be brought back into balance for a generation or more. And it is likely that economic regimentation, in most important trading nations, is here to stay. The attempt to restore a liberal trading system is thus condemned to end in failure.

So runs the argument. And it may turn out, in the end, to be true. But Americans are scarcely prepared, today, to agree that permanent imbalance of trade is inevitable, or that the tide is running so strongly toward collectivism, regimentation and restriction that we, too, must collectivize, regiment and restrict. We have already invested several billions of dollars in programs of reconstruction on the assumption that world economic order can be restored. In doing so, we have deliberately assumed the risk of failure. In joining the International Trade Organization, the risk will be identical; the cost, by comparison, will be insignificant.

It is true that the dominant philosophy of the Charter is the philosophy of economic liberalism. But its detailed provisions do not reflect a dogmatism that would render them inapplicable to the circumstances of the world today. The Charter is a flexible instrument. It accommodates itself to the necessities of the period of reconstruction. It is designed to meet the conditions both of prosperity and depression. It seeks to establish general principles that will enable diverse economies to meet on common ground. And, for these reasons, the Charter for an International Trade Organization may be expected to work.

The fourth line of criticism, it must be admitted, contains a considerable measure of truth. The commitments in the Charter do not go as far as an uncompromising liberal might wish, and many of them are qualified by exceptions and provisions for escape. But are the commitments so weak and the escape clauses so large that the document holds little of value for the United States? If this question is to be answered, the Charter's structure of obligations and its provisions for release from obligations must be briefly summarized.

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III

The core of the Charter is to be found in commitments that limit the freedom of governments to employ restrictive and discriminatory measures to prevent foreign competition with domestic industry. In the main, these provisions are familiar: they follow recommendations made by committees of the League of Nations between the two world wars; they embody principles contained in the commercial treaties and trade agreements of the United States.

Countries joining the I.T.O. must agree to carry out negotiations directed toward the substantial reduction of tariffs and the elimination of preferences. The parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, concluded at Geneva in 1947, have already gone far toward fulfilling this commitment among themselves. Under the terms of the Charter, comparable concessions must be made by other states. Unconditional most-favored-nation treatment is established as a general rule. Preferences surviving negotiations may be continued, but no new preferences may be created without the permission of the I.T.O. and no existing preferences may be increased.

Tariffs and subsidies are accepted in principle; quantitative controls and indirect or hidden methods of protection are condemned. Members of the I.T.O. will agree to abandon the use of license and quota systems in all cases other than those specifically excepted by the Charter or granted exemption by the Organization. Where such controls are permitted, they must be so administered, in general, as to avoid discrimination. Members of the I.T.O. may not evade the rules of the International Monetary Fund on exchange controls by using quantitative restrictions; they may not evade the Charter's rules on quantitative restrictions by using exchange controls.

In order to prevent resort to indirect or hidden methods of protection, members of the I.T.O. will agree, among other things, not to impose on imported goods internal taxes that are higher or regulations that are more onerous than those imposed on like domestic goods; not to impose any new requirement that a specified portion of any product be supplied from domestic sources; to adopt common definitions and procedures for determining the values of goods upon which customs duties are levied; to reduce the diversity of other customs charges and to limit them

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to the value of services rendered; to confine anti-dumping and countervailing duties to cases of actual injury and to limit them to the extent of the dumping or the bounty they are designed to offset; to afford freedom of transit to goods moving across their territories; to eliminate unnecessary marking regulations; to simplify import and export formalities and documentation requirements; to afford traders adequate opportunities for consultation with customs administrators; and to maintain independent tribunals for the review of administrative action.

Certain other commitments cover less familiar ground. Members maintaining state trading enterprises are required to carry out negotiations directed toward the expansion of their purchases and sales. In conducting such operations, they must act solely in accordance with commercial considerations, affording the enterprises of other countries adequate opportunity to compete for participation in their trade. A member may not subsidize the exportation of any primary commodity so heavily as to acquire for itself more than an equitable share of the world market; it may not subsidize the exportation of other goods; it must be prepared, on request, to discuss the possibility of limiting any subsidy that operates, directly or indirectly, to increase exports or to limit imports.

The Charter marks the first attempt, through international action, to curb the restrictive practices of international cartels. Each member of the I.T.O. will agree to take all possible steps to insure that private or public enterprises do not engage in practices, within its jurisdiction, which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control in international commerce, whenever such practices operate to interfere with the expansion of production or trade. Upon complaint by a member, the I.T.O. will make an investigation, hold hearings, and, if it finds that the practices in question have such an effect, may recommend remedial action.

The Charter also contains the first agreement on policy with respect to regulation of the international trade in primary commodities. Under its terms, members of the I.T.O. will agree substantially to limit their present freedom to enter into intergovernmental arrangements that control production, exports, imports or prices. Such arrangements will be permitted only in the cases of certain agricultural staples and of a few minerals that are produced in isolated regions. They must be limited in

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duration and subject to periodic review. They must afford consuming countries and producing countries an equal voice. They must assure the availability of adequate supplies. They must provide increasing opportunities for satisfying world requirements from the most economic sources. And each country participating in such an arrangement must adopt a program of domestic economic adjustment designed to render its continuance unnecessary.

The Charter recognizes, for the first time in an international agreement, the dependence of freer trade upon the maintenance of industrial stability and the importance of maintaining stability through measures that do not restrain trade. Each member of the I.T.O. will agree to take action designed to achieve and maintain full and productive employment and large and steadily growing demand within its own territory. And if pronounced imbalance in international trade persists, all of the members concerned must take action designed to correct the maladjustment. It is recognized that such action should be directed toward the expansion rather than the contraction of international trade. But the nature of the action to be taken by any member is for it alone to choose. No member is asked to guarantee that its efforts will succeed; the commitment is merely that such efforts will be made.

The Charter also contains provisions designed to promote the economic development of backward areas and to encourage the international flow of private capital for productive investment. Upon request, the I.T.O. may advise any member concerning its plans and programs for economic development and aid the member in obtaining technical advice and assistance. Members exporting facilities required for such development will agree to impose no unreasonable impediment to their exportation. Members importing such facilities will agree to take no unreasonable action injurious to the interests of those who provide them. They must afford adequate security for existing and future investments. They may impose no requirements as to the ownership of investments that are not just and no other requirements that are not reasonable. They must enter into consultation or participate in negotiations directed toward the conclusion of further agreements relating to opportunities and security for investment.

If any of the commitments contained in the Charter is not kept, the United States or any other member of the I.T.O. can complain that benefits promised it have been nullified or im-

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paired. If it chooses to do so, it may request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice and such an opinion, when delivered, will be binding on the I.T.O. If a complaint is found to be justified, the complaining member may be released, on a compensatory basis, from its obligations toward the offender. The latter may then be faced with higher tariffs, quotas or other restrictions on its trade. A powerful deterrent to noncompliance is thus assured.

The Charter provides, finally, for the constitution of the I.T.O. The agency will have, as the basis of its organization, a Conference of member states, each of them casting a single vote. Continuing administration of its affairs will be in the hands of an Executive Board of 18 members, eight of whom will always represent the countries of chief economic importance, including the United States. It will be the function of the Organization to serve as an international center for information and as a source of advice and assistance on matters affecting trade, to encourage consultations and sponsor negotiations between governments, to receive complaints, settle disputes, and authorize withdrawal of benefits in cases of violation, and, finally, to act on requests for releases from obligations and lay down conditions to limit such releases as it may grant.

IV

The commitments contained in the Charter are accompanied, of necessity, by a number of detailed exceptions and by provisions for possible exceptions. It is argued by the uncompromising liberals, among the critics of the document, that these escape clauses are so numerous and so sweeping that the commitments are likely to be nullified. It is even said that the Charter, in operation, will impose binding obligations exclusively on the United States. This is not the case.

Only eight of the escape clauses have real significance. All of these are defined with precision and safeguarded in detail by their terms. Four of them were included at the instance of the United States. Four were designed to meet the needs of countries in balance-of-payments difficulties and of countries whose economies are in the process of reconstruction or development.

The exceptions upon which the United States insisted are these: (1) Tariff or other concessions may be suspended or withdrawn if increased imports of a particular product cause or

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threaten serious injury to domestic producers. (2) Quotas may be imposed on imports of agricultural products when domestic production or sale is also controlled. (3) Exports of agricultural products may be subsidized. (4) Measures adopted for the protection of essential security interests are exempt.

The four other exceptions are more likely to be used by other countries than by the United States: (1) Import quotas may be imposed by a country that is found by the International Monetary Fund and the I.T.O. to be in balance-of-payments difficulty, during the period and to the extent necessary to protect its monetary reserves. (2) Exceptions to the most-favored-nation rule may be granted by the I.T.O. where they are incidental to the establishment of a customs union. (3) New preferences may be permitted by the I.T.O. for fixed periods, between two of its members, if found to be necessary to the promotion of their economic development. (4) Import quotas may be imposed to protect infant industries if permission is obtained, in the case of products covered in trade agreements (the great bulk of the world's trade) from the other parties to the agreements, and in the case of most other products (a minor part of the world's trade) from the I.T.O.

The four exceptions in the first group become effective without any sort of finding or approval by any international agency. Those in the second group do not come into operation until numerous obstacles have been surmounted, conditions fulfilled, criteria satisfied, procedures followed, and permissions obtained. Once this has been done, they impose a series of additional obligations that must be assumed. And finally, they provide in one way or another for the limitation of the period during which the exception may be enjoyed.

There is some virtue in the fact that the exceptions in the Charter are plainly labelled as exceptions to general principles whose validity every signatory of the document must recognize. Their legal status is that of release from obligations that have been voluntarily assumed. They do not condone unauthorized departures from general rules; they do permit departures with international sanction, under international control.

It should be emphasized that these exceptions will not enable any country to do anything that it was not already free to do. It is true that the commitments in the Charter, when qualified by the provisions for escape, have less value than they would if they

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stood alone. But it is equally true that the commitments, together with the escapes, give far greater assurance as to the future direction of national commercial policies than would exist if no commitments were to be assumed.

V

Taking its virtues with its defects, the Charter must be evaluated as a whole. Its provisions relating to tariff negotiations set up an effective mechanism for the reduction of barriers to trade. Those relating to discriminatory internal taxes and regulations and methods of customs administration constitute a common code of detailed rules to govern conduct in this field. Those relating to cartels, commodity agreements, subsidies and international investment are not as strong as could be wished. The commitments relating to state trading will be difficult to enforce. Those relating to quantitative restrictions are subject to important qualifications. But, in all of these fields, the I.T.O. will bring abuses into the full light of publicity. It will serve as a continuous forum where they can be challenged and condemned. Through the accumulation of decisions, case by case, it should develop a body of international law that will come to influence the commercial policies of governments. In the absence of the I.T.O., no mechanism to serve this important purpose would exist.

There is danger, of course, that members of the Organization will attempt to exploit the exceptions that may be permitted under the Charter while giving lip service to its general rules. If this should happen, an accumulation of decisions granting such exceptions might come to be regarded as a codification of accepted practice, endorsed by world opinion and given international sanction. Such a development is possible; it is by no means inevitable. Unreasonable exceptions will be sought; they will also be opposed; it is not to be assumed that they will usually — or frequently — be granted.

In some cases, countries requesting exceptions must obtain the consent of other parties to trade agreements; such parties may veto their requests. In the case of the balance-of-payments exception, the most important in the Charter, the I.T.O. must accept determinations made by the International Monetary Fund, in which the United States casts a weighted vote. In certain other cases, decisions taken by the Organization require a two-thirds

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vote. But even where issues are decided by a simple majority, it is unlikely that countries seeking to weaken the Charter would form a cohesive voting bloc. There is no single sharp division of interest that will appear in every case. The line-up of votes will be constantly shifting, from issue to issue and from time to time. When a particular country applies for permission to impose a restriction on imports of a particular product, every exporter of the product is likely to vote against the application. And when any two countries apply for permission to establish new preferences, every country whose trade would suffer is likely to vote in the negative. The influence of a major power, moreover, cannot be limited to the weight accorded to its vote. There is no reason to suppose that the United States would often find itself in a minority within the councils of the I.T.O.

It is true that the Charter fails to guarantee the restoration of conditions that would satisfy the ideal requirements of economic liberalism. But this complaint must be dismissed as academic. The real question to be asked is whether the Charter affords an opportunity to establish trade relationship better than those that are certain to obtain if it should not be approved. And here the answer is in the affirmative. Acceptance of the present terms of the Charter, moreover, is not irrevocable. Any member of the Organization may withdraw after three years. Provision is made for amendment. And all of the provisions of the Charter must be reviewed within five years after it enters into force.

VI

The Charter is an integral part of a larger program of world economic reconstruction. If the loans extended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are to be repaid, goods must be permitted to move more freely among nations. If the International Monetary Fund is to succeed in stabilizing currencies, steps must be taken to restore balance in the world's trade. If the Fund's efforts to remove exchange regulations are to have meaning, quantitative restrictions must also be subjected to international control. If the commitments as to long-run trade policy required by Congress of the countries participating in the European recovery program are to be carried out, a continuing agreement must take over where the recovery program leaves off. The instruments that have been designed to

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serve these purposes are the Charter for an International Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The Charter and the General Agreement, while independent of one another, were conceived and negotiated as related parts of a common plan. The Charter obligates members of the I.T.O. to negotiate for entry into the Agreement. The concessions contained in the Agreement are safeguarded by incorporating those provisions of the Charter that prevent resort to other methods of restriction. When the Charter becomes effective, the common provisions of the two instruments are to be administered by the I.T.O. The Agreement, moreover, commits its signatories, pending approval of the Charter, to adhere to its general principles in so far as existing legislation may permit. It clearly contemplates the eventual establishment of the I.T.O.

The General Agreement, now in effect among 22 countries, has already made a substantial contribution toward the reduction of barriers to trade. It has reduced many duties, bound others against increase, bound the free entry of still other goods, eliminated a long list of preferences and reduced the margin of many other preferences. But the future of the General Agreement depends upon the fate of the Charter. It is in effect provisionally, not definitively; it can be denounced on short notice. If the United States were to renounce the Charter, many of the contracting parties might withdraw from the Agreement. If this were to happen, tariffs would rise, quota systems and exchange controls would be maintained and strengthened, bilateralism would persist and discrimination would be intensified. In almost every country, outside of the United States, detailed administrative regulation of exports and imports, instead of being the exception, would become the general rule. Under these circumstances, the Bank and the Fund would be condemned to futility; the commitments required of countries participating in the European recovery program would be nullified; the whole effort to restore a freer trading system would end in failure.

This is a risk that we, in America, cannot afford to take. Our prosperity, our freedom, our national security, and our hopes for peace are bound up in our efforts to rebuild a world economy. Instead of seeking a perfectionism that is unattainable, we should do well to lay hold on the measure of order that is within our grasp. The I.T.O. should be set up, strengthened in operation, and given a trial. The Charter should be approved.

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THE RUSSIAN POPULATION ENIGMA

By Eugene M. Kulischer

THE question of the size of the postwar population of the Soviet Union is not the least of the enigmas which have been baffling students of Russian affairs. Hardly any estimate or evaluation of an economic, sociological or military character for the U.S.S.R. can be made meaningful without an accurate knowledge of the demographic base.

The last reliable population figure was that of the census of January 17, 1939, which showed a population of 170,500,000. Since that date, both before and after the war, there have been incorporated into the Soviet Union territories with a prewar population of about 24,000,000. For the postwar population of the enlarged territory of the U.S.S.R., Soviet sources offer only an estimated figure of 193,000,000, disclosed in January 1946 by G. F. Alexandroff, then Chief of Propaganda of the Communist Party Central Committee.[1]

Mistrusting this estimate, which was made in a political speech practically without substantiation, two outstanding scholars of Russian origin have attempted to evaluate independently the postwar population of the Soviet Union on the basis of other available information. Professor S. N. Prokopovich based his estimate mainly on the number of voters registered for the elections of February 1946.[2] Assuming that they constituted the same percentage of the total population as in the elections of 1937, Prokopovich estimates the postwar population of the Soviet Union as 180,500,000. This computation leaves out of account the changing age distribution and the increasing numbers of disenfranchised persons.

Nearly the same figure (181,000,000) is obtained by Professor N. S. Timasheff.[3] He estimates the postwar population in a new and original way, calculating separately three age groups: 1, up to seven years; 2, from eight to 17 years; and 3, 18 and over (let us call them respectively infants, adolescents and adults). However, this attempt, too, can hardly be considered successful, in spite of the copious data utilized by the author and his skillful interpretation of them.

The number of infants in 1946 is computed by Timasheff at 36,000,000, on the basis of prewar data and assuming a wartime birth deficit of 10,900,000. Probably this figure is too high, since both components of the birth deficit — the so-called normal birth rate and its relative wartime decrease — are exaggerated. However, my main objections are methodological. As matters stand, the estimates of birth rate and birth deficit which can be made are too rough to be of any use for calculating the population. Data on the wartime birth rate and mortality are lacking. By analogy with all the belligerent countries in World War I the assumption can be made that the decline of the birth rate was somewhere between 40 and 50 percent, or even less. This may mean a difference of 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 infants.

Nor do we know how many children were born in the U.S.S.R. between the 1939 census and the outbreak of the war. The birth rate was changing greatly in the last recorded years. In 1935 the number of births was less than 5,000,000;

[1] Associated Press dispatch from Moscow, January 22, 1946; *Pravda*, January 23, 1946.

[2] *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, November 27, 1947, and January 23, 1948.

[3] *American Journal of Sociology*, September 1948.

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in 1936 it was above 5,000,000; and 1937 and 1938 it approached 6,500,000. This increase is due primarily to the fact that from 1936 on candidates for marriage were supplied by the populous classes of those born in 1917–19, *i.e.* between the return from the Imperial Army and mobilization for the Red Army in the Civil War. In the following years, 1939–1941, the same cause might have continued to raise the number of births still more, but the numbers of marriageable persons might also have been already diminished. On such an uncertain basis we may trace in general outlines the trends of population evolution, but we may not calculate the number of postwar infants, *i.e.* of children who in the course of seven years were actually born and survived the wartime hardships.

No more successful is the calculation of the number of adolescents in the postwar population. Professor Timasheff estimates the size of this group on the basis of figures for pupils in primary and secondary schools. In 1939, when persons of eight to 17 years within the old Soviet borders numbered 39,600,000, the number of pupils was 31,000,000. In 1947–48 in the enlarged territory there were only 31,300,000 pupils. From this figure Timasheff infers that in 1946 the number of adolescents was still 39,000,000. However, even on the assumption that the prewar level of educational facilities had been fully restored by 1947–48 — which is too optimistic — the figure of pupils is indicative only of persons seven to 13 years old since they constitute the great bulk of the school population. After the war this age group was certainly relatively smaller, not only as a consequence of war losses but also because into this group moved the small numbers of those born during the period of collectivization and famine of the early thirties. Neither this consideration nor the small figure of the 1947–48 school population applies to persons 14 to 17 years old. This group may influence the total of adolescents in such a way that it may be much higher than in 1939, in spite of the same low number of pupils. Thus the attempt to calculate the second age group separately leads to dubious results.

In estimating the number of adults, however, a solid starting point is available: the number of voters. For the elections of February 9, 1946, 101,700,000 were registered. Under Soviet conditions, almost all of those entitled to vote are registered. In order to obtain the total of the adult population who have reached the voting age of 18 years, we have to add to the number registered the mass of disenfranchised persons, including the inmates of the concentration camps.

Here is the crux of the matter. According to Timasheff, the number of non-voters does not exceed 4,000,000. He based this estimate on the assumption that in 1937 there were but 3,300,000 adult non-voters, a figure corresponding to the difference between the calculated percentage of voters in the 1937 elections (56.3 percent of the total population) and that of persons of 18 years and more, which, according to the 1939 census, was 58.3 percent[4] of the total population. This reasoning is methodologically objectionable. Calculations of residual quantities are hazardous if the two compared figures are derived from different sources. Apart from this general consideration, which makes questionable a meticulous comparison of census returns and voting lists, the two sources (1937 elections and 1939 census) are not even synchronous. And it was just between 1937 and 1939 that a sharp shift in the age distribution occurred. Two and a half million more children were born in 1937–38 than in the two preceding years. Likewise,

[4] The precision of this figure is open to some doubt, since the census data were not tabulated separately for the age groups of 18 and 19 years.

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a smaller number advanced into the adult age, because this group included those born during the civil war. Accordingly, the percentage of adults was substantially higher in 1937 than in 1939 and the difference between the adult and the voting population should have surpassed the assumed 3,300,000. But in any case the number of non-voters calculated for 1937 is not convincing for 1946.

True, the number of political deportees in the Soviet Union has been grossly exaggerated; fantastic rumors of 12,000,000 or more inmates of concentration camps have been uncritically repeated by political writers. But we should not go from one extreme to another. There is ample evidence of numerous concentration camps not simply in the polar region where a great prison population could not be supported, but also in various other parts of the Soviet Union. An estimated total of 4,000,000 non-voters would reduce the number of concentration camp slave-laborers to a very small figure. This is because at least 1 percent, *i.e.* 1,000,000, must be written off for inevitable defects of the voting register. Another 1,000,000 comprise insane persons and criminals deprived by courts of electoral rights. Furthermore, just on the eve of the 1946 elections 5,000,000 repatriated prisoners of war and civilian workers were being investigated, and obviously a considerable part of these could not yet be included in the electoral lists. The remainder of the assumed 4,000,000 non-voters, representing inmates of concentration camps, would be rather insignificant.

Answering my article in *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*,[5] Prokopovich admitted that part of the millions which he considered as war victims might be inmates of concentration camps. On the other hand, he considers it as equally possible that deportees were allowed to vote, since they were deported on administrative orders without trial. However, this assumption is refuted by numerous former inmates of concentration camps who have described the mock trials in which they were sentenced to confinement in "labor camps." It is true that many "forced colonists," such as the *kulaki* and some minority national groups, have been deported without trial and are living at large in remote regions, and even might be allowed to vote. But the general tendency is toward eliminating all politically unreliable elements from voting.[6] In order to substantiate his low population estimate, Prokopovich proposed the number of workers and employees as another indicator of the adult population. In 1946 it was down to what it was in 1937 on a much smaller territory. However, comparability is ruled out by three reasons: the much larger number of people in the armed forces, the increased employment of women, and the mass of invalids in 1946.

Thus estimates of the postwar population made by scholars outside the Soviet Union are not only unconvincing but also in contradiction with other information which has passed the Iron Curtain. Alexandroff's figure of 193,000,000 remains the only estimate of the postwar population that seems to be usable. In contrast with the estimates discussed above, it is quite compatible with the well-founded assumption that in the Communist paradise millions of citizens are enduring the horrors of concentration camps. Even though they do not number 10,000,000 to 15,000,000 they certainly reach at least 5,000,000 — surely an enormous enough figure! On the other hand, the actual decline of the population by about 7,000,000 during the four and a half years between the German invasion and

[5] December 25, 1947.

[6] See the report of an eyewitness, "Elections to the Supreme Council," *The Socialist Courier*, November 30, 1948.

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1946, while putting a check on unfounded exaggerations, nevertheless suggests a hecatomb of war victims without historic precedent.[7]

The difference between the expected population of 215,000,000 to 217,000,000 and the reported figure of 193,000,000 shows a loss of 22,000,000 to 24,000,000. Deducting from this figure some 2,000,000 who left the Soviet Union (migratory loss), and eliminating a birth deficit of 8,000,000 to 10,000,000, we obtain an excess mortality of 10,000,000 to 14,000,000 which might be evenly distributed between military and civilian deaths. The higher figure is the more probable.[8] In other words, as a result of World War II, Russia lost as many human lives as all other European countries taken together. Russia's losses during the four years of the last war equalled her losses in the course of the nine-year period which comprises the first World War, the Russian civil war and the Great Famine. Military losses, which numbered 2,000,000 in World War I and over 1,000,000 in the civil war (1918–1921), were considerably greater in World War II because of the progress of means of destruction and the higher mortality among prisoners of war.

On the other hand, civilian losses were higher in the years 1914–22, amounting to about 9,000,000,[9] because the civil war (not World War I) and the famine had resurrected the scourge of former times — epidemic diseases. True, in World War II this rôle was assumed by the Germans; but the ideologically-imbued Nazi pest seized Jews primarily for methodical extermination; other subjugated peoples had to fulfill their destiny by serving the master race as slaves. Accordingly, Jews constituted the majority of civilians killed by Germans in occupied territories having a considerable Jewish population, as was demonstrated with regard to countries for which reliable statistics are available. Thus, the Czechoslovak Statistical Office estimated the number of civilians who were killed at 138,000 Jews and 55,000 non-Jews. The Netherlands Bureau for War Documentation put the figure for Holland at 114,000 Jews and 17,000 non-Jews. According to the Belgian Government Information Center, which does not account separately for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens, the total of Belgian civilians killed was 40,564; but apart from them are listed as German victims 20,000 non-citizen Jews. In these three countries Jews formed only 1 to 2 percent of the population.

[7] It may be of more than academic interest that during the Tsarist régime the peak number of convicts at hard labor was 52,000 in 1913. In addition, 25,000 were sent into exile in 1901–10 and 27,000 in 1911–14. According to a rough estimate of M. Rosanov (*Novoye Russkoye Slovo,* December 21, 1948), who claims that he worked in the planning department of an important regional correction camp's administration, the number of inmates in 1941 was 7,000,000 to 8,000,000. Rosanov reveals for the first time an essential fact with regard to the 1939 census, namely that it listed deportees according to their former legal domicile.

[8] The figure of 7,000,00 was disclosed by Stalin (United Press dispatch from London, March 13, 1946; *New Times,* Moscow, May 1, 1946). It is unlikely that the figure was intentionally minimized, since it was contained in a statement emphasizing the losses of Russia in comparison with those of her allies. However, though it seems to refer mainly to military losses, it also mentions losses from occupation and deportation. In a broadcast from Moscow, May 4, 1947, the outstanding Soviet historian, Tarlé, blamed "some people in Western Europe and America" who "are at times little inclined to full justice and pay the well-deserved tribute to the memory of the 7,000,000 Soviet soldiers who laid down their lives."

[9] See my "Europe on the Move," p. 71.

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The Soviet territory occupied by the Germans had a prewar population of some 85,000,000, of whom nearly 5 percent were Jews. The number of Jews killed was about 2,500,000. The number of non-Jews who perished under the German rule hardly could be higher and probably was smaller. If, therefore, the number of civilian losses in the German-occupied territory[10] did not exceed 4,000,000 to 5,000,000, the figure for the uninvaded territory probably was not higher than 2,000,000 to 3,000,000. This gives us a total approaching 7,000,000, as compared with 9,000,000 during 1914–1922.

The purpose of these remarks is not to minimize Russia's civilian losses. Indeed, a total of about 7,000,000 is, proportionately to the population, twice as high as the corresponding figure for Axis-ruled Europe outside the U.S.S.R. Rather, it is intended to warn against an uncritical acceptance of figures, with preference for the highest available, as if a million corpses were somehow trifling. An UNRRA representative reported a Ukrainian Government estimate of 7,000,000 to 9,000,000 civilian losses. A well-known American writer reported for the Ukraine a figure of 6,000,000. A medical officer of UNRRA estimated the excess mortality in Belorussia at 2,200,000. A leading Polish Communist gave an estimate of military and civilian losses of the Soviet Union at 17,000,000 (not including excess mortality from harsh living conditions).[11] We know what difficulties there are in the way of computing civilian losses. We know also, in particular since Delbrück's methodological researches, the tendency of the human mind grossly to exaggerate losses from wars and other disasters. Certainly there is less reason to accept the above hearsay evidence from Soviet sources (albeit reported by dependable persons) than to reject the postwar population figure disclosed by an influential Soviet spokesman, even though this figure is inconsistent with fantastic estimates of war losses.

As long as there is no postwar census, any suggested population figure will not be more, in view of radical wartime changes, than an intelligent guess. Nor can Alexandroff's figure of 193,000,000 claim greater validity. However, the information on which it is based is certainly better and more abundant than that at our disposal. Some persons have suspected that it is nothing but a prewar figure founded on the 1939 census for the old Soviet territory. However, Alexandroff stated that 100,000,000 of the reported total population were born after the October 1917 revolution. This figure could not possibly be deduced from the 1939 census. There seems no doubt, then, that it is a postwar population estimate. It is the only one given by Soviet sources which is not admittedly based on prewar data, and probably it is used for official purposes. Its principal virtue is that it does not lead to exaggerating or minimizing either war losses or the population of the concentration camps.

[10] The bulk of civilian losses occurred in the German-occupied territory. The situation of besieged Leningrad, which lost 650,000 inhabitants, was unique in non-occupied Russia.

[11] These estimates have been compiled by Timasheff, *op. cit.* His own estimate of excess mortality amounts to 25,000,000 (7,000,000 military and 18,300,000 civilian losses). The same total has been given by Prokopovich.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

NOTE—FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 58 East 68th Street, New York 21, N. Y.

General: Political, Military and Legal

MUNICH: PROLOGUE TO TRAGEDY. By JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT. New York: Duell, 1948, 507 p. $5.00.

A clear and thoroughly objective history and interpretation of European developments during the eight months from March to October 1938, founded on a wealth of documentation. Mr. Wheeler-Bennett, a British historian with practical diplomatic experience, is one of the editors of the captured German documents and is preparing an authoritative history of the Nuremberg trials.

FROM VERSAILLES TO POTSDAM. By LEONARD VON MURALT. Hinsdale (Ill.): Regnery, 1948, 93 p. $2.00.

A Swiss historian's review of 30 unhappy years and what we might learn from them, including the need for a European union to act as a balance between Russia and America.

THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF WORLD WAR II. By FLOYD A. CAVE AND OTHERS. New York: Dryden, 1948, 820 p. $4.75.

A coöperative treatise prepared by a dozen teachers in American universities and covering the last 35 years of international history.

POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE. By HANS J. MORGENTHAU. New York: Knopf, 1948, 489 p. $5.50.

The "realistic" approach to international politics.

EVERYMAN LOOKS FORWARD. By LANCELOT LAW WHYTE. New York: Holt, 1948, 78 p. $2.00.

A speculative view of the coming two decades in world history "as determined by U. S.-Soviet relations."

EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES. EDITED BY FELIKS GROSS. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948, 1,075 p. $12.00.

Some two dozen experts — American and European — describe the nature and historical development of a wide spectrum of contemporary political ideas.

LA SÉCURITÉ DES ÉTATS ET LA SÉCURITÉ DU MONDE. By CHARLES CHAUMONT. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1948, 156 p. Fr. 250.

The author, who participated in the formulation of the United Nations Charter, believes that only in a truly democratic and effective world organization can such an organ as the Security Council function properly.

WORKSHOP OF SECURITY. By PAUL HASLUCK. Melbourne: Cheshire, 1948, 181 p. 15/.

How, and to what effect, the Security Council of the United Nations works, explained by a onetime Australian representative on that body.

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THE WORLD COMMUNITY. Edited by Quincy Wright. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, 322 p. $5.00.

This exploration of the practicability of proposals for a world government is based on the papers and discussions of the 1947 Harris Institute at the University of Chicago.

PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF A WORLD CONSTITUTION. By Robert M. Hutchins and Others. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, 91 p. $2.00.

This elaborate proposal of an organic act for a universal "state," already made public elsewhere, is accompanied by a "summary report" and documentary appendix.

LAST CHANCE. Edited by Clara Urquhart. Boston: Beacon Press, 1948, 182 p. $2.50.

Eleven brief "general statements on world problems" and answers to 11 very broad "questions on world problems" by 26 international figures.

L'ÉTAT MONDIAL. By Paul Haesaerts. Brussels: Jaric, 1948, 451 p.

An art critic dreams up a Utopia.

AIR POWER CAN DISARM. By J. M. Spaight. London: Pitman (for the Air League of the British Empire), 1948, 173 p. 10/6.

A British aviation expert holds that, in the recent war, air power, minus atomic bombs and guided missiles, *did* disarm and defeat the Axis Powers. He also believes that, because of the fear of retaliation, atomic bombs will not be used in the future.

NO PLACE TO HIDE. By David Bradley. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1948, 182 p. $2.00.

Dr. Bradley, a medical man who acted as "radiological monitor" at the Bikini experiments, kept a diary of what he saw, heard and felt. The result is this unpretentious little book, eloquent in its candor and thoroughly frightening in its implications as to the sort of life, and death, henceforth to be the lot of this earth.

STRATÉGIE ET BOMBE ATOMIQUE. By General L.-M. Chassin. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1948, 288 p. Fr. 350.

Largely a collection of articles published in French reviews during 1946 and 1947.

ATOMIC ENERGY. By Karl K. Darrow. New York: Wiley, 1948, 80 p. $2.00.

Nuclear physics explained for the layman by an expert.

ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATION. Edited by Irving R. M. Panzer and the Editorial Staff of Pike and Fischer. Albany: Bender, 1947–48, 450 p. $25.00.

A looseleaf compendium on the legal status of atomic energy in the United States, foreign countries and the international field.

TRATADO DE DIREITO DIPLOMÁTICO. By Rubens Ferreira de Mello. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1948, 2 v.

An official Brazilian synthesis of current doctrine and practice.

LA RATIFICATION DES TRAITÉS ET LE PROBLÈME DES RAPPORTS ENTRE LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET LE DROIT INTERNE. By Pierre Freymond. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1948, 175 p. Fr. 350.

A study of divergencies in national and international practice.

TRIAL OF HEINZ ECK, AUGUST HOFFMANN, WALTER WEISSPFENNIG, HANS RICHARD LENZ AND WOLFGANG SCHWENDER (THE *PELEUS* TRIAL). Edited by John Cameron. London: Hodge, 1948, 247 p. 18/.

The record of a trial in which German submarine officers were sentenced, three of them to death, for slaughtering survivors of a torpedoed British cargo ship.

DIE GRUNDRECHTE DER STAATEN IM VÖLKERRECHT. By Karl Bernhard Graf. Basel: Helbing, 1948, 208 p.

A critical examination of the theory and practice.

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THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK 1948. EDITED BY S. H. STEINBERG. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 1,471 p. $7.50.

This year's issue is particularly useful for current information on countries and areas that have undergone recent constitutional reforms.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1949. EDITED BY WALTER H. MALLORY. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1949, 220 p. $3.50.

The striking development made manifest in the new edition of the "Political Handbook of the World" is the uniformity with which the Communists have absorbed the other parties in the East European countries. In Hungary and Rumania new "Workers Parties" now control the state. In Czechoslovakia the new ruling group is called the "National Front;" in Bulgaria it is the "Fatherland Front." All are Communist. The Handbook has up-to-date summaries of these changes, and, of course, all its usual well-organized and dependable information about the composition and objectives of political parties, and the ownership and political coloration of the press, in every country.

General: Economic and Social

THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE. BY GEOFFREY CROWTHER. Claremont (Cal.): Claremont College, 1948, 79 p. $2.75.

Three wise little essays by the editor of the London *Economist.*

THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM. BY SEYMOUR E. HARRIS. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948, 309 p. $4.50.

A cogent analysis of the salient features of the Marshall Plan and an examination of some of the problems yet to be faced.

POSTWAR MONETARY PLANS AND OTHER ESSAYS. BY JOHN H. WILLIAMS. New York: Knopf, 1947, 312 p. $3.50.

This volume, bringing together the writings of a distinguished American economist on international monetary problems, is the third edition of a book which originally appeared in 1944. It contains three new essays, the most important of them a discussion of the Marshall Plan and the current crisis in Europe.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE: TARIFF AND COMMERCIAL POLICIES. BY ASHER ISAACS. Chicago: Irwin, 1948, 838 p. $6.00.

An up-to-date treatise on the history, theory and current practice of international trade by the various Powers, large and small.

THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE. BY RICHARD CARLTON SNYDER. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1948, 264 p. $2.75.

A scholarly analysis with special attention to recent practice.

ROAD TO SURVIVAL. BY WILLIAM VOGT. New York: Sloane, 1948, 335 p. $4.00.

Facts about, and warnings against, the profligate manner in which man is throwing away the earth's natural resources, and a program for eliminating some of this waste.

FEEDING THE HUMAN FAMILY. BY F. LE GROS CLARK. London: Sigma, 1948, 125 p. 7/6.

A little book on scientific aspects of world-wide nutrition problems.

HUMAN ECOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT. BY THOMAS ROBERTSON. Glasgow: Maclellan, 1948, 534 p. 21/.

A remarkable *tour de force* of social synthesis in which a student of medicine seeks, with unorthodox results, to apply scientific techniques to the problem of how better to adjust man to his environment.

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WAR ECONOMICS OF PRIMARY PRODUCING COUNTRIES. By A. R. Prest. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1948, 308 p. $4.50.

A factual description of the wartime economic contributions of India, several Middle Eastern countries, Nigeria and Trinidad.

THE RUBBER INDUSTRY: A STUDY IN COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY. By P. T. Bauer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948, 404 p. $7.50.

This amply documented monograph deals with the twin issues of competition and monopoly in the producing areas (primarily Southeast Asia) since World War I and is published for the London School of Economics and Political Science.

SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INTERNATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF WORLD AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES. Prepared by John C. Cooper. Princeton: Princeton University, Aeronautical Engineering Laboratory, 1948, 174 p.

Introductory matter by the compiler and 18 annexes of documentary and other source material assembled for an aeronautical conference at Princeton in October 1948.

DYNAMIQUE ÉCONOMIQUE. By Raymond Florin. Soissons (France): Imprimerie Saint-Antoine, 1948, 115 p. Fr. 500.

A somewhat technical analysis of current theories.

THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND. By Stuart Chase. New York: Harper, 1948, 311 p. $3.50.

A critical appraisal of the virtues and faults of the social disciplines, undertaken at the request of the Carnegie Corporation and the Social Science Research Council.

THE RESCUE OF SCIENCE AND LEARNING. By Stephen Duggan and Betty Drury. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 214 p. $3.00.

The story of how the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars provided much needed help to over 300 refugees as well as of the services of these to scores of American institutions of learning.

EDUCATION FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING. By Thomas R. Adam. New York: Institute of Adult Education, 1948, 181 p. $2.00.

An analysis and criticism of the agencies and forces currently trying to direct American opinion toward world coöperation, with suggestions for reform.

OF FLIGHT AND LIFE. By Charles A. Lindbergh. New York: Scribner, 1948, 56 p. $1.50.

For his blind faith in science Colonel Lindbergh has substituted an emotional faith in God. But in politics he is still an isolationist who distrusts world organizations like the United Nations and believes in the intellectual and moral superiority of the west.

COMMUNIST CHALLENGE. By Kenneth Ingram. London: Quality Press, 1948, 147 p. 10/6.

Communism is Mr. Ingram's "wave of the future" and he offers it as the best refuge for those opposed to Fascism and "liberal capitalism."

UNITY IN DISPERSION. New York: World Jewish Congress, 1948, 381 p. $3.50.

A score of chapters by various hands on the activities of the World Jewish Congress, created in 1936 and claiming the affiliation of most Jews outside the Soviet Union. The record as here set forth stresses the unity of all Jews regardless of nationality.

The Second World War

CRUSADE IN EUROPE. By Dwight D. Eisenhower. Garden City: Doubleday, 1948, 559 p. $5.00.

Some of the qualities that made Eisenhower a great commander of coalition forces —

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modesty, tact, humanity — are evident in these memoirs of his service in the recent war. Though he steadfastly sought to avoid politics, he was inevitably involved in important political decisions on which he has some interesting things to say. Most of his narrative, however, is about high strategy and the manner in which victory was organized in the west.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE ARMY GROUND FORCES: THE PROCUREMENT AND TRAINING OF GROUND COMBAT TROOPS. By Robert R. Palmer and Others. Washington: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1948, 696 p. $4.50.

The second volume in a monumental series.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFLECTIONS FROM WORLD WAR II. By Luther Gulick. University: University of Alabama Press, 1948, 139 p. $2.50.

Lessons from wartime experience that are applicable in peace.

STAR-SPANGLED RADIO. By Edward M. Kirby and Jack W. Harris. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1948, 278 p. $3.50.

Two professional broadcasters present a rather breathless account of how the American radio helped win the late war.

THE RISING SUN IN THE PACIFIC, 1931–APRIL 1942. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1948, 411 p. $6.00.

Starting with the moment when the militarists took control of Japan's foreign policy, Professor Morison reviews the record of American-Japanese relations up to Pearl Harbor before giving his balanced, authoritative account of the dark first four months of the Pacific war. This is Volume III in his "History of U. S. Naval Operations in World War II."

FROM FIJI THROUGH THE PHILIPPINES WITH THE THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE. By Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin E. Lippincott and Others. New York: Macmillan (distributor for Newsfoto Publishing Co., San Angelo, Tex.), 1948, 193 p. $10.00.

Nearly one hundred 8½" by 11" paintings (some in full color), plus brief accompanying texts, portraying the wartime rôle of the 13th Air Force.

RYKMENTTI TAISTELEE. By Paavo Susitaival. Helsinki: Söderström, 1948, 253 p. M. 480.

An account of the Finnish-Russian war of 1941–44, by a recognized military writer.

The United States

ROOSEVELT AND HOPKINS: AN INTIMATE HISTORY. By Robert E. Sherwood. New York: Harper, 1948, 979 p. $6.00.

Seldom has such masterly history been written so well and so soon after the events it recounts. At his death early in 1946, Harry Hopkins left a vast amount of documentary material — letters, memoranda, copies of state papers and the like. Mr. Sherwood, a playwright who himself was a member of the White House circle, in preparing this best of all the war books, exploited not only this treasure but additional material which was put at his disposal by other actors in the drama, here and abroad. The figure of Roosevelt comes more and more to dominate the book as it progresses through the years of neutrality, until in the war the onetime social worker becomes almost the President's other self. Sherwood tells the story as the record reveals it, without hero-worship. Despite its length of nearly one thousand pages, the narrative moves along with verve and is studded with the texts of immensely important documents.

PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Lester Markel and Others. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1949, 227 p. $3.50.

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How well informed is American public opinion in the field of foreign affairs? What can be done to make it better informed? How effective is our propaganda abroad? What can be done to improve it? This book is an effort to answer these questions. It describes what public opinion is, how it is being used, how it should be used. Written by nine authors, all experts on various aspects of the subject, the book is not a symposium but a running discussion. Lester Markel, Sunday editor of *The New York Times*, planned the book and coördinated the work of the other contributors.

THE NIGHTMARE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Edgar Ansel Mowrer. New York: Knopf, 1948, 283 p. $2.95.

Mr. Mowrer's nightmare is the failure of our leaders to use the power of this nation to prevent the disaster of recurring world wars. These anxieties he derives from the record of our foreign policy during the last 30 years, which he here retells and interprets.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. By Malbone W. Graham. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1948, 279 p. $3.25.

The Albert Shaw Lectures for 1946, in which Professor Graham documents our active diplomatic intervention in the larger affairs of the non-American world.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE COLD WAR. By D. N. Pritt. New York: International Publishers, 1948, 96 p. $1.25.

This is a decidedly Leftist commentary on the State Department's published collection of documents on "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941," by a British Labor M.P., whose reliability as an historian leaves much to be desired.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. VOLUME VIII. JULY 1, 1945–DECEMBER 31, 1946. Edited by Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the World Peace Foundation), 1948, 962 p. $6.00.

The source material concerning the peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria will be included in a supplement.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. Edited by Seymour E. Harris. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948, 490 p. $6.00.

Contributions by two dozen authorities on our economic relations with individual areas and countries, international economic coöperation, the E.R.P., and the problems of international economic equilibrium.

THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROBLEMS. By Cleona Lewis. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1948, 359 p. $4.00.

This is a very solid contribution to a discussion that is causing a lot of head-scratching around the world. First Miss Lewis surveys the changed position of the world's debtors and creditors from 1938 to 1947, providing a lot of valuable data. She then gives special attention to problems of providing capital for economic development and the many factors that make investors hesitate to venture their money abroad. The final third of the book is a comprehensive survey of the policy of the United States Government as a foreign lender and in relation to its private investors and their property abroad.

WOOL TARIFFS AND AMERICAN POLICY. By Donald M. Blinken. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948, 168 p. $3.00.

The author concludes that the wool tariff should be abandoned.

WINGS AROUND THE WORLD. By Captain Burr W. Leyson. New York: Dutton, 1948, 192 p. $3.00.

A narrative of the development of American international civil air transport.

MISSOURI AND THE WORLD WAR, 1914–1917. By John Clark Crighton. Columbia: University of Missouri, 1947, 199 p. $2.50.

A scholarly study of public opinion during the neutrality period.

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OUR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. By Wright Patman. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1948, 143 p. $2.75.

A Texas Congressman answers "1,001 questions on how it works."

THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE. By J. Howard McGrath. New York: Messner, 1948, 196 p. $2.75.

The achievements and virtues of the Democratic Party set forth for the benefit of young voters, by the chairman of its National Committee.

PROBLEM I USA. By Herbert Tingsten. Stockholm: Bonnier, 1948, 122 p. Kr. 4.50.

Acute observations on a trip through America in 1947, by the editor of *Dagens Nyheter* of Stockholm.

THE WAR LORDS OF WASHINGTON. By Bruce Catton. New York: Harcourt, 1948, 313 p. $3.00.

The tale of how, in the author's estimation, we failed to use the golden opportunity afforded by the war to make our economic organization more responsive to democratic needs. Mr. Catton was director of information at the War Production Board.

WOODROW WILSON: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HIS PUBLISHED WRITINGS, ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC PAPERS. By Laura Shearer Turnbull. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948, 173 p. $2.00.

In part a revision of a compilation prepared and published by H. S. Leach in 1927, with much new material listed by Arthur S. Link and Katharine E. Brand.

GARNER OF TEXAS: A PERSONAL HISTORY. By Bascom N. Timmons. New York: Harper, 1948, 294 p. $3.00.

Incidental sidelights on the foreign policy of the New Deal as revealed to the writer by the Vice-President during Roosevelt's first two terms.

THE INSIDE STORY OF THE LEGION. By Justin Gray. New York: Boni and Gaer, 1948, 255 p. $3.00.

This young veteran of World War II, after serving as Assistant Director of the National Americanism Commission of the American Legion, became a labor union official. In his book he throws a lurid light on the authoritarian setup and the reactionary policies of the Legion's high command.

THE AMERICAN ECONOMY. By Sumner H. Slichter. New York: Knopf, 1948, 214 p. $2.75.

A keen, original analysis of the major factors in our economic life, with suggestions for achieving greater stability.

MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES. By the Staffs of the Bureau of Mines and Geological Survey. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948, 212 p. $5.00.

A statement on what is available, where, and in what quantities.

AMERICAN AGENCIES INTERESTED IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Compiled by Ruth Savord. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1948, 195 p. $2.50.

The revised edition of this handy reference book provides up-to-date data concerning 176 organizations and partial data about 26 foreign chambers of commerce. In addition, it lists 29 foreign information bureaus and 124 dormant and discontinued organizations. A subject index classifies the agencies both under their primary and secondary spheres of interest, and there is a personnel index, containing over 1,000 names.

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Western Europe

AU QUAI D'ORSAY, À LA VEILLE DE LA TOURMENTE. By Maurice Paléologue. Paris: Plon, 1947, 329 p. Fr. 250.

The author was Political Director of the Quai d'Orsay and French Ambassador in St. Petersburg during the last years before World War I. His diary from January 1, 1913, to June 28, 1914, provides interesting personal impressions but no revelations.

DE MUNICH À LA Vme RÉPUBLIQUE. By Paul Faure. Paris: Éditions de l'Élan, 1948, 274 p. Fr. 255.

The author takes a dark view of the future of France, which he holds has been sadly weakened by postwar purges, an unworkable constitution, an ill-considered program of socialization, the destruction of public credit, etc.

MONTOIRE: VERDUN DIPLOMATIQUE. By Louis-Dominique Girard. Paris: Bonne, 1948, 571 p. Fr. 450.

This is an important book regardless of what opinion the reader may form as to its objectivity. The author, a functionary who served the Vichy régime in various capacities, in January 1944 became chief of Pétain's *cabinet civil*. As he has indicated in his title, Girard's purpose in describing the Marshal's foreign policy is to show that it sought to serve the best interests of France and that this was demonstrated by Pétain's behavior in the negotiations culminating in the conversations at Montoire in October 1940. There are 30 pages of notes and references to published works and documents.

THE DIARY OF PIERRE LAVAL. New York: Scribner, 1948, 240 p. $3.50.

This apologia of the arch-collaborationist, edited by his daughter Josée, consists not of a diary but of notes prepared by Laval while in prison during the summer of 1945 and intended to prove that his error was in expecting an ultimate German victory, not in any desire to sell his country down the river.

FACE AUX RÉALITÉS. By Pierre Cathala. Paris: Éditions du Triolet, 1948, 302 p. Fr. 288.

This work was prepared, not for publication, but as a defense before the High Court of Justice — the author was Minister of Finance during the Nazi occupation — and as such is of historical importance for its record of the conduct of French public finances from 1942 to the liberation.

BATAILLES POLITIQUES ET MILITAIRES SUR L'EUROPE: TÉMOIGNAGES (1932–1940). By General Armengaud. Paris: Éditions du Myrte, 1948, 340 p. Fr. 507.

A French air officer, who observed the Civil War in Spain and the Polish campaign of 1939, is critical of the army commanders in France, in particular Gamelin, who neglected development of the air arm.

LA RÉPUBLIQUE DES PARTIS. By Roger A. Priouret. Paris: Éditions de l'Élan, 1947, 279 p. Fr. 180.

Observations and animadversions on French postwar politics.

LA TRAHISON PERMANENTE. By Maurice Ceyrat. Paris: Spartacus, 1948, 164 p. Fr. 100.

A bitterly hostile review of Communist policies and tactics in France since 1920.

HISTOIRE DU PARTI COMMUNISTE FRANÇAIS. By Gérard Walter. Paris: Somogy, 1948, 390 p. Fr. 350.

A much more solid and better documented work, carrying the account to 1940. Notes, chronological table and bibliography.

HISTOIRE DU SOCIALISME ET DU COMMUNISME EN FRANCE, DE 1871 À 1947. By Alexandre Zévaès. Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1947, 439 p. Fr. 300.

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A lively and authoritative summary by an historian who has followed closely the Socialist movement and known its leaders since the late nineteenth century.

THE MONETARY PROBLEM OF FRANCE. By Pierre Dieterlen and Charles Rist. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1948, 98 p. $2.50.

A description of the monetary situation inherited by liberated France in 1944, and a critical analysis of the policies pursued since then. The authors, distinguished French economists with wide practical experience, have considerable fault to find with the monetary record of the Fourth Republic.

LA FRANCE D'OUTRE-MER: DE L'EMPIRE COLONIAL À L'UNION FRANÇAISE (1938–1947). By Michel Devèze. Paris: Hachette, 1948, 321 p. Fr. 350.

A valuable statement of the changes wrought by the war in the French colonial empire, with special attention to the formation and functioning of the French Union.

LA VIE ÉCONOMIQUE DE L'UNION FRANÇAISE. By Maurice Rouable. Paris: Dunod, 1948, 302 p. Fr. 320.

A manual aimed primarily at the student.

LE GÉNÉRAL LECLERC VU PAR SES COMPAGNONS DE COMBAT. Paris: Alsatia, 1948, 365 p. Fr. 500.

The story of the late Free French leader's exploits in Africa, western Europe and Indo-China during and immediately after the war.

CLEMENCEAU AND THE THIRD REPUBLIC. By J. Hampden Jackson. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 266 p. $2.00.

A turbulent era in French history centered around its dominating personality.

FAHRTEN IN ISLAND. By Rudolf Jonas. Vienna: Seidel, 1948, 197 p. Schillings 34.

The illustrated account of an expedition into south and east Iceland, with maps.

THE COAST OF NORTHEAST GREENLAND. By Louise A. Boyd and Others. New York: American Geographical Society, 1948, 339 p. $6.00.

An illustrated report on the scientific observations of expeditions to Greenland in 1937–38, with a separate case of maps.

A HISTORY OF DENMARK. By John Danstrup. Copenhagen: Wivel, 1947, 195 p.

Despite inaccuracies, a useful brief treatment.

HANDLINGAR RÖRANDE SVERIGES POLITIK UNDER ANDRA VÄRLDSKRIGET. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1947–1948, 4 v.

These "White Books" comprise documents of the Swedish Foreign Office, edited in consultation with Norwegian scholars and officials who have simultaneously issued their own series. The first three volumes, dealing with the background of the war in the north and its course up to the end of 1940, contain the more significant material.

RÄTSEL UM DEUTSCHLAND: 1933 BIS 1945. By Bernhard Schwertfeger. Heidelberg (U. S. Zone): Winter, 1947, 574 p.

One-third of this excellent, objective book, by a well-known scholar of pre-Hitler days, is devoted to the period from 1918 to 1933, while emphasis is put on the years 1932–34. There is little new factual material for American readers, though the author's point of view will be of interest. Good bibliography.

LE SENTIMENT NATIONAL EN ALLEMAGNE. By Maurice Boucher. Paris: Éditions du Vieux Colombier, 1947, 258 p. Fr. 300.

Deals primarily with the awakening of nationalism in the Romantic Era.

DEUTSCHLAND NACH DEM ZUSAMMENBRUCH. By Max Pribilla. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Knecht, 1947, 147 p.

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In four essays a Jesuit, editor of *Stimmen der Zeit*, critically surveys the Third Reich and summons the Germans to a moral regeneration.

LES ALLEMANDS D'AUJOURD'HUI. By Robert d'Harcourt. Paris: Hachette, 1948, 320 p. Fr. 250.

A member of the French Academy, after considerable contact with the postwar Germans, concludes that the task of creating democratic and pacific behavior patterns among them will be long and arduous.

RUSSIAN ZONE OF GERMANY. By Gordon Schaffer. New York: Soviet Russia Today, 1948, 192 p. $2.50.

A British journalist visits the Soviet zone of occupation freely and finds much to praise and little to criticize.

KAISERREICH, REPUBLIK, NAZIHERRSCHAFT. By Ludwig Heilbrunn. Hamburg (British Zone): Hamburger Kulturverlag, 1947, 146 p.

A plea that Germans return to the principles of liberalism.

DEUTSCHLAND IST TOT — ES LEBE DEUTSCHLAND. By Paul Diehl. Heidelberg (U. S. Zone): Freiheit-Verlag, 1947, 188 p.

A polemic refutation of Hitler's theories.

DEUTSCHLAND ODER DEUTSCHE LÄNDER? By Wolfram von Hanstein. Dresden (U.S.S.R. Zone): Voco-Verlag, 1947, 123 p.

A cogent argument that an industrial and socialized Germany requires a centralized state, whereas federalism has always been the watchword of the conservatives.

WO LIEGT DEUTSCHLANDS ZUKUNFT? By Hermann Kapphan. Seebruck (U. S. Zone): Heering, 1947, 430 p.

The author believes that "healing energies" are still available in Germany for removing the remnants of the Fascist mentality and for combating moral cynicism.

DIE ZWEITE REPUBLIK. By Walter Dirks. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Knecht, 1947, 190 p.

An intelligent analysis of the present political scene in Germany with reference to a future republic.

GIBT ES NOCH EINE DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK? By Eugen Budde. Hamburg (British Zone): Hugo, 1947, 120 p.

A plea that the governments of the *Länder* take the lead in appealing to international law as a means of furthering the interests of Germany.

VOLK OHNE RAUM: BRAUCHT DEUTSCHLAND NEUEN LEBENSRAUM? By Hans Fülster. Hamburg (British Zone): Hamburger Kulturverlag, 1947, 134 p.

This well-documented and serious study of the population problem in Germany appears as Volume II in the new series of "Kultur und Zeitfragen."

THE GERMAN GENERALS TALK. By B. H. Liddell Hart. New York: Morrow, 1948, 308 p. $4.00.

A noted British military expert reconstructs phases of the war in the west as seen through the eyes of a number of high German commanders with whom he talked. Interesting, not so much as history, but as to what the generals think in retrospect.

LES ARMES SECRÈTES ALLEMANDES. By Albert Ducrocq. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1948, 252 p. Fr. 250.

A description of the new German weapons just completed, and about to be, at the conclusion of the war.

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GUSTAV STRESEMANN. By Walter Görlitz. Heidelberg (U. S. Zone): Ähren, 1947, 287 p.

A popular yet substantial biography.

PORTRAIT EINES MENSCHHEITSVERBRECHERS NACH DEN HINTERLASSENEN MEMOIREN DES EHEMALIGEN REICHSMINISTERS ALFRED ROSENBERG. By Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenck. St. Gallen (Switzerland): Zollikofer, 1947, 356 p.

These memoirs, written in jail by the party philosopher, have been edited (how much is not clear) and interlarded with comments intended to rectify glaring errors in his apology. They disclose bitter animosity among the top-ranking Nazis.

PERMANENCE DE L'AUTRICHE. By Jean Delaporte and Others. Paris: Éditions du Temps Présent, 1948, 404 p. Fr. 395.

A Catholic collaborative work on the history and culture of Austria.

LA SUISSE: DÉMOCRATIE-TÉMOIN. By André Siegfried. Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1948, 238 p.

This well-informed, readable survey of the economic and political geography and the political institutions of the Swiss is in the tradition of Siegfried's similar works on the United States and Canada.

L'EUROPA VERSO LA CATASTROFE. By Galeazzo Ciano. Milan: Mondadori, 1948, 722 p. L. 1,100.

This important collection of documents from the files of the Palazzo Chigi for the most part supplements Ciano's "Diaries," either published or yet to appear. To Ciano's minutes of 184 conversations with foreign statesmen between 1936 and April 1942 the editors have added some 40 hitherto unpublished documents and other useful explanatory matter. Though there are few great revelations, much new light is thrown on Italy's tortuous foreign policy, particularly in regard to Germany and Spain.

LA MIA VITA. By Benito Mussolini. Rome: Faro, 1947, 225 p. L. 450.

Ostensibly, and plausibly, the autobiography of the early Mussolini, written while he was imprisoned from December 1911 to March 1912. The salient features of his character and philosophy are already clearly evident.

THE FALL OF MUSSOLINI: HIS OWN STORY. By Benito Mussolini. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1948, 212 p. $3.00.

This is *Il Duce's* account of Italian events from November 1942 until he became head of the puppet Republic a year later. It is full of bombast, complaints of betrayal and self-exculpation. Here and there are facts and documents of importance, and analyses of such phenomena as the relations between the crown and the party régime. Its main interest is Mussolini's unintended but deeply etched portrait of himself. No future historian will need to deflate his character and intellectual pretensions to their true dimensions, so effectively has he himself done the job. This work originally appeared in the *Corriere della Sera* during June and July 1944, and has here been translated and edited by Max Ascoli.

I 600 GIORNI DI MUSSOLINI. By Ermanno Amicucci. Rome: Faro, 1948, 313 p. L. 900.

Amicucci was editor of the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan, once Italy's leading newspaper, under the neo-Fascist Republic; and in this strategic position he observed at close range the men and events of that singular chapter in Italian history. His story is primarily that of Mussolini's adventures from his rescue by Nazi parachutists to his death. The author adds few facts to the record but sheds much light on personal relationships among the Fascist and Nazi leaders.

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AFFARI ESTERI 1943–1945. By Luigi Villari. Rome: Magi-Spinetti, 1948, 307 p. L. 550.

A well-known apologist for Fascist policies attempts, without documentation, to recount the diplomatic achievements of Mussolini's puppet Republic.

LA RICOSTRUZIONE DELL'ESERCITO. By General Francesco Rossi. Rome: Faro, 1946, 152 p. L. 200.

Specific proposals for reforming the postwar army of Italy, by the former deputy chief of the Italian General Staff.

L'ESPAGNE: PROBLÈME DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES. Brussels: Institut des Relations Internationales, 1948, 122 p.

A brief factual résumé of Spain's current economic and political conditions, and international relations, prepared by a study group at the Institut.

SLEEPLESS SPAIN. By Victor Alba. London: Cobbett, 1948, 207 p. 8/6.

A Catalan journalist portrays the fear, degradation and poverty that grind down the Spanish masses under Franco and discourage them from active resistance.

L'ESPAGNE DE FRANCO. By François Mirandet. Paris: Hachette, 1948, 287 p. Fr. 250.

A candid report on political affairs in Spain by a French journalist who lived there during the war years. He finds the fear of Communism, cleverly exploited by Franco, to be a principal source of his continued power.

EL MEDIO Y LA VIDA EN ANDORRA. By Salvador Llobet. Barcelona: Instituto Juan Sebastián Elcano, Estación de Estudios Pirenaicos, 1947, 347 p. Ptas. 120.

An exhaustive, illustrated treatise on the economic geography of the diminutive Pyrenean republic. Appendices and bibliography.

Eastern Europe

POLITICAL POWER IN THE U.S.S.R. 1917–1947. By Julian Towster. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, 443 p. $6.00.

A systematic exposition of the structure and operation of the Soviet Government, based on Russian sources available in the United States, by an assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE. By Andrei Y. Vyshinsky. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 749 p. $15.00.

Here, after considerable delay, is the English translation of the standard Soviet text, written a decade ago when the author was People's Commissar of Justice. Despite its generally formal presentation, the author indulges in violent polemics when treating all whom he regards as enemies of true Marxist doctrine. A valuable introduction is contributed by Professor Hazard of Columbia University's Russian Institute.

CALENDAR OF SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY, 1917–1941. Compiled by Jane Degras. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948, 248 p. $4.50.

The document titles are arranged by year-groups and country, and references are given to Russian and other sources.

L'U.R.S.S. CONTRE LA GUERRE. By Jean Cathala. Paris: Éditions Hier et Aujourd'hui, 1948, 253 p. Fr. 180.

M. Cathala, who served for some time as information officer at the French Embassy in Moscow, has arranged and annotated a number of speeches and interviews by top Soviet leaders in order to elucidate Russian policy.

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THE ECONOMY OF THE U.S.S.R. DURING WORLD WAR II. By Nikolai A. Voznesensky. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948, 103 p. $3.00.

The American Council of Learned Societies, in its new series of monographs on "Current Soviet Thought," is providing mimeographed English translations of important Russian works on contemporary politics, economics and cultural affairs. The volume here translated appeared in Russia during 1947 and was written by the Deputy Premier of the U.S.S.R. and Chief of the State Planning Commission. It is a curious and disturbing mixture of statistical fact, Marxian dialectic and Soviet propaganda — and the reader has difficulty in discerning which is which. But the author's official position lends considerable importance to his economic interpretations and distortions of history, and, above all, his statement of the basis for east-west collaboration. The French edition of this book appeared as "L'Économie de Guerre de l'U.R.S.S.: 1941–1945" (Paris: Médicis, 1948, 140 p. Fr. 180).

DER VIERTE FÜNFJAHRPLAN DER SOWJETUNION, 1946–1950. By S. N. Prokopovicz. Zurich: Europa, 1948, 152 p.

An analysis of Russia's economic situation at the close of the war and of the prospects for the fourth Five Year Plan, illustrated with many statistics and based largely on Russian sources.

EN PLEINE VIE RUSSE. By Ernest Jucker. Neuchâtel: Éditions du Griffon, 1946, 304 p.

A mixture of personal reminiscences and general observations on Russia and the Soviet régime, by a Swiss who was in that country from 1916 to 1932.

LOST ILLUSION. By Freda Utley. Philadelphia: Fireside Press, 1948, 288 p. $3.00.

A reissue of the author's "The Dream We Lost," the story of her disillusionment with life in the Soviet Union, originally published in 1940.

TAISTELU SUOMISPÄIVÄSTÄ. By Matti Kurjensaari. Helsinki: Tammi, 1948, 210 p. M. 470.

A brilliant essay on Finnish political developments from the Civil War to the present, by one of the country's leading young literati. This penetrating volume contains a thoroughgoing analysis of the rise and spread of the tragic Greater Finland dream and a strong plea for a reorientation of Finnish politics, internally to provide a greater measure of social justice, externally to establish friendly relations with Russia.

SUOMALAINEN JA VENÄLÄINEN TAKTIIKKA TALVISODASSA. By Y. A. Järvinen. Helsinki: Söderström, 1948, 266 p. M. 420.

An analysis of Finnish and Russian military tactics in the Winter War of 1939–40, by a lieutenant general in the Finnish Army. It includes background material on military developments in the two countries following the First World War, an appraisal of their armed power on the eve of the "David and Goliath struggle," and a detailed treatment of the ebb and flow of that conflict.

NUORUKAINEN ETSII SIJAANSA YHTEISKUNNASSA. By Väinö Tanner. Helsinki: Tammi, 1948, 472 p. M. 490.

This third volume of reminiscences by one of Finland's wartime leaders was written while he was serving a term imposed by his country's "Nuremberg Trials." It covers his career from university days to his acceptance of the responsible post of manager of the Elanto coöperative ventures, and includes travels in Germany, Sweden and England, his apprenticeship in journalism, and service in the Diet.

LE GLACIS SOVIÉTIQUE. By Nicolas Clarion. Paris: Somogy, 1948, 283 p. Fr. 270.

A survey of Soviet political and economic policy in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe and northeastern Asia.

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FACING EAST. By L. B. Namier. New York: Harper, 1948, 159 p. $2.50.
Essays by a British historian on selected problems in the development of modern Germany and Russia, and the Slavic countries between them.

BALTIC BACKGROUND. By Bernard Newman. London: Hale, 1948, 280 p. 16/.
An illustrated postwar tour through the nine countries washed by the Baltic, conducted by a well-informed and interesting guide.

TECHNIQUE OF ECONOMIC SOVIETISATION: A BALTIC EXPERIENCE. By Endel Kareda. London: Boreas, 1947, 127 p. 4/.
What Soviet rule has done to Estonia.

HISTORY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN OUTLINE. By J. V. Polišenský. Prague: Sfinx, 1947, 144 p.
A sound but conventional survey of the Czechoslovak people, with numerous historical documents and pictures.

THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Leopold Chmelař. Prague: Orbis, 1948, 174 p.
An official review of the salient facts.

ASPECTS DE LA TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE. By Maurice Descotes. Paris: Éditions du Temps Présent, 1948, 288 p. Fr. 365.
An informal review of modern history and current problems, foreign and domestic.

THE RAPE OF POLAND. By Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. New York: Whittlesey House, 1948, 309 p. $4.00.
The author, a leader of the Peasant Party, joined Sikorski's London government-in-exile and after the war returned to Poland as Deputy Premier. The elections of January 1947 convinced him that Poland was on the verge of complete Sovietization, and he escaped once again to London. This is the story of the tragedy that has overtaken his country during the last ten years, told with restraint and honesty.

THE STRUGGLE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN. By Ferenc Nagy. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 471 p. $6.00.
Another peasant leader, Prime Minister of Hungary for 18 months after the recent war, finds that working *with* the Soviets means working *for* them, or else. Nagy, who now operates a farm in Virginia, tells a somewhat less heroic story than Mikolajczyk.

MAGYARORSZÁG ÉS KELETEURÓPA. A MAGYARSÁG KAPCSOLATAI A SZOMSZÉDNÉPEKKEL. Edited by István Gál. Budapest: Officina Budapest, 1947, 276 p.
Essays by nearly a score of Hungarian writers on the historic relations of their country with the other peoples of central and southeastern Europe.

MAGYARORSZÁG. TÖRTÉNETI, GAZDASÁGI ÉS KULTURÁLIS ÉVKÖNYV. Budapest: Hungária Lloyd, 1948, 259 p.
A comprehensive review of Hungary's recent history, economic potentialities, social welfare progress and prospects of industrial expansion and agricultural improvement.

THE WAR WE LOST. By Constantin Fotitch. New York: Viking, 1948, 344 p. $3.50.
The author was Jugoslav Ambassador in Washington before and during the war. High American officials considered him one of the ablest members of the diplomatic corps. Nevertheless the anti-Tito policy which he recommended was eventually scrapped by Churchill and Roosevelt. In presenting this account of these events, Mr. Fotitch makes no effort to conceal his Serbian nationalist feeling and his resentment at Anglo-American behavior towards Mihailovitch and the Karageorgevitch dynasty.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TOTALITARISME ET DROITS DE L'HOMME. By Dessimir Tochitch. Paris: The Author, 1948, 154 p.

An indictment of Tito's régime based on its denial of elementary human rights.

RUSSIA ASTRIDE THE BALKANS. By Robert Bishop and E. S. Crayfield. New York: McBride, 1948, 287 p. $3.50.

The Soviet pattern for conquest, as witnessed in Rumania by two American intelligence officers. Their report would carry more weight if less mystery surrounded them.

FERDINAND DER BULGARE. By Josef Knodt. Bielefeld (British Zone): Bechauf, 1947, 237 p.

Some interesting personal sidelights, but of no value on the monarch's politics.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1919-1939. Edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler. London: H. M. Stationery Office (available at British Information Services in New York).

Thus far the following have been published: First Series, Volumes I (1947, 969 p. $7.75) and II (1948, 971 p. $8.40); Second Series, Volumes I (1947, 602 p. $5.50), II (1947, 525 p. $5.50) and III (1948, 617 p. $5.50). The two in the First Series deal with events in 1919, while those that have appeared in the Second Series contain documents for the years 1930–32. The editors' selection and arrangement of the documents has been criticized by fellow historians, but it is safe to say that nothing less than the publication of all the material in the archives would satisfy some critics. Meanwhile, the collection as it is coming out will prove of the utmost value to students of what has now already begun to seem a faraway epoch.

SOCIALISM OF THE WEST. By Leo Moulin. London: Gollancz, 1948, 336 p. 7/6.

After analyzing the ideological ancestry of "the anarchy of the twentieth century," the author explains how his "Socialist humanism," which he sees evolving under the Labor Government in Britain, may provide a middle way between the extremes of monopoly capitalism and monopoly Communism.

BRITISH DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. By Henry Drummond-Wolff. London: Hutchinson, 1948, 136 p. 7/6.

A plea for increased economic interdependence within the Empire.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE. Edited by Hector Bolitho. New York: Batsford, 1948, 246 p. $6.00.

Many parts of the empire described by diverse authors, with varying degrees of competence and timeliness. Illustrations.

IRELAND AMONG THE NATIONS. By Basil Clancy. Tralee: The Kerryman, 1948, 103 p. 5/.

Brief lectures and essays intended to orient the Irish citizen in world affairs.

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS. By Hugh Shearman. London: Faber, 1948, 288 p. 16/.

An honest effort to produce an even-handed history of relations that have not been noted for their felicity.

ON BEING CANADIAN. By Vincent Massey. Toronto: Dent, 1948, 198 p. $3.00.

Essays on the nature of Canadian nationalism and on the Dominion's position among the nations.

THE CANADIAN JAPANESE AND WORLD WAR II. By Forrest E. La Violette. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1948, 332 p. $3.75.

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"A sociological and psychological account" of their behavior, interesting when compared with the wartime story of the Nisei in the United States.

BOTHA, SMUTS AND SOUTH AFRICA. By Basil Williams. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 216 p. $2.00.
A readable summary of the last half-century of South African history.

IN SEARCH OF SOUTH AFRICA. By H. V. Morton. New York: Dodd, 1948, 359 p. $4.00.
A record of recent travel largely devoid of politics and the race question.

THE BRITISH ACHIEVEMENT IN INDIA. By H. G. Rawlinson. London: Hodge, 1948, 248 p. 15/.
A reminder of the solid benefits conferred by British rule.

NETAJI'S LIFE AND WRITINGS. By Subhas Chandra Bose. Calcutta: Thacker and Spink, 1948, 2 v. Rs. 15.
Part I is the autobiography of Bose from 1897 to 1920; Part II is his "The Indian Struggle," written while he was an exile in Europe. The latter presents Bose's interpretation of Indian political events from 1920 to 1934. It was published in London during 1935, but its circulation in India was rigorously suppressed by the British authorities. This is thus the first Indian edition of the work of a most controversial figure.

MUSLIM LEAGUE, YESTERDAY AND TODAY. By A. B. Rajput. Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1948, 288 p. Rs. 8.
A pro-Moslem account of recent Indian political history, by a onetime President of the Council of State.

GANDHI LIVES. By Marc Edmund Jones. Philadelphia: McKay, 1948, 184 p. $3.00.
An appreciation of Gandhi's rôle as leader and thinker.

The Near East

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST FROM THE RISE OF ISLAM TO MODERN TIMES. By George E. Kirk. London: Methuen, 1948, 301 p. 16/.
A competent summary stressing the last century, with some attention to economic and social trends.

KURDS AND KURDISTAN. By Arshak Safrastian. London: Harvill, 1948, 106 p. 7/6.
Though the author is an Armenian scholar, he presents the Kurds' claim to a glorious past and describes their modern nationalist movement with sympathy.

BRETTON WOODS ANLAŞMASI VE TÜRKIYE. By Targan Hacim Çarikli. Istanbul: The Author, 1947, 214 p. Ltq. 3.50.
A discussion of the nature and background of the Bretton Woods Agreement, followed by a discussion of (1) the war's effect on Turkish currency and (2) the reasons for, and results of, the Ankara government's financial decisions of September 7, 1946.

BRITISH RULE IN PALESTINE. By Bernard Joseph. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948, 279 p. $3.75.
A critical review of British performance under the mandate, by a Zionist lawyer, currently the Israeli military governor of Jerusalem.

PALESTINE DILEMMA. By Frank C. Sakran. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948, 230 p. $3.25.
An historical review intended to give the Arabs their due.

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THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL: THE DRAMA AS I SAW IT. By Jorge García-Granados. New York: Knopf, 1948, 291 p. $3.00.

Impressions and observations on the work of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine by its Guatemalan member, whose sympathies are with the Zionists.

L'EXPÉRIENCE SIONISTE. By Georges Reutt. Algiers: Riveill, 1948, 231 p. Fr. 350.

Comprehensive data on the Jewish colonization of Palestine.

HAARAVIM B'ERETZ YISRAEL. By J. Waschitz. Merhavya (Israel): Workers' Book Guild, 1947, 400 p.

A survey of cultural, economic and social conditions among Arabs of Palestine, from a Leftist and Zionist point of view.

The Far East

THE WHITE MAN'S PEACE. By No-Yong Park. Boston: Meador, 1948, 252 p. $3.00.

An oriental pays his respects to occidental "peacemaking" in recent years.

RISE OF THE NEW ASIA. By Darshan S. Sangha. Toronto: Progress Books, 1948, 260 p. $3.00.

A young Sikh, who has become a labor union official in Canada, interprets the current anti-imperialist movement among Asiatic peoples.

THERE IS ANOTHER CHINA. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1948, 178 p. $2.75.

Essays on various subjects, written in honor of Chang Poling, noted Chinese educator, by 11 Americans and Hu Shih.

CHANGING CHINA. By Harrison Forman. New York: Crown Publishers, 1948, 337 p. $4.00.

Manifold and somewhat miscellaneous data on China's past and present, illustrated with 250 photographs.

NEW PATHS FOR JAPAN. By Harold Wakefield. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1948, 222 p. $3.75.

This is a sequel, and in part a revision, of "Japan in Defeat," a Chatham House Study Group Report published in 1945. Mr. Wakefield is of the opinion that there exists a very real chance to deflect Japanese history away from the path of militarism.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE FAR EAST. By David J. Dallin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, 398 p. $5.00.

In this sixth of his studies on Soviet policy Mr. Dallin is more convincing in his reconstruction of the events of the prewar period, for which documentation is more ample, than for the last ten years.

LA PAIX AU VIET-NAM. By Jean Bidault. Paris: The Author, 1947, 150 p. Fr. 150.

The Indo-Chinese problem, according to the author, demands a federal solution, tact and patience, and an exemplary degree of French political unity.

Africa

AMMINISTRAZIONE FIDUCIARIA ALL'ITALIA IN AFRICA. Florence: Università degli Studi di Firenze, Centro di Studi Coloniali, 1948, 415 p. L. 1,000.

The proceedings of the Second Conference on Colonial Studies held at Florence in May 1947. The record of the Third Conference of African Studies, which took place

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at Florence early in June 1948, is contained in "Atti del Terzo Convegno di Studi Africani: Firenze, 3–5 Giugno 1948" (same publisher, 1948, 208 p. L. 800).

THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA. By MARGERY PERHAM. London: Faber, 1948, 481 p. 30/.

Unquestionably the most authoritative treatise on the country's social and economic as well as political institutions. Current developments are treated in detail, Ethiopia's international position is described, and there are a documentary appendix, a bibliography and maps.

DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL EMPIRE. VOLUME I. WEST AFRICA. By R. R. KUCZYNSKI. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1948, 821 p. $21.00.

The first of four contemplated studies, this is a monumental statistical analysis of the population problems of the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast and Nigeria.

POLÍTICA INDÍGENA EN GUINEA. By A. YGLESIAS DE LA RIVA. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1947, 366 p. Ptas. 25.

A colonial magistrate presents a comprehensive and authoritative summary of the political, economic, social and cultural organization of Spain's largest colony.

THE UNIFORM OF COLOUR: A STUDY OF WHITE-BLACK RELATIONSHIPS IN SWAZILAND. By HILDA KUPER. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1947, 160 p. 15/.

A social anthropologist's systematic study of the influence of European culture on the natives of Swaziland. Plates and folded map.

Latin America

RURAL MEXICO. By NATHAN L. WHETTEN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, 671 p. $10.00.

A massive synthesis, treating in statistical detail the social, economic, cultural and political life of the great mass of the Mexican people.

BRITAIN AND THE WEST INDIES. By AGNES M. WHITSON AND LUCY FRANCES HORSFALL. London: Longmans, 1948, 87 p. 1/6.

Packed with useful information on the history, government, economy and social problems of the islands.

BRASILE MODERNO. By LUIGI GALVANI. Milan: Cavallotti, 1948, 402 p. L. 700.

A fairly detailed summary of the country, its people and its institutions, by one who lived there between 1936 and 1942.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

Aeronautics

Aspects of United States participation in international civil aviation. Washington, 1948. 118 p. (Dept. of State. International Organization and Conference Series IV, 2.)

Agriculture

European programs of agricultural reconstruction and development. Washington, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1948. 60 p. $1.00.

Fao Commodity series. Washington, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1948. 25¢. each.

3. Livestock and meat. 49 p. *4.* Dairy products. 36 p. *5.* Poultry and eggs. 27 p. *6.* Vegetables and fruits, no. 1. (A study of current problems in Europe.) 34 p. *7.* Rice bulletin, no. 1. 32 p. *8.* Sugar bulletin, no. 1. 29 p.

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